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ABSTRACT 
The 9/11 Commission recommended that the federal government set standards for the 
issuance of identification documents. Insecure identification documents are used to 
engage in fraud against individuals, government institutions, and businesses, and they 
have been used to facilitate terrorism. The federal government has led by enacting the 
REAL ID Act in 2005, which set issuance standards for driver’s licenses and state 
identification documents. Nine years later, only 21 of the 56 states and territories are in 
full compliance. This thesis provides a high-level overview and evaluation of some of the 
major state concerns that have led some jurisdiction to resist REAL ID openly, and others 
to make material, but not yet full compliance. It explores the federal government’s 
response to those concerns; how it has sought to facilitate compliance, and its more 
recent move toward enforcement as it begins to restrict the use of non-compliant 
documents for federal official purposes. The thesis provides case studies of three states to 
illustrate the implementation experience of those states. Finally, it provides an analysis of 
federal efforts to date, and provides recommendations on what the federal government 
might do to address states’ concerns, and reach the goal of full compliance.  
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The attacks of 9/11 served as a wake-up call that the United States (U.S.) was vulnerable 
to terrorism on U.S. soil and that it was unprepared to address that threat. The 9/11 
Commission undertook a thorough examination of how it happened that the nation was 
unprepared and what needed to be done to avoid such a tragedy in the future. It issued a 
limited set of recommendations that it believed to be the most important, and whose 
implementation could make the greatest difference, as stated in the Preface to the 9/11 
Commission Report. One of those recommendations addressed the vulnerability posed by 
insecure birth certificates and identification documents, which enabled the hijackers to 
remain in the United States and board the planes. Noting that secure identification should 
begin in the United States, it recommended that the federal government establish 
standards for the issuance of such documents. That recommendation led to the enactment 
of the REAL ID Act of 2005. The law was, and remains controversial, and its 
implementation through the state driver’s license and ID issuance process has proven 
contentious, difficult, and slow. Nearly nine years after the enactment of REAL ID, only 
21 states and territories are in full compliance with the law’s requirements and another 35 
range from being in or working toward material compliance, or remain in a status of non-
compliance—some defiantly so. The current state of affairs falls short of fulfilling the 
objectives behind the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation. This author sought to 
understand why implementation of the law has proven so difficult, why full 
implementation is desirable, and what the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has 
done and can do to assist states seeking to achieve full compliance. What the author 
discovered is that REAL ID and the problems that it seeks to address are complex, and 
multi-faceted. The issues posed by insecure identity documents and the proposed remedy 
represent a complex homeland security policy and implementation issue with significant 
real life impacts upon individuals, government entities, and institutions, which requires 
much attention, effort, and informed discourse. The existing literature consists of a 
myriad of background documents, advocacy pieces, and assessments of REAL ID by a 
variety of different individuals and entities. This thesis is intended as a resource that can 
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serve as a starting point for those who seek a general overview and background on the 
primary issues surrounding REAL ID, where things stand in regard to state 
implementation, and some possible ways forward. 
 THE THESIS OBJECTIVES AND THE APPROACH 
The objective of this thesis is to examine, through an evaluative and case study 
approach, the principal issues that have contributed to the slow adoption of, and in some 
instances, the active defiance of the law; how DHS has responded to and sought to 
address those issues; and what more can be done to promote full implementation. This 
thesis offers three things to readers: 1) an overview of REAL ID requirements, and a 
high-level examination of the major issues of concern to the states and critics related to 
those requirements, 2) an examination of case studies of three states arrayed along the 
continuum of implementation milestones, ranging from being in full compliance, in 
material compliance, and in non-compliance, and 3) an analysis of the factors that have 
led to the current implementation status, and recommendations for how DHS should 
proceed as it seeks to achieve compliance by the states and territories.  
 THE ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
REAL ID has attracted both proponents and opponents of the law, and it has 
created unlikely alliances, often between liberal entities and those promoting libertarian 
principles that emphasize freedom from government regulation and requirements. On the 
other side, are individuals and entities concerned about the risks of terrorism and 
criminality associated with insecure identity documents, and who favor decisive action by 
the federal government to enhance national and individual security. A place also exists 
for more neutral entities, or evaluators, generally from academia and government entities, 
such as the General Accountability Office, and the Congressional Research Service. The 
fact that the law engenders such a broad range of interests and generates strong views is 
reflective of the difficulty of gaining consensus on the various issues raised by the law. 
Opponents have raised several concerns with the legislation. The principal ones are 
whether the legislation creates a national identification system, whether it poses an 
 xvi 
infringement on state sovereignty, whether it constitutes an unfunded mandate, and 
whether it poses a risk to individual privacy and security of information.  
The federal government, largely through DHS, has sought to rebut or mitigate 
these concerns through the rulemaking process and the associated privacy impact 
assessments, as well as assistance and grants. It has provided an array of tools to assist 
states in verifying the information submitted in support of the applications, and it has 
provided funding directly to the states in support of efforts to build up the verification 
capabilities and providing tools, such as the Systematic Alien Verification for 
Entitlements (SAVE) system, designed to verify the immigration status of individuals, 
and the Electronic Verification of Vital Events (EVVE) system, designed to verify vital 
records information. The individual state grants are designed to help states make the 
necessary modifications to their issuance systems.  
DHS has also postponed the consequences that would fall to individuals holding 
non-REAL ID compliant documents. Those consequences prohibit the acceptance of such 
documents for federal official purposes, such as entry into federal buildings, and the most 
significant effect, the non-acceptance of such documents for purposes of boarding 
commercial aircraft. It has created the concept of material compliance, which rewards 
states moving toward compliance by allowing their documents to continue to be used for 
federal purposes, principally to board commercially regulated aircraft. Yet, it has also 
determined that it will begin to enforce the requirements. 
State reaction has been mixed and has ranged from states that sought to be in full 
compliance early in the process, to states that have taken important, but not complete 
steps toward full compliance, and states that have openly defied REAL ID, and in some 
cases, have passed laws restricting their ability to comply. The thesis discusses the 
experience of three East Coast states, Delaware, New Jersey, and Maine, to illustrate the 
range of states responses and implementation challenges.  
The thesis also sought to explore additional consequences arising from insecure 
identification documents beyond terrorism, emphasized by the 9/11 Commission in its 
report. In that regard, the thesis explores the role of insecure identification documents in 
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identity fraud and identity theft, a consequence that has had profound effects on 
individuals and government and financial institutions. This issue was addressed, as it is 
important for these additional effects of insecure identity documents to be factored in the 
ongoing implementation effort surrounding REAL ID, particularly as the stark memory 
of 9/11 recedes, and the consequences of fraud and identity theft continue to increase, and 
themselves pose national security risks beyond the consequences to the individual, 
governmental and financial systems.  
This paper undertakes a broad examination of REAL ID, as well as an analysis 
from which the following findings have emerged.  
• REAL ID is a necessary and appropriate tool to address the problem of 
insecure identities 
• DHS has worked to address the range of concerns raised by critics 
regarding the legislation and its implementation challenges, but must do 
more 
• REAL ID is not a national ID but caution is warranted 
• REAL ID does not violate Tenth Amendment principles or constitute an 
unfunded mandate, but funding is a key issue for the states  
• Privacy and safeguarding of private information are important 
considerations and are being addressed  
As DHS continues to work to have states achieve full compliance, some lessons 
and recommendations can guide DHS’ future efforts.  
• Engage with members of the general public to educate them on the 
importance of document security efforts 
• Partner with states that are in full compliance with REAL ID and/or are 
striving to be in compliance and recruit state leaders who support REAL 
ID as national spokespersons 
• DHS should dispel myths associated with REAL ID and actively respond 
to critics 
• Undertake annual reporting on state progress on Real ID and outcomes 
within individual states 
• Use enforcement as an opportunity to persuade and build alliances and 
avoid deepening divisions, while preparing for litigation 
• Commit to REAL ID, and show that commitment through active 
assistance and funding 
 xviii 
 CONCLUSION 
The federal government has sought to implement the 9/11 Commission’s 
recommendation and has set federal standards for the issuance of driver’s licenses and 
state identification documents. The task of achieving full implementation of REAL ID 
through the adoption of those standards by the 56 states and territories has proven to be 
more challenging, and the timeframe more lengthy than many may have anticipated. The 
complex policy and implementation issues arising from REAL ID are important, difficult, 
and DHS must continue to address them with careful consideration and meaningful 
action. REAL ID can be seen as promoting the security of society, and protecting 
individuals, as well as government and private institutions, from a range of negative 
stemming from insecure documents. These range from more simple forms of identity 
theft leading to inconvenience, to more serious forms of fraud and identity theft resulting 
in significant financial impacts on individuals and institutions, and ultimately, the most 
serious consequence—terrorism. The challenge that remains is to achieve full compliance 
so that weak links in the nation’s identity issuance system do not compromise the whole 
system and contribute to an insecure document issuance system. The journey has been 
long and the final destination on the road to full compliance with REAL ID has not been 
reached—but the destination is within sight.  
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Insecurity about the true identity of those with whom we interact, and concerns 
about the type of fraud and systemic vulnerabilities that facilitated the ability of the 9/11 
hijackers to remain in the United States and travel, have forced American society to 
grapple with the issue of the security of identity documents and the consequences that 
would flow from requirements to enhance the security of the identity document issuance 
system. 
This thesis explains that current discussion, and describes the threats that an 
insecure identity document issuance system poses to national security, to the identity 
security of individuals, and the security of commercial and other transactions in U.S. 
society. It also examines the thorny and complex policy and implementation issues 
surrounding the REAL ID Act (REAL ID).1 Finally, it examines the progress made to 
date under the current legislation, examines the implementation efforts of sample states 
as case studies, and looks at efforts of the federal government to facilitate full 
compliance. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis seeks to answer the following: whether, despite protestations by the 
states, the REAL ID Act is a necessary and effective solution to the problem of insecure 
driver’s licenses and identity documents and whether it does so in a way that addresses 
concerns, such as privacy issues and concerns about a de facto national ID system, 
whether its existence has had the salutary effect of dragging the states, slowly but surely, 
toward more secure documents, and possible full compliance with the Act, and whether 
implementing REAL ID shows promise as an effective mechanism to help address the 
problem of identity theft. This paper explores the progress of state implementation efforts 
and identifies factors that have contributed to the success of the states that have been 
found by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to be in compliance with the 
1 The REAL ID Act of 2005, Public Law 109–13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302, 2005, REAL ID Public 
Law.pdf. 
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legislation, as compared to states not in compliance, and some effects of REAL ID within 
the compliant states. Finally, it also examines efforts by DHS and the federal government 
to promote compliance, and makes recommendations as to what more the federal 
government should do to have the states achieve full implementation.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This country’s ability to verify the true identity of persons is critical to the 
protection of the nation and its people from a variety of threats to national, individual, 
and economic security. The terrorist attacks inflicted upon the United States on 9/11 
dramatically illustrated this problem when it was determined that all or nearly all of the 
hijackers had obtained identity documents in the form of driver’s licenses and identity 
documents, to embed themselves in the United States; six of the hijackers used the state 
issued identity documents as proof of identity in boarding the aircraft, and three of those 
documents were fraudulent. The national security nexus is only one aspect of the problem 
posed by insecure identity documents; it also includes the growing problem of identity 
theft, and fraud perpetrated upon government, financial institutions, and business entities.  
The events of 9/11 provided an opening and an imperative for the federal 
government to set standards for the issuance of state driver’s licenses and identification 
documents. Prior to that time, standards for such documents were set by the states, and 
were governed by no national standards.2 Following the attacks, and consistent with 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, Congress passed the REAL ID Act, in May 
2005, which set federal standards for the issuance of state identity documents, to include 
driver’s licenses and state identification cards. Addressing insecure documents poses 
significant policy issues. Among them are the proper balance between the power of the 
federal government and the authority reserved to the states, and concerns about 
establishing an actual or de facto national identity document. This paper examines the 
various criticisms of the REAL ID, as well as its benefits and contributes to the issue by 
consolidating the literature and addressing how the implementation efforts have 
2 Michael J. Garcia, Margaret M. Lee, and Todd Tatelman, Immigration: Analysis of the Major 
Provisions of the REAL ID Act of 2005 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 25, 2005), 
38, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA453701. 
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negatively or positively impacted individual and societal considerations associated with 
identity security, as well as exploring key policy issues and implementation challenges. 
Nearly nine years have elapsed since the enactment of REAL ID and state 
implementation efforts have been uneven and inconsistent, ranging from full compliance, 
steady progress toward compliance, to active defiance. On December 20, 2013, DHS 
announced that it had certified 21 states as being in full compliance with REAL ID; in 
other words, those states had met the minimum standards under the legislation for 
improving the security of state issued driver’s licenses and identification cards.3 DHS 
further indicated that it had granted extensions to another 20 states and territories that had 
submitted information indicating that they were on the pathway to full implementation.4 
Through its announcement, DHS also stated that beginning in 2014, it would begin “an 
achievable schedule” for the “phased enforcement” of REAL ID.5 News reports at the 
time indicated that two states, Arizona and Pennsylvania, had failed to submit status 
reports on their compliance efforts.6  
This paper also begins to address the knowledge gap that exists relative to the 
implementation efforts of the states and the issues, impediments, and in some cases, 
successes they have had. It accomplishes this task through illustrative case studies of 
three states, including a state that has achieved full compliance with REAL ID 
(Delaware), in contrast to a state that has actively resisted compliance with the law, 
(Maine), and a state that had made efforts to achieve compliance but whose efforts to 
comply were thwarted by litigation designed to prevent compliance with the law (New 
Jersey).  
The paper explores the potential benefits of REAL ID beyond the federal 
purposes specified in the legislation, specifically, benefits in addressing problems, such 
as identity theft. It also discusses some of the efforts that have been made by the federal 




6 Reuters, “REAL ID Enforcement Begins in 2014, 21 States Compliant,” December 20, 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/csdl-dhs-real-id-act-idUSnPnDCfLrqh+168+PRN20131220. 
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government to assist the states in achieving compliance through grants awarded, the 
availability of tools to facilitate verification of the documents and information used to 
obtain licenses and identification documents. It discusses recent efforts by the federal 
government to enforce compliance deadlines. Finally, the paper recommends additional 
measures that DHS can take to encourage compliance.  
This effort is worthy of graduate level research because the issues that REAL ID 
seeks to address are multi-faceted, the remedy is controversial and expensive, seen by 
many as unproven, and is alleged to impact individual and states’ rights adversely. In 
short, the problem of insecure documents, and REAL ID as the identified solution, 
represents a complex homeland security policy and implementation issue with significant 
real life impacts upon individuals, government entities, and institutions, which 
necessitates much attention, effort, and informed discourse. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States sought to address vulnerabilities in its 
issuance of state driver’s licenses and identity documents to ensure that such documents 
were not used to enable terrorists to embed themselves in the United States using false 
identities. The United States did so by enacting legislation known as the REAL ID Act of 
2005 (REAL ID), which required the federal government to set standards for the issuance 
of driver’s licenses and state issued identification documents.7  
This literature review explores the treatment of some of those issues, by focusing 
on views reflecting the competing camps that examine the balance between security 
versus privacy and civil liberties, the federalism issues implicated by federal action 
versus states’ rights, and the question about whether REAL ID establishes a national ID. 
It begins to explore literature on the technology utilized, the interoperability 
requirements, and how the discussions regarding the risks to privacy are being affected. 
Also touched upon in this thesis, and being further explored, is literature on the 
implementation challenges being faced by the states to include what obstacles they face 
7 The REAL ID Act of 2005. 
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in terms of compliance, and how, at the state level, they are addressing or not addressing 
the privacy concerns raised by REAL ID. 
D. ARGUMENTS AND CLAIMS BY PROPONENTS AND OPPONENTS 
A number of proponents and opponents have spoken or written about the policy 
and legal issues posed by REAL ID. These concerns are reflected in the literature that has 
surrounded the enactment of the law and the subsequent efforts to modify its provisions, 
as well as efforts to repeal it and pass alternative legislation. The discussion in public 
forums, such as the news, in Congress, in think tank discussions, and the debate 
emanating from written commentary and scholarly writings, breaks down principally into 
two divergent philosophies on the issue of identity and document management, and one 
more neutral position taken by some commentators. On one side are those who favor a 
stronger role of government through standards and such in the management of identity 
related documents, such as driver’s licenses and identity cards. This paper refers to this 
group as the secure identity/law and order camp. The reasons these individuals and 
groups offer in support of REAL ID generally fall into the areas of: 1) enhancing security 
generally, including more specifically preventing terrorism, 2) favoring REAL ID as a 
way to address the problem of identity theft due to its effects on individuals and society, 
and 3) favoring REAL ID as a means to hamper other forms of criminality and adverse 
effects on society, such as those stemming from the use of false identity documents, 
underage drinking, or the avoidance of legal obligations like child support or 
unauthorized employment.8  
On the other side are those opposed to such government efforts due to concerns 
about a government that encroaches on people’s individual rights, puts privacy at risk, 
and violates states’ rights by having government impose standards in violation of 10th 
Amendment principles, and does so in a way that creates unfunded mandates on the 
states. The camp opposed to REAL ID has posed several arguments against the 
legislation and its implementation. Principal among them is that REAL ID is a national 
8 Janice Kephart, “Repealing REAL ID? Rolling Back Driver’s License Security,” Backgrounder, 
Center for Immigration Studies, June 2009. 
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ID by another name.9 Other concerns relate to the presumed illegality of such a program, 
its privacy implications, concern about governmental abuses of power, and the costs of 
implementing the law’s requirements. This paper refers to this group as the 
libertarian/privacy/states’ rights camp. 
In between the two, or at least not explicitly taking sides, is a more neutral group 
that neither explicitly supports nor opposes REAL ID, but instead employs a more 
rigorous, evaluative mode offering assessments and recommendations. This paper refers 
to this group as the researchers/evaluators. 
1. The Secure Identity/Law and Order Camp 
The principal representative of this camp is Janice Kephart, currently, a National 
Security Fellow, and formerly, the Director of National Security Policy at the Center for 
Immigration Studies, a Washington, DC think tank that focuses on immigration issues.10 
Ms. Kephart has published numerous articles on this issue, none of which focus 
exclusively or even primarily on the immigration implications of REAL ID as her current 
affiliation might suggest.11 The law and order/secure identity camp approach the issue 
from two principal positions. One is that non-secure state identification documents are 
vulnerable to misuse by individuals posing a national security threat to the United States, 
and why it is imperative that REAL ID be implemented to reduce the risk of terrorists 
9 Electronic Privacy Information Center, REAL ID Implementation Review: Few Benefits, Staggering 
Costs: Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security’s National ID Program, May 2008, 3. 
[Hereinafter EPIC: Real ID Implementation Review]. See also Daniel J. Steinbock, “Fourth Amendment 
Limits on National Identity Cards,” in Privacy and Technologies of Identity: A Cross-disciplinary 
Conversation, ed. Katherine Jo Strandburg and Daniela Stan Raicu, CIPLIT Symposium on Privacy and 
Identity: The Promise and Perils of a Technological Age (New York: Springer Science+Business Media, 
2006). (Steinbock cites in footnote 1 to various articles from the last 20 years in which conversations 
regarding national IDs are referenced. 
10 Ms. Kephart is a particularly prolific writer in support of REAL ID and brings to the issue her past 
perspective as counsel to the 9/11 Commission. 
11 Kephart has authored at least five articles on behalf of the Center for Immigration Studies related to 
REAL ID: Janice Kephart, “REAL ID Final Rules: A Summary,” Center for Immigration Studies, March 
2008; Janice Kephart, “The Appearance of Security, REAL ID Final Regulations vs. Pass ID Act of 2009,” 
Backgrounder, Center for Immigration Studies, April 2009; Kephart, “Repealing REAL ID? Rolling Back 
Driver’s License Security”; Janice Kephart, “REAL ID Implementation: Less Expensive, Doable, and 
Helpful in Reducing Fraud,” Center for Immigration Studies, January 2011, http://cis.org/real-id. 
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using identity documents to embed themselves in society and go unnoticed.12 The second 
general theme is that identity documents must be made secure to reduce the ever-growing 
threat of identity theft given the implications that it has for individuals and the security of 
commercial and governmental transactions. This camp sees strengthening the security of 
identity documents as a win-win for society and for the individual. As noted by one 
member, “[c]reating a secure identity document is needed to help keep America safe, 
free, and prosperous.”13 Members of this camp dispute the notion that the REAL ID 
provisions establish a national ID by noting that implementing the law does not require 
any aggregation of data into a centralized database operated by the federal government.14 
It should be noted that allied members of this camp also include outspoken advocates of a 
national ID system. However, the reasons they support such a system are similar to those 
that see direct and indirect benefits of greater security in identity documents that further, 
in their view, national security and the prevention of terrorism.15 
Finally, the federal government, under the administration of President George W. 
Bush, should also be considered a member of the secure identity/law and order camp. 
While no longer in office, and largely silent in the current debate, its engagement on the 
issue indicates agreement with the general positions of this camp. It rejected the idea that 
REAL ID was creating a de facto national ID system, noting in its privacy impact 
assessment (PIA) issued in conjunction with the final rule, the preamble to the rule stated, 
“DHS does not intend that a REAL ID document become a de facto national ID based on 
the actions of others outside of DHS to limit their acceptance of an identity document to a 
REAL ID-compliant driver’s license or identification card.”16 The PIA further noted that 
neither the law nor the final rule expressly create a centralized database of all drivers’ 
12 Federation for Immigration Reform, “Identity and Immigration Status of 9/11 Terrorists (2011),” 
November 2011, http://www.fairus.org/issue/identity-and-immigration-status-of-9-11-terrorists. 
13 James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., “Web Memo: DHS Gets REAL ID Right,” The Heritage Foundation, 
February 7, 2008, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/02/dhs-gets-real-id-right. 
14 Kephart, “Repealing REAL ID? Rolling Back Driver’s License Security,” 4. 
15 Alan Dershowitz, “Thinking About National ID Cards,” May 2002, http://triton.towson.edu/ 
~swartout/cosc311/dershowitz2.htm. 
16 Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the REAL ID Final Rule, January 
11, 2008, 6. 
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information.17 It should be noted that the Bush administration recognized that certain 
risks were inherent in implementing REAL ID. Its PIA addressed the various privacy and 
security concerns raised during the rulemaking process and developed a set of 
recommendations for the states to follow in implementing REAL ID. Known as “Best 
Practices for the Protection of Personally Identifiable Information Associated with State 
Implementation of the Real ID Act,” these recommendations were included as an 
appendix to the PIA.18 
Overall, the law and order/secure identity camp is comprised of more 
conservative think tanks and writers, which generally support strengthened measures to 
enhance national security, and have greater confidence in a system that issues identity 
documents at the state level through adherence to common standards, rather than through 
the current individual state standards approach administered as rigorously or loosely as 
individual states determine.  
2. The Libertarian/Privacy/States’ Rights Camp 
The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) issued its review of the 
proposed implementation of the REAL ID Act in May 2008. Its arguments are 
representative of those raised by those who oppose REAL ID, although EPIC can be seen 
as taking a “kitchen sink” approach on identifying every conceivable argument that any 
opponent of REAL ID might raise. The arguments fall into seven basic areas. First, that 
REAL ID represents an effort to establish a national ID system, despite numerous 
historical and more current expressions of Congress’ opposition to such a system when it 
established DHS. Second, REAL ID was passed with little public input, and when the 
rulemaking process afforded an opportunity to comment, over 21,000 public comments 
were received with a multitude of organizations collaborating to express their opposition 
to a program resisted by state governments, civil liberties advocates, and security experts. 
Third, it is an involuntary program imposed upon the states, and thus, an unfunded 
mandate. Fourth, the standards for documentation that must be submitted to the states, for 
17 Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the REAL ID Final Rule. 
18 Ibid., 17, attachment A. 
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states to verify an individual’s identity prior to issuing state documents create burdens for 
many segments of society that may not be able to produce underlying documents, and 
necessary exceptions have not been provided for in the program. Fifth, problems with the 
regulations’ data verification procedures have not been addressed, such as availability, 
data integrity, and the role of state DMV employees becoming enforcers of immigration 
laws. Sixth, the necessary privacy protections established by the federal government do 
not exist, which leaves this important issue to the states with numerous insider and 
outsider threats to the privacy of the information remaining unaddressed. Seventh, REAL 
ID creates new national security risks as the rules allow individuals to use a foreign 
passport to access the facilities to which a REAL ID would provide access. 
The ACLU, arguably the most well-known entity advocating on the issue of civil 
rights, has provided its own assessment of REAL ID, and echoes many, if not all of the 
arguments raised in EPIC’s assessment.19 However, the ACLU’s assessment, reflected in 
a report by its New York affiliate, the New York Civil Liberties Union, is not as worthy 
of serious consideration given its alarmist, exaggerated, and at times, inaccurate, 
presentation of the REAL ID provisions. By way of example, it presents a hyperbolic 
discussion—even extending to the title, “Government Spying on Americans’ Everyday 
Activities,” and includes the statement, “Under a REAL ID regime, Americans will be 
forced to go through an endless series of electronic checkpoints in the course of their 
daily routines.” Later in the same document in its section entitled, “A History of 
Government Abuse and Data Mining,” it makes the following statement: “The REAL ID 
system is the next massive surveillance scheme designed to allow the government to 
collect large amounts of information on Americans’ lives with little oversight by 
Congress of the public.20  
Also, writers in academic journals criticize the federal government’s efforts to 
establish uniform standards for driver’s license and identification documents. One 
representative journal has noted that the effort will result in a de facto national ID card, 
19 New York Civil Liberties Union, No Freedom Without Privacy: The Real ID Act’s Assault on 
Americans’ Everyday Life, February 2009. 
20 Ibid., 16–18. 
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and will facilitate a “function creep” that adversely implicates privacy, noting that doing 
so under national security justifications reflects either “function creep or ignorance.”21  
3. The Researchers/Evaluators Camp 
The researchers/evaluators approach the issue from the framework of legal 
analysis (researchers), or examination of issues related to or directly impacted by REAL 
ID (evaluators). The researchers in this literature review are lawyers. They 
understandably addressed legal considerations posed by a national ID system. A 
consensus appears to exist that it is likely that the REAL ID framework itself does not 
actually establish a national ID; yet, it may make such a phenomenon more likely.22 A 
central concern of the researchers is the need for dialogue on the issue of national ID 
cards based on their view that given the substantial and powerful advocacy in favor of 
national identity cards, “we will have a national debate on ID cards, if we are lucky; if 
we’re unlucky, we’ll dispense with the debate and go straight to the cards and the 
database.”23  
In terms of the legal constraints, some believe that given a recent Supreme Court 
precedent decision involving requests for individuals to identify themselves during a 
Terry stop, that it might be likely for the Court to uphold a requirement for individuals to 
present, upon request, an identification document.24 The principal concern relative to the 
Fourth Amendment is that the decision may have changed the psychological dynamic 
between citizens and police, and that it may make it more likely that the country will 
adopt a national ID.  
In general, the researchers seem less concerned about the fact that the federal 
government is setting standards, or even that it is running a centralized database—and 
21 Serge Egelman and Lorri Faith Cranor, “The REAL ID Act: Fixing Identity Documents With Duct 
Tape,” I/S A Journal of Law and Policy 2, no. 1 (2006). 
22 Steinbock, “Fourth Amendment Limits on National Identity Cards,” in Privacy and Technologies of 
Identity: A Cross-disciplinary Conversation. (Steinbock cites in footnote 1 to various articles from the last 
20 years in which conversations regarding national IDs are referenced. 
23 A. Michael Froomkin, “The Uneasy Case for national ID Cards,” in Securing Privacy in the Internet 
Age, ed. A. Chander, L. Gelman, and M. J. Radin (Stanford: Stanford Law Books, 2008), 295–321.  
24 Ibid., 295–296. 
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they acknowledge that REAL ID does not set up such a database. The researchers assert 
that while many people react negatively to the idea of a government-sponsored national 
ID system, the marginal harms of a well designed national ID system “are fewer than one 
might initially believe given the ways in which invasive technologies are reducing 
personal privacy.”25  
Rather, the concern is that they see that even non-centralized databases, when 
combined with the many private databases containing information on individuals, 
constitutes the equivalent of a national identity system. The researchers would prefer that 
the federal government exercise some type of management of such a vast system of data, 
and regulate its use. It is felt that building protections into such a federally managed 
system could serve to establish rules on the use of the data and provide more protection 
for the data than it would otherwise have. 
There has also been a contribution to the literature on REAL ID by entities that 
can be described as the evaluators or auditors. These contributors, largely government or 
academic entities, suggest that the conversation might be influenced largely by the 
increasing problem of identity theft, which many assert can be curtailed through greater 
efforts to secure the identification document issuance process.26 The problem of identity 
theft is growing, and affects more than 8.1 million Americans who have incurred a mean 
of $631 in costs as a result.27 The ties between identity theft and other types of crimes, 
such as credit card fraud, document fraud, and employment fraud, are recognized as 
having implications not just for the nation’s economy but also its security.28 In addition 
to identity theft, one source identifies weaknesses in the individual taxpayer identification 
number program (ITINs), which indicates that the application process for ITINs is subject 
to fraud, and that state driver’s license bureaus are allowing ITINs to be used by illegal 
25 Froomkin, “The Uneasy Case for national ID Cards,” in Securing Privacy in the Internet Age, 297. 
26 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Driver’s License Security: Federal Leadership Needed to 
Address Remaining Vulnerabilities (2012). 
27 Kristin M. Finklea, Identity Theft: Trends and Issues, CRS Report R40599 (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, February 15, 2012), 1. 
28 Ibid.  
 11 
                                                 
aliens to obtain driver’s licenses, even though ITINs are only to be used only as a 
taxpayer identification number.29 
E. METHODOLOGY/RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design/methodological approach is two-fold, and first encompasses 
an evaluative study of REAL ID and the policy issues surrounding its value and risks, and 
second, an examination of steps taken and obstacles encountered related to its 
implementation, including a focus on the experiences of three states and their approach to 
implementation. The evaluative portion of the thesis examines the law, provides a general 
overview of implementation efforts at the federal and state level, and addresses relevant 
legal, policy, and societal aspects to include civil liberties, federalism, and political and 
pragmatic concerns, such as the law’s effect on document security and identity theft. The 
second part of the thesis discusses implementation issues generally, and illustrates those 
issues using a case study approach examining three different categories of states as 
represented by three states. The experiences of these states demonstrate distinct 
implementation issues and approaches. The thesis discusses how those states dealt with, 
and are continuing to deal with, the law’s implementation and the factors contributing to 
each state’s implementation posture. 
The topic was selected because it presents challenging policy and operational 
issues, and reflects the tension between the desire for greater collective security by 
control of threats to society and to individuals, against the impacts and controversy 
surrounding such post 9/11 policies. It illustrates the dynamic of greater security and the 
resulting pragmatic concerns, such as implementation costs, the gap between the 
technology and the operational needs, the political dynamics surrounding the role of 
federal and state governments, and the allocation of roles and responsibilities between 
federal and state entities.  
29 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, Substantial Changes Are Needed to the 
Individual Taxpayer Identification Number Program to Detect Fraudulent Applications (Washington, DC, 
July 16, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2012reports/201242081fr.html. Another area 
worth exploring but which is beyond the scope of this thesis is what effect enhancing identity documents 
under REAL ID has had on identity theft and related fraud in those states that have implemented the 
provisions of the law, relative to states not yet REAL ID compliant, or that have passed legislation refusing 
to comply with REAL ID. 
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The three states selected for the case study portion of the thesis paper (Delaware, 
Maine, and New Jersey), were selected to illustrate a range of state approaches to the 
implementation of REAL ID, while focusing on a particular region of the country. The 
case studies discuss factors that influenced each state’s approach, and the measures each 
took to implement, or to resist implementing, REAL ID. It also seeks to demonstrate the 
result of each state’s efforts including some benefits and possible negative consequences. 
Delaware represents the states that have been most proactive on implementation, Maine 
would represent states adamantly opposed to implementation, and New Jersey is a state 
that sought implementation, yet faced a tremendous challenge, through litigation that 
ultimately derailed its efforts to comply but not its efforts to improve document security. 
The data sources to be collected and used include the research from various 
sources reflected in the literature review, state and federal documents, and other available 
resources that reflect or comment on the interaction of the states and DHS on 
implementation efforts. Additional data include crime statistics, data related to identity 
theft, and other information regarding the misuse of identity documents in connection 
with crime.  
The method being used is the evaluative and case study mode of analysis. Within 
the scope of the evaluation are specific issues such as: civil liberties; federalism; and the 
tools and assistance made available to states. It also examines the effect of insecure 
identification documents on personal, and financial security, and on the program integrity 
involving federal or state tax, and benefit programs.  
While much has been written about REAL ID, the vast majority of the written 
work and analysis has focused on the events leading to the law’s passage, opposition to 
the law, discussions of the law’s requirements, and the anticipated effects of the on 
privacy and civil liberties of individuals. Only a few works have sought to provide 
updates on the implementation efforts. Fewer still have sought to provide a critical review 
of the issues that have contributed to slow-adoption by the states. No documents have 
been identified by the author that have undertaken case studies examining factors that 
have led certain states to be rapid adopters, and others to continue to resist adoption, and 
how those states have fared. 
 13 
Readers of the thesis have access to a broad-based treatment of REAL ID 
consisting of an overview of its background, its provisions, objectives, and identified 
criticisms. They have a basis to understand better the complexities of efforts to secure 
state driver’s licenses and identification cards, as well as better appreciate the reasons 
why it was important to undertake such an effort. They are exposed to the range of 
practical and political issues surrounding state efforts to implement, or not, REAL ID, 
and the unique implementation challenges that many states faced. More specifically, they 
emerge with a better understanding of the factors that led some states to implement the 
law successfully, while others refused or were prevented from doing so. The thesis can be 
read from start to finish, but its individual chapters can also serve as a brief overview for 
those wanting a general understanding of a variety of distinct issues associated with 
REAL ID, with references to literature in which a more in-depth treatment of a particular 
issue can be found. Two groups of intended readers that could find the thesis particularly 
useful include state officials in states that have not yet achieved full compliance, and 
DHS and federal officials charged with overseeing or evaluating implementation of 
REAL ID. Both groups are able to see the issues associated with REAL ID 
implementation, may identify ways to mitigate concerns, and see the benefits of 
compliance, and how it is best achieved. Finally, other readers who find it useful are 
individuals interested in seeing how a complex policy issue involving both state and 
federal elements can be navigated, and learning what actions can be undertaken to 
implement a complex regulatory structure designed to enhance national and individual 
security. 
F. LIMITS OF THE RESEARCH 
This thesis seeks to provide readers with a source that provides a broad overview 
of the variety of issues surrounding REAL ID, to demonstrate why it a complex 
manifestation of national security policymaking, and to demonstrate the ways it has 
posed implementation challenges for the federal government and the states. Through the 
case studies, it also seeks to give readers a sense of the differing issues confronting states, 
to encompass, practical, political, and social acceptance issues that have played a role in 
how each of the states have approached the issue of REAL ID implementation. While the 
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thesis seeks to consolidate and provide both a macro perspective, and with the case 
studies, a more micro treatment of the implementation challenges, limits to the research 
should be noted in this paper. First, a wealth of information is available on the various 
issues associated with REAL ID. This paper is already quite lengthy, and an adequate 
treatment of the literature would itself require a good-sized book, let alone a lengthy 
thesis. Second, much is not publicly available, such as the exchanges between DHS and 
state officials on each state’s respective implementation efforts. Access to that 
information would be very informative, and would itself be the subject of a truly in-depth 
examination of the implementation challenges for the states. Although that information 
can occasionally be located through mechanisms like Google searches, insufficient 
information is publicly available that would have allowed a discussion of those 
exchanges in this thesis—even as to the three case study states, Delaware, New Jersey 
and Maine. Third, within the last year or so, an issue of particular interest to the author, 
and to many others, has arisen that adds an additional dimension to the discussion. That 
issue is the increasing debate over whether to provide illegal aliens, also referred to as 
undocumented aliens or undocumented immigrants, with state issued driver’s licenses. It 
is an interesting issue in terms of the overall immigration policy debate, but also in the 
context of the discussion over REAL IDs implementation, and the fact that in part, REAL 
ID was also seen as a measure that could address illegal immigration. Most importantly, 
the effect of such policies on the objective of REAL ID, to issue driver’s licenses and 
state identity documents pursuant to consistent federal standards, may be compromised or 
at least complicated. This is because REAL ID requires verifying the status of aliens in 
the country, and only issuing state identity documents to coincide with the period of 
authorized stay. This poses additional issues that may extend to the ability of the law to 
succeed and accomplish its objectives. While such state identity documents will not be 
REAL ID compliant, they potentially complicate, rather than streamline, the document 
issuance process for states and add ambiguity to the overall issue of secure identity 
document that serve federal, state, and institutional purposes. This topic itself is a worthy 
subject for additional treatment by this author, or by others interested in REAL ID, as 
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well as those interested in immigration related policies generally, but is outside of the 
scope of this thesis.  
A further limit on the research is that while the three case study states demonstrate 
a variety of approaches to REAL ID and a set of unique challenges, the way the three 
states have approached implementation, and their unique issues, can only demonstrate so 
much. Ideally, the author would have liked to undertake a case study of each of the states 
and territories and then grouped an analysis of those case studies into more significant 
trends, lessons learned, and best practices. The academic calendar and the ambitiousness 
of such a project put a check on the author’s natural tendencies to want to tackle that 
issue. However, the next project is always available. 
 16 
II. REAL ID AS A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF 
INSECURE IDENTITY DOCUMENTS  
The REAL ID Act can be traced to the aftermath of 9/11, when it became 
apparent that the hijackers had acquired numerous licenses or identification documents 
from different states and used those documents to embed themselves into U.S. society, 
and ultimately, to board the aircraft used in the attacks. The National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission), in its principal report, 
and in the associated Staff Report entitled 9/11 and Terrorist Travel: A Staff Report of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, provided detailed 
information regarding the travel of the hijackers.30 According to the 9/11 Commission, 
all the pilots, and 14 of the 15 operatives, had acquired one or multiple forms of state 
issued identification documents.31 As noted in the Staff Report, having those documents 
would have “assisted them in boarding commercial flights, renting cars, and other 
necessary activities.”32 (See Appendix A for a detailed listing of the state driver’s 
licenses and identification documents obtained by the 9/11 hijackers.) As a result of its 
findings, the 9/11 Commission made the following recommendation:  
Recommendation: Secure identification should begin in the United States. 
The federal government should set standards for the issuance of birth 
certificates and sources of identification, such as drivers licenses. Fraud in 
identification documents is no longer just a problem of theft. At many 
entry points to vulnerable facilities, including gates for boarding aircraft, 
sources of identification are the last opportunity to ensure that people are 
who they say they are and to check whether they are terrorists.33  
30 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Authorized Edition 
(Westminster, MD: SOHO Books, as released by the U.S. Government, 2010). 
31 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel: A 
Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Franklin, TN: 
Hillsboro Press, 2004), 13, 44. 




                                                 
The REAL ID Act passed with no debate on its provisions, and was attached to a bill 
dealing with tsunami relief and military appropriations.34 The easy part, it seems, was 
passing the law; the greater difficulty lay in maintaining consensus after its passage, 
when the Bush administration sought to implement the provisions through the federal 
rulemaking process, during which it received and addressed over 21,000 public 
comments.35  
The principal elements of REAL ID relate to standards that the law charged the 
federal government with promulgating for state-issued driver’s licenses and identification 
cards to be accepted for an “official purpose.”36 The REAL ID Act defines “official 
purpose” as including accessing federal facilities, boarding federally regulated 
commercial aircraft, entry into nuclear power plants, and such other purposes as 
established by the Secretary Homeland Security.37 DHS issued the final regulations on 
January 29, 2008.38 They included standards on “the information and security features 
that must be incorporated into each card; application information to establish the identity 
and lawful status of an applicant before a card can be issued; and physical security 
standards for the locations issuing driver’s licenses and identification cards.”39 
The generally acknowledged purpose of such efforts was to address the myriad 
issues that arise from the increasing uncertainty that exists regarding the identity of the 
persons who interact with the government, with commercial systems, and with all 
34 Electronic Privacy Information Center, REAL ID Implementation Review: Few Benefits, Staggering 
Costs: Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security’s National ID Program, 3.  
35 “Department of Homeland Security, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Minimum Standards for 
Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 72 Fed 
Reg. 10,819,” Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2007, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2007-03-09/html/07-
1009.htm; Department of Homeland Security, “Final Rule, Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and 
Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 73 Fed. Reg. 5271,” January 
29, 2008, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2008-01-29/html/08-140.htm. 
36 EPIC: Real ID Implementation Review. 
37 The REAL ID Act of 2005, 312. 
38 Department of Homeland Security, “Final Rule.” 
39 Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the REAL ID Final Rule. 
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Americans in their daily lives or interact with others through identity theft.40 Balanced 
against greater assurances of identity document security, and the true identity of those 
dealt with in society are the weighty concerns relating to information security, privacy, 
and liberty. REAL ID’s enactment and the related implementation efforts have raised 
numerous questions including whether it serves to create a form of national ID, whether it 
raises substantial constitutional and privacy concerns, and whether acceptable alternatives 
exist. 
The use of fraudulently obtained identity documents by several of the 9/11 
hijackers is relatively well known, but it is not the only example. A report, prepared by 
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and 
Homeland Security, shortly before the enactment of REAL ID illustrates the role that 
insecure documents play in national security concerns. 
One area of concern to the Subcommittee is document security and 
terrorist use of identity theft . . . Since 1998, the Subcommittee has held 
seven hearings on identity theft and fraud. (citation omitted) During a 
Subcommittee hearing in 2002, Dennis Lormel, Chief of the FBI’s 
Terrorist Financial Review Group, testified that identity theft was a ‘key 
catalyst’ for terrorist groups. (citation omitted) He said that identity theft 
posed an ‘alarming” threat and that ‘terrorists have long utilized identity 
theft as well as Social Security Number fraud to enable them to obtain . . . 
cover employment and access to secure locations.’ (citation omitted) 
It is clear from the GAO’s report that terrorists and other dangerous 
criminals can pass as U.S. citizens or steal American identities with 
alarming ease. Robert Cramer, the Managing Director of the GAO, who 
oversaw the investigations, testified, ‘The weaknesses we found during 
these investigations clearly show that border inspectors, motor vehicle 
departments, and firearms dealers need to have the means to verify 
identity and to determine whether out-of-state driver’s licenses presented 
to them are authentic.’(citation omitted). 
John Pistole, Acting Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism 
Division, said that terrorists have long committed identity theft and 
misused Social Security numbers to infiltrate the United States. (citation 
omitted) Social Security number fraud has enabled them ‘to obtain such 
40 The Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies, George Washington University, “Communitarian 
Update #48» Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies,” September 24, 2002, http://icps.gwu.edu/ 
contact/mailing-list/communitarian-letter-archives/communitarian-update-48/. 
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things as cover employment and access to secure locations.’ (citations 
omitted) Once Social Security numbers and driver’s licenses are obtained, 
bank and credit-card accounts, through which terrorism financing is 
facilitated, are easily accessed. (citations omitted) 
Chairman Kyl said that the GAO’s investigation ‘shows a dangerous lapse 
in the ability of state and federal employees to detect and deter document 
fraud, which is often the first step terrorists must take to assimilate 
themselves in the United States and form sleeper cells.41 
The final regulations issued by DHS on January 29, 2008, included standards on “the 
information and security features that must be incorporated into each card; application 
information to establish the identity and lawful status of an applicant before a card can be 
issued; and physical security standards for the locations issuing driver’s licenses and 
identification cards.”42  
A. THE REAL ID DOCUMENT SECURITY ELEMENTS 
Under the REAL ID Act, the states must adhere to the federally developed 
standards in their issuance of state-issued driver’s licenses and identification cards in 
order for their state issued documents to be accepted for an “official purpose” under the 
Act.43 The final regulations issued by DHS included, among other things, standards on 
“the information and security features that must be incorporated into each card.”44 That 
requirement was intended to make the documents themselves more secure and 
tamperproof. In that regard, REAL ID requires that state issued driver’s licenses and 
identification documents contain the following elements. 
 
41 United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and 
Homeland Security: Three Years After September 11: Keeping America Safe (Washington, DC, March 
2005). 
42 Department of Homeland Security, Final Rule; Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact 
Assessment for the REAL ID Final Rule. 
43 Department of Homeland Security, Final Rule. The REAL ID Act defines “official purpose” as 
including accessing federal facilities, boarding federally regulated commercial aircraft, gaining entry into 
nuclear power plants, and such other purposes as established by the Secretary of Homeland Security. 
44 Ibid. In general, the requirements upon the states fell within three general areas: 1) certain 
information that must be contained within the documents, 2) certain issuance standards for the documents, 
and 3) certain other practices that states were required to adopt that generally addressed the integrity of the 
issuance process. 
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• The person’s full legal name 
• The person’s date of birth 
• The person’s gender 
• The person’s driver’s license or identification card number 
• A digital photograph of the person 
• The person’s address of principal residence 
• The person’s signature 
• Physical security features designed to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, 
or duplication of the document for fraudulent purposes 
• A common machine–readable technology, with defined minimum data 
element45 
Balanced against greater assurances of identity document security and the true 
identity of those dealt with in society, are the weighty concerns relating to information 
security, privacy, and liberty. DHS entered the debate in a significant way with the 
introduction and passage of the REAL ID Act. REAL ID, as it has become known, has 
come under assault by a number of states, which have resisted its implementation on 
multiple grounds, including as an unfunded mandate, as an intrusion into state 
sovereignty, and as the creation of an insecure national ID system that imperils the 
privacy of their citizens. This thesis elaborates on those various concerns in subsequent 
chapters.  
This chapter discusses the changes REAL ID sought to make to improve the 
security of state identification documents, and also puts REAL ID into context by 
discussing how REAL ID fits into the recent federal efforts to address the integrity of 
identification documents. REAL ID represents a significant, bold, and controversial step 
by the federal government to address document security. However, it is not the first time 
that the federal government had sought to address the problem of insecure identity 
documents through the setting of standards. Two previous, recent legislative efforts are 
worth noting.  
45 The REAL ID Act of 2005, Section 202(b). 
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B. DOCUMENT SECURITY AND PREVIOUS LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS, 
DOCUMENT SECURITY PROVISIONS OF IIRIRA 
Concerns about the security of identity documents preceded the experience of 
9/11. One previous effort, and an early precursor of REAL ID, came with Congress’ 
passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
known as (IIRIRA).46 While largely focused on immigration reforms, it contained a 
provision related to document security—Section 656(b) entitled State-Issued Driver’s 
Licenses and Comparable Identification Documents. That provision, like REAL ID, 
required federal agencies only to accept documents as proof of identity that conformed to 
federally established requirements for secure documents. In the case of IIRIRA, those 
standards were to be set forth in regulations issued by the Secretary of Transportation.47 
The document security provision had three basic elements. First, applicants for driver’s 
licenses and identification cards would be required to submit such documents for 
verification of identity as required by regulations issued by the Secretary of 
Transportation, following consultation with the American Association of Motor Vehicle 
Administrators (AAMVA).48 Second, the driver’s license or identification documents 
were to be in a form consistent with requirements set forth in regulations promulgated by 
the Secretary of Transportation, again after consultation with AAMVA. In general, the 
documents were to contain security features designed to limit tampering, counterfeiting, 
photocopying, or otherwise duplicating, the driver’s license or identification document 
for fraudulent purposes and to limit their use by imposters. Third, the state driver’s 
licenses and identity documents were to include an electronic version of the Social 
Security number (SSN), unless certain conditions were met to include verifying the SSN 
with the Social Security Administration.49 The Department of Transportation (DOT) 
46 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Public Law 104–209, 
Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009, 1996, REAL ID Public Law.pdf. 
47 Ibid., Section 656(b)(1)(A)(iii). 
48 AAMVA, which is an association of the nation’s motor vehicle administrators, has been an active 
and vocal advocate for the need to improve the security of state driver’s licenses and identity documents. It 
is generally recognized that its report, issued in 2004, AAMVA DL/ID Security Framework, was a 
significant influence on the passage of REAL ID.  
49 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Section 656; Garcia, 
Lee, and Tatelman, Immigration, 38. See footnote 117. 
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published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on June 17, 1998, to implement the 
document security provisions. The proposed rule also provided that states would be 
required to self-certify by October 1, 2000, that they were in full compliance with the 
regulations.50 
In addition to the security features, and provisions related to the SSN issues, the 
proposed rule required the submission of one primary document and one secondary 
document. The primary documents would establish identity, and the secondary 
documents would be used to help to verify or confirm that identity. It was DOT’s 
intention to publish the list of acceptable documents as appendices to the final rule and 
update them as necessary through subsequent Federal Register notices.51 
However, the document security provisions proved to be very controversial, due 
to concerns that it appeared to establish a national ID system, and Congress withheld 
funding necessary for implementing the provisions.52 The DOT never issued a final rule 
and the law’s provisions were never implemented. Instead, Congress repealed the 
document security provisions of IIRIRA in 1999, and two years later, DOT withdrew the 
proposed rule providing the following explanation.  
The agency received a total of 2,591 comments, the vast majority of which 
strongly opposed the agency’s proposal. The most frequent objections 
were based on privacy and civil liberty concerns. Congress also received 
an overwhelming number of negative comments regarding section 656(b) 
and the agency’s proposal to implement that section. On October 9, 1999, 
Congress repealed section 656(b) Pub. L. 106–69, 113 Stat. 1027. 
Accordingly, the proposed rule to implement the requirements contained 
in section 656(b), published on June 17, 1998, at 63 FR 33220, entitled 
State-Issued Driver’s Licenses and Comparable Identification Documents, 
is hereby withdrawn.53 
50 Department of Justice, “Department of Transportation, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: State 
Issued Driver’s Licenses Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Comparable Identification 
Documents, 63 Fed Reg. 33,220,” June 17, 1998, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/fedreg/1998_1999/ 
fr17jn98P.pdf. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Garcia, Lee, and Tatelman, Immigration, 38. See footnote 117. 
53 U.S. Government Printing Office, “Department of Transportation, Withdrawal of Proposed Rule on 
State-Issued Driver’s Licenses and Comparable Identification Documents 66 Fed Reg, 56261,” November 
7, 2001, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2001-11-07/html/01-28007.htm. 
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C. DOCUMENT SECURITY PROVISIONS OF ITRPA 
The second, and more substantial effort, which served as the immediate 
predecessor to REAL ID, was the effort to establish standards contained in the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). An important 
section of the IRTPA was dedicated to implementing the recommendation of the 9/11 
Commission that the federal government establish federal standards for the issuance of 
driver’s licenses personal identification documents, SSNs, and birth certificates. The 
House and Senate versions of the legislation took very different approaches to the issue 
with the House of Representatives setting forth specific requirements in the proposed 
legislation, and the Senate version electing to require that the issue be placed under 
federal regulation, but leaving it to the specific federal agencies to determine the 
appropriate form that the regulatory efforts should take.54 While the proceedings in 
Congress surrounding the standards were contentious, the final version of the legislation 
contained elements of both, although many of the more controversial provisions were left 
out of the final version, with members indicating that they would be revisited during the 
next Congress.55  
The IRTPA again delegated authority to the Secretary of Transportation, but this 
time, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, to issue regulations setting 
minimum standards for federal acceptance of state issued driver’s license and identity 
cards.56 In many respects, the law’s provisions were very similar to REAL ID with the 
documents being required to incorporate the following data elements pursuant to section 
7212 (b)(2)(D). 
• The person’s full legal name 
• The person’s date of birth 
• The person’s gender 
• The person’s driver’s license or personal identification card number 
54 Todd B. Tatelman, “Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004: National Standards 
for Drivers’ Licenses, Social Security Cards, and Birth Certificates,” January 6, 2005, http://www.fas.org/ 
irp/crs/RL32722.pdf. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., 2. 
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• A digital photograph of the person 
• The person’s address of principal residence 
• The person’s signature57 
It also required that regulations be issued within 18 months and prohibited acceptance of 
state documents for a “federal official purpose” that within two years of enactment did 
not meet the regulatory requirements that included the following additional factors. 
• Use of a machine readable technology 
• Tamperproof features on the card 
• Standards for documentation, and verification 
• Processing of the applications 
Some key differences with REAL ID included language that prohibited the 
federal government from not only infringing upon the “State’s power to set criteria 
concerning what categories of individuals are eligible to obtain a driver’s license or 
personal identification card from that State,” but also from requiring a state to take an 
action that “conflicts with or otherwise interferes with the full enforcement of state 
criteria concerning the categories of individuals that are eligible to obtain a driver’s 
license or personal identification card.”58 This provision would, understandably, be 
welcomed by states that feared federal intrusion into what they would consider to be state 
functions.  
Another key difference that did not survive in REAL ID, and which has 
contributed to some of the state rebellion against that law, was the inclusion in IRTPA of 
a provision, recommended by the Senate, of negotiated rulemaking between the federal 
government and the states. According to the Congressional Research Service’s (CRS) 
analysis of IRTPA. 
This process is designed to bring together agency representatives and 
concerned interest groups to negotiate the text of a proposed rule. The 
rulemaking committee is required to include representatives from: (1) 
State and local offices that issue driver’s licenses and/or personal 
57 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law 108–408 §§ 7211–7214, 
118 Stat. 3638, 3825–3832 (2004). 
58 Tatelman, “Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004: National Standards for 
Drivers’ Licenses, Social Security Cards, and Birth Certificates,” 3. 
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identification cards; (2) State elected officials; (3) Department of 
Homeland Security; and (4) interested parties.59 
The negotiated rulemaking was to develop recommendations within nine months, while 
assessing the benefits and costs of the recommendations, and thereafter, publishing a final 
rule within 18 months of the law’s enactment.60 
In addition to dealing with the security of state driver’s licenses and identity 
documents, the IRTPA took measures to address the security of two additional categories 
of documents, birth certificates and Social Security cards. With respect to birth 
certificates, the IRTPA delegated authority to the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to establish standards no later than one year from the date of enactment for such 
documents to be acceptable for federal purposes, but the provisions would not be binding 
on the states until two years later. The standards would require adoption of a variety of 
measures, ranging from the use of safety paper, to measures to verify the information 
provided, and additional steps for people not applying for their own birth certificate.61 
Interestingly, and in an apparent attempt to make clear that the federal government was 
not taking over the role played by the states, the legislation specifically stated that 
uniformity would be not required in the appearance of the birth certificates, and also 
allowed for differences in how the birth records were stored, and subsequently, used to 
produce birth certificates.62 The IRTPA also included language that authorized grants to 
assist the states to meet the standards.63 It further offered a two-year extension from 
consequences from their failure to comply, for those states making “reasonable efforts” to 
achieve compliance.64 
59 Tatelman, “Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004: National Standards for 
Drivers’ Licenses, Social Security Cards, and Birth Certificates,” 3. 
60 Tatelman, “Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004: National Standards for 
Drivers’ Licenses, Social Security Cards, and Birth Certificates.” 
61 Ibid., 9. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Tatelman, “Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004: National Standards for 
Drivers’ Licenses, Social Security Cards, and Birth Certificates.” 
64 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Section 7212(d). 
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Turning to the IRTPA’s changes to the Social Security card, a number of 
modifications were made regarding the verification, display, and use of the SSN to 
reduce fraud risks associated with them. The primary changes were that the 
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (SSA) was to prohibit the issuance 
of more than three replacement Social Security Cards in one year to individuals, or a total 
of 10 during the individual’s lifetime, unless the Commissioner determines a minimal 
risk of fraud is present.65 In addition, requirements were imposed to increase the 
verification of information submitted in support of a request to establish eligibility for an 
original or replacement Social Security card, as well as requiring independent verification 
of all information submitted by applicants for SSNs.66 A number of measures were 
included in the law to increase the protection of the SSNs and deter their fraudulent use. 
Among them, were the creation of an interagency task force, which would be responsible 
for developing requirements for safeguarding SSN information, verifying its authenticity, 
and developing enforcement mechanisms to deter its fraudulent issuance or use of SSN 
and Social Security cards.67 Specific provisions were also included to address the special 
problem of fraud associated with SSNs related to newborns, with reports and 
requirements to submit recommendations to Congress. Finally, on a more basic level, to 
address identity theft and protect privacy, IRTPA also prohibited states and local political 
subdivisions from displaying the SSN in electronic or other format on the driver’s 
licenses, identity documents, or other forms of identification issued by the states or their 
subdivisions.68  
1. Status of IRTPA Document Security Provisions 
It appears that IRTPA achieved some success as to the changes associated with 
the security of the Social Security card. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the 
SSA undertook an audit and released its findings and recommendations in a report 
65 Tatelman, “Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004: National Standards for 
Drivers’ Licenses, Social Security Cards, and Birth Certificates,” 6. 
66 Ibid., 5. 
67 Ibid., 6–7. 
68 Ibid., 7. 
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completed in 2008. It generally was pleased with the SSA’s progress but recommended 
that SSA periodically assess its efforts and make adjustments as needed.69  
D. CONCLUSION 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 drove home with startling urgency the need to 
address a number of vulnerabilities faced by the nation in a number of areas that 
imperiled its national security. Among those, was the relative ease with which individuals 
could obtain identity documents that would allow them to remain in the United Sates and 
engage in activities that could facilitate events like 9/11. The United Sates had not been 
oblivious to these issues, and has been grappling with, and seeking to address, the relative 
insecurity of driver’s licenses and identity documents by strengthening the security of the 
documents and verification measures associated with their issuance to address fraud and 
identity theft concerns. While measures were pursued both before and after 9/11 through 
measures such as IIRIRA and IRTAPA, it took the events of 9/11 to galvanize 
government efforts to address this vulnerability in a more comprehensive manner.  
An examination of the previous efforts shows that provisions in those earlier 
legislative efforts recognized the role of the states in identity document issuance and 
sought to balance the role of the federal government with that of the states; as best seen 
with the negotiated rulemaking provisions contained in the IRTPA. It is unclear what 
would have resulted had those efforts been allowed to proceed. On the one hand, they 
may have resulted in weaker document security provisions, thus diminishing the effort to 
address fraud. It may have also led to endless debate and disagreement with ensuing 
delays, which would have delayed implementation of needed changes. On the other hand, 
had the discussions been successful, it is easy to see how the states—particularly the ones 
currently opposing REAL ID—might have been more accepting of the changes and could 
have facilitated implementation and reduced state resistance.  
69 Office of the Inspector General, Social Security Administration, “Audit Report: The Social Security 
Administration’s Compliance With Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 Provisions 
Regarding Security of Social Security Cards and Numbers,” May 2008, http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/ 
files/audit/full/html/A-08-08-18058.html. 
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REAL ID appears to have been one of those legislative enactments that passed 
due to all of the elements coming together to enable its passage, where it might not have 
passed at another time, and it seems it likely it would not be passed today. Furthermore, 
the Bush administration acted swiftly for a legislative and regulatory scheme of such a 
broad scope and tremendous impact upon the states and territories and their citizens. It 
undertook and published an extensive and ambitious rulemaking process in what many 
would agree was record time when compared with the difficulty and slow pace of 
extensive rulemaking efforts. It processed and addressed over 21,000 public comments 
and published regulations that altered significantly the requirements to be met by states in 
their identity document issuance procedures. As challenging as the rulemaking effort 
was, the more substantial challenges for both the federal government and the state 
governments, involved taking the measures necessary to implement the law successfully 
and do so in a way cognizant of, and which addressed the various concerns associated 
with REAL ID. The most significant of those concerns and the controversies surrounding 
them are discussed in the chapters that follow.  
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III. DOES REAL ID CREATE A NATIONAL ID? 
The literature review has briefly touched on several of the reasons that the 
passage and implementation of REAL ID has proven to be controversial. Among them, 
were issues, such as Tenth Amendment concerns regarding the proper role of the federal 
government as to functions reserved for and better entrusted to the states, concerns 
regarding the implementation costs of REAL ID and the belief that the law set forth 
unfunded mandates for the states, and privacy and civil liberties concerns stemming from 
the law’s requirements. All these reasons will be the subject of more detailed discussions 
in the paper. Within the category of concerns stemming from violations of civil liberties, 
is the concern raised by critics that REAL ID establishes a national identity card (national 
ID). This assertion composes part of the debate that continues to this day. DHS became 
enmeshed in the national ID debate through its efforts to implement REAL ID, which 
was enacted a mere two years after DHS came into existence. That law has come under 
assault by many who object to what they view as the creation of an insecure national ID 
system that imperils the privacy and civil liberties of the citizenry.70  
This chapter discusses DHS’ response to claims that it was establishing a national 
ID, and compares the REAL ID elements that give rise to the charge that it creates a 
national ID, to the efforts to those of four key democracies, the United Kingdom, India, 
South Africa, and Germany that have implemented, or have tried but failed to implement 
national ID schemes. Doing so provides a better understanding of how U.S. efforts 
compare to those of countries that have actually sought to establish a national ID. This 
thesis finds that the U.S. effort is more modest in its design, and discusses how DHS has 
countered the assertion that REAL ID establishes a national ID system. Nevertheless, 
REAL ID has faced opposition and slow adoption by many states. Looking at the 
experience of countries that have sought to implement a national ID system can assist 
DHS in identifying best practices that can help address some of the social acceptance 
70 EPIC: Real ID Implementation Review; see also Steinbock, “Fourth Amendment Limits on National 
Identity Cards,” in Privacy and Technologies of Identity: A Cross-disciplinary Conversation. (Steinbock 
cites in footnote 1 to various articles from the last 20 years in which conversations regarding national IDs 
are referenced.). 
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issues that are impeding full implementation of the law, as well as countering critics’ 
claims that REAL ID constitutes a national ID scheme. 
A. WHAT CONSTITUTES A NATIONAL ID? 
The definition of a national ID is itself controversial, and a lack of consensus 
exists as to whether the United States has been moving toward a national ID scheme. 
Some view a national ID document as establishing both citizenship and identity. By that 
definition it would appear that the only document that establishes both in the United 
States is the passport.71 Others assert that the use of the phrase “national ID” is “a bit of a 
misnomer in that a card would likely be but one component of a large and complex 
nationwide identity system, the core of which would be a database of personal 
information on the U.S. population.”72 
If REAL ID in its present form does not establish a national ID, then it begs the 
question of what does constitute a national ID? Little consensus may exist on this issue as 
well, but some sources point to the treatment of this issue by Roger A. Clarke, who is 
credited with having articulated the “seminal formal definition” of a national ID.73 Most 
recently, Clarke has identified several elements necessary to establish a national ID, and 
which, taken together, illustrate the complexity of national identification schemes. Those 
elements, are listed as follows.  
• A database 
• A Unique Signifier for Every Individual either a unique number or a 
biometric identifier) 
• An “(Id)entification token” such as an ID card 
• Quality assurance mechanisms 
71 Ruth Ellen Wasem, Unauthorized Aliens’ Access to Federal Benefits: Policy and Issues, CRS 
Report RL34500 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 17, 2012), 3. 
72 Stephen T. Kent et al., IDs--Not That Easy Questions about Nationwide Identity Systems 
(Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2002), http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct 
=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=87005. 
73 A. Michael Froomkin, “The Uneasy Case for national ID Cards,” in Securing Privacy in the Internet 
Age, ed. Anupam Chander, Lauren Gelman, and Margaret Jane Radin (Stanford, CA: Stanford Law Books, 
2008), citing to Roger A. Clarke, “Human Identification in Record Systems” (June 1989) and Roger A. 
Clarke, “The Resistible Rise of the National Personal Data System,” 5 Software L. J. 29, 33–36 (1992). 
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• Widespread use of the data flows, the identifiers and the database 
• Obligations on individuals and many organizations 
• Sanctions for non-compliance74 
1. United States-REAL ID 
From the beginning, opponents have claimed that REAL ID established a national 
ID requirement for the United States. The Bush administration denied the charge and 
sought to address that concern through the rulemaking process. As part of that process, 
DHS issued a PIA, on January 11, 2008, to accompany the implementing regulations for 
REAL ID.75 This issuance was done in accordance with subsection 4 of Section 222 of 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, which requires the DHS Chief Privacy 
Officer to conduct a “privacy impact assessment of proposed rules of the Department.”76 
This PIA was an update to one published in March 2007 that accompanied the Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). In the final rule PIA, DHS directly addressed five 
privacy areas posed by REAL ID.77 It specifically recognized the national ID concern 
raised by commenters during the NPRM period, stating: “[a] primary privacy concern has 
been whether the REAL ID will result in a national identity system, including a 
centralized database of PII including all drivers.”78 DHS refuted the claim by stating that 
while it could not control what use the states would make of the identity cards, DHS 
could nonetheless assure the public regarding the centralized database that “[n]either the 
REAL ID Act nor the requirements of the final rule expressly create a centralized 
database of all drivers’ information.”79 DHS further noted that the preamble to the rule 
stated: 
74 Roger A. Clarke, “National Identity Schemes—Elements,” February 8, 2006, http://www.roger 
clarke.com/DV/NatIDSchemeElms.html. 
75 Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the REAL ID Final Rule. 
76 The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 2002, http://www. 
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-107hr5005enr/pdf/BILLS-107hr5005enr.pdf. 
77 Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the REAL ID Final Rule, 3. 
78 Ibid., 6. 
79 Ibid. 
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DHS does not intend that a REAL ID document become a de facto 
national ID based on the actions of others outside of DHS to limit their 
acceptance of an identity document to a REAL ID-compliant driver’s 
license or identification card.80 
The PIA provided, however, that even though no central database would exist, REAL 
ID’s prohibition on states issuing a REAL ID compliant driver’s license to someone who 
holds a driver’s license from another state (without verifying that the license has been or 
is in the process of being terminated), made it necessary to facilitate the states’ ability to 
verify that fact. Consequently, while no central repository was established, it was 
necessary for the states to be able to utilize an “index or pointer system rather than 
checking with each State DMV individually.”81 The PIA goes on to explain that without 
such a pointer system, it would be cost prohibitive for states to undertake the required 
verification and they would be inundated by data if they were required to exchange 
information based only on individual queries. Nevertheless, DHS’ Chief Privacy Officer 
noted in the PIA that DHS would work with the states to ensure that 
this central repository is only used to facilitate the State-to-State data 
checks or to permit access by authorized law enforcement personnel who 
are checking a specific license or identification card against the system 
and for no other purpose. The access rules to the still-to-be-built hub, for 
example, will help implement these protections. In addition, DHS will 
work to ensure that this index or pointer system will include the minimal 
amount of PII needed to facilitate effective querying and reduce the 
occurrence of false positives and false negatives.82 
In addressing additional concerns about the use to which information in the hub (the 
personally identifiable information, or PII), might be utilized, the PIA further provided: 
Of particular privacy concern, however, is how the PII contained in the 
State-to-State data verification index or pointer system will be used by 
DHS, the States, or other entities, if, given access to it. Setting limitations 
on the use of the PII in the index should be the first item of business for 
the governance body established to operate and oversee the State-to-State 
80 Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the REAL ID Final Rule, 6. 
81 Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the REAL ID Act: In 
Conjunction with the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and 
Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, March 1, 2007, 6–7. 
82 Ibid., 7. 
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data verification system. The Privacy Office intends to monitor the work 
of the governance body and to provide privacy guidance as appropriate. 
The central index or pointer system should not be used, for example, by 
any Federal or State agency for intelligence, data mining, or “fishing 
expeditions.” Rather, access should be limited to targeted law enforcement 
or DMV investigations or verification of an individual’s identity based on 
a “need to know,” as outlined in the Privacy Act and many similar State 
privacy acts.83 
Thus, DHS sought to address directly what the major concerns would be 
regarding the use of PII associated with the REAL ID verification system. It also sought 
to assure the public it was cognizant of the concerns and was taking action to ensure that 
the information was not used for purposes that traditionally evoke concerns about 
national ID systems. At the same time, it sought to give states autonomy and 
responsibility for the use of information. 
Overall, there has been a lack of consensus on REAL ID’s status as a national ID, 
with some advocates insisting that the federal government was setting up such a program, 
and other advocates arguing that no national ID system was established, but that national 
security concerns required the federal government to develop standards for state identity 
documents. Even if the REAL ID framework itself does not actually establish a national 
ID, some assert that implementing REAL ID may make a move toward a national ID 
system more likely.84 
A range of views exists as to whether the standards imposed by REAL ID in 
essence create a national ID. On one side, are the civil rights/civil liberties advocates such 
as the EPIC, which assert that REAL ID represents an effort to establish a national ID, 
despite historical and recent congressional opposition to such a system, reaffirmed by 
Congress when it established DHS.85 On the other end of the spectrum are individuals 
and entities that strongly support REAL ID and reject the national ID charge, noting that 
implementing the law requires no aggregation of data into a centralized database operated 
83 Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the REAL ID Act, 11. 
84 Steinbock, “Fourth Amendment Limits on National Identity Cards,” in Privacy and Technologies of 
Identity: A Cross-disciplinary Conversation.  
85 EPIC: Real ID Implementation Review. 
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by the federal government.86 Nevertheless, among supporters of REAL ID, outspoken 
advocates of a national ID system do exist, who see direct and indirect benefits of secure 
identity documents to further national security and the prevention of terrorism.87  
Interestingly, among the supporters of a national ID system is the Washington 
Post, which responded to the issue most recently in the context of the debate over 
comprehensive immigration reform. The Post, a moderate to liberal newspaper, supports 
immigration reform, and has come out in favor of adopting a tamper proof national ID 
card incorporating biometrics, such as a fingerprints or a comparable identifier, and noted 
that the President and a bi-partisan group of senators had urged something similar while 
not calling it a national ID.88 In response to the criticism that such a system would 
constitute intrusive government that threatens privacy, the Post offered the following 
response. 
Critics on both the civil-liberties left and the libertarian right have long 
resisted such cards as the embodiment of a Big Brother brand of 
government, omniscient, invasive and tentacular. Their criticisms ring 
hollow. 
More than a third of Americans (35 percent) possess passports; up from 
just 6 percent 20 years ago — and all passports issued since 2007 contain 
chips that enable biometric use of facial recognition technology. The 
proliferation of passports for foreign travel has not encroached on 
Americans’ civil liberties. Why would another form of ID, used for 
employment verification, pose such a threat? 
Yes, unscrupulous employers could still ignore the law, but doing so 
would become riskier and more prone to enforcement. Critics contend that 
a national ID would only drive up the cost of counterfeit documents. 
Would they prefer that falsified documents are cheap?89 
86 Center for Immigration Studies, “Repealing REAL ID? Rolling Back Driver’s License Security 
(Announcement),” accessed September 3, 2013, http://www.cis.org/realidannounce. 
87 Dershowitz, “Thinking About National ID Cards”; see also, David Frum and Richard Norman Perle, 
An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror (New York: Ballantine, 2004). 





                                                 
While the debate continues, it is unlikely that consensus on whether REAL ID constitutes 
a national ID can be reached, those who support enhanced identity documents believe 
that such a system could prevent tragedies like 9/11 because in addition to the biographic 
information contained on the cards, they could be equipped with a chip through which an 
embedded fingerprint or other biometric identifier could then be compared with the 
corresponding biometric of the person presenting the document to verify identity. In 
addition, information about the individual maintained in law enforcement, immigration 
databases, or watch lists could be associated with the person.90 
2. Understandable Concerns Are Raised by a National ID  
Regardless of an individual’s opinion on the issue of national ID systems, it is 
easy to understand the concerns surrounding them, which relate principally to privacy 
and the loss of liberty. One author who set out to examine the societal perceptions of 
biometric technology and what is necessary to promote acceptance, describes the concern 
as follows. 
Foremost among these are the loss of liberty, whether in the form of 
governmental control or the misuse of information, and the potential for 
loss of privacy and anonymity; all of which must be offset by the 
legitimacy of identification.91  
The author summarizes the challenge for DHS and any entity seeking to improve 
identification systems—whether or not one calls them a national ID system—as follows. 
Societal acceptance or rejection can shore up a system of identification or 
destroy it. The societal assessment of the objectives of a system of 
identification in the public or private sector is no easy matter, yet it is safe 
to say that ignoring the political, societal, and cultural influences that 
shape perceptions of systems of identification is impossible.92 
90 Tova Andrea Wang, The Debate Over a National Identification Card (The Century Foundation 
Homeland Security Project, May 10, 2002). 
91 Lisa S. Nelson, America Identified: Biometric Technology and Society (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 2011), 13, http://books.google.com/books?id=64zo8GjybdYC&printsec=frontcover&dq=America+ 
Identified&hl=en&sa=X&ei=k7cRUtKnEKugyAHy3IEo&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=America
%20Identified&f=false. 
92 Ibid., 56. 
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The societal acceptance issue that DHS has faced with REAL ID becomes apparent when 
one considers that society is generally willing to support systems of identification when it 
is facing issues, such as “[e]xternal threats of war, identification of criminal elements in 
society, distribution of social welfare, and internal threats to social stability such as 
immigration.”93 Yet, public support and acceptance wanes when the idea of long-term 
reliance on identification systems for “day-to-day bureaucratic workings of the 
government” is the goal.94 Part of the difficulty facing REAL ID is that the effort to 
increase the security of state identity documents is, on one hand, an effort to address an 
external threat of terrorism and criminality, while at the same time, it impacts what is 
seen as a day-to-day bureaucratic activity—the routine process of getting and using state 
licenses and identity documents. In addressing public concerns and being able to 
distinguish REAL ID efforts from efforts more clearly intended to establish a national ID, 
it is helpful to examine the experiences of other countries to see if any lessons can be 
learned for DHS and the states.  
B. NATIONAL ID EFFORTS IN COMPARISON COUNTRIES 
Four countries that have adopted or are seeking to adopt a national ID system 
were selected for comparison purposes with U.S. efforts on REAL ID. Each represents a 
western style democracy that brings unique considerations to the analysis and has faced 
similar considerations in its implementation efforts. The United Kingdom (UK) was 
selected because of its status as a close U.S. ally, and as an example of a nation that has 
alternatively succeeded and failed at implementing a national ID system. India was 
selected as a country that has embarked on an effort to issue a national ID to an extremely 
large population and has done so under challenging circumstances given the population 
size, and the remoteness of some areas of the country, and has leveraged private 
enterprise in its implementation challenges. South Africa was selected as it is considered 
“the first example of a “truly biometric order” where “[m]uch of what the advocates of 
biometric registration systems around the world have been calling for since the start of 
93 Nelson, America Identified: Biometric Technology and Society, 13. 
94 Ibid. 
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the War on Terror has already been implemented.”95 Finally, Germany was selected as 
the classic example of the use of identity controls by the government to harm segments of 
its population, yet has overcome that history and today has a national ID system in place.  
1. The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom represents an interesting case study with its alternating 
adoption of, and rejection of national IDs. It is unusual within Europe for not having a 
national ID.96 This situation has not always been the case as the United Kingdom had 
two previous experiences with national ID’s prompted by war related considerations. 
During World War II, for example, the United Kingdom enacted the National 
Registration Act of 1939, which required all residents to carry an identity card for the 
duration of the war “emergency.”97 
Its ambivalence regarding a national ID system was most recently manifested in 
the government’s actions surrounding the Identity Act of 2006 (Identity Act).98 The 
concept behind the Identity Act was to link the individual to a biometric identifier in the 
form of fingerprints, and in turn, link that information to the National Identity Register.99 
The United Kingdom started issuing IDs in 2009.100 However, it repealed the law less 
than two years later through passage and enactment of the Identity Documents Act on 
January 21, 2011.101 The repeal was a consequence of the 2010 national elections, when 
95 Keith Breckenridge, “The Elusive Panopticon: The HANIS Project and the Politics of Standards in 
South Africa,” in Playing the Identity Card Surveillance, Security and Identification in Global Perspective, 
ed. Colin J. Bennett and David Lyon (London; New York: Routledge, 2008), 287. 
96 David Wills, “The United Kingdom Identity Card Scheme,” in Playing the Identity Card 
Surveillance, Security and Identification in Global Perspective, ed. Colin J Bennett and David Lyon 
(London; New York: Routledge, 2008), 163. 
97 C. H. Rolph, “The English Identity Cards,” in National Identification Systems: Essays in 
Opposition, ed. Carl Watner and Wendy McElroy (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2004), 125. 
98 Wills, “The United Kingdom Identity Card Scheme.” 
99 BBC, “In Full: Smith ID Card Speech,” sec. UK Politics, March 6, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7281368.stm. 
100 Home Office, “Commencement of the Identity Cards Act 2006—Issue of Identity Cards and New 
Criminal Offences—Publications—GOV.UK,” accessed August 25, 2013, https://www.gov.uk/govern 
ment/publications/commencement-of-the-identity-cards-act-2006-issue-of-identity-cards-and-new-
criminal-offences. 
101 Home Office, “ID Cards No Longer Valid—News Stories—GOV.UK,” January 21, 2011, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/id-cards-no-longer-valid. 
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a coalition of the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats agreed to repeal the 2006 
legislation. One notable and dramatic action taken as a consequence of the repeal was 
that 500 hard drives housing the identity register were shredded to fulfill the requirement 
of the repeal legislation that the national register be destroyed.102  
The UK’s recent attempt to establish a national ID was justified by the 
government on the basis of two main objectives. These objectives were set forth in a 
speech delivered by Home Secretary Jacqui Smith, on March 6, 2008.103 The speech, 
intended to inject new momentum into the program’s implementation, began from the 
premise that the National Identity Scheme was a public good, offering British citizens a 
new, secure, and convenient way to protect and prove their identity, and for the 
government, it was a way to support national security efforts.104 The Home Secretary 
articulated the need as follows. 
We all need to be able to prove who we are - quickly, easily and securely. 
And so it is essential for all of us to be able to lock our identity to 
ourselves and to protect its integrity. We need a way of doing so that we 
can trust in, and that can be trusted by others - when applying for a job, 
travelling abroad, or using business and government services. 
As citizens, it will offer us a new, secure and convenient way to protect 
and prove our identity. And it will provide us with the reassurance we 
need that others who occupy positions of trust in our society are who they 
say they are as well. 
As a government, we have a duty to ensure that the National Identity 
Scheme supports our national security, and that it provides a robust 
defence against those who seek to use of false identity to mask criminal or 
terrorist activity.105 
While the justification sounds quite similar to justifications in support of REAL ID, one 
notable difference is that the recently repealed UK national ID effort utilized a card that 
102 Electronic Frontier Foundation, “Success Story: Dismantling UK’s Biometric ID Database,” 
accessed August 25, 2013, https://www.eff.org/pages/success-story-dismantling-uk%E2%80%99s-
biometric-id-database. 




                                                 
was linked to a national identity register. The card itself was to resemble the UK driver’s 
license, but would hold more data, including two fingerprints and a photograph, that 
would be encoded on a chip.106 The unique number and the chip facilitate linkage to the 
national identity register that the enabling legislation authorized to maintain additional 
information.107 It was also anticipated that the document could be used, similar to a 
passport, to facilitate travel throughout Europe.108 While the card was originally 
envisioned as mandatory, it was later made voluntary to address critics’ concerns.109 Its 
rollout was to have begun with transportation sector workers, followed by others in 
positions of public trust, such as Olympic security workers, and those working in critical 
infrastructure positions, such as power plants. It was next to have been made available on 
a voluntary basis to young people, beginning in 2010.110 Although the rollout began in 
Manchester, with the intention of expanding nationwide during 2011–2012, it did not 
extend beyond Manchester before being cancelled.111 
The opponents seized upon the program’s mandatory nature, and disputed the 
government’s stated reasons in support of the identity program, asserting:  
[A] designer piece of plastic is not going to combat identity fraud, crime 
or terrorism. This intrusive scheme should be scrapped immediately.”112 
Even the government’s attempts to make it mandatory for airport workers 
failed, with the government backing off of even that requirement. The 
opposition also included a privacy rights group No2ID, which proved to 
be a vocal opponent. In addition, national polling suggested little support 
for the voluntary program.113 The cost of the program was also of 
concern, with the London School of Economics issuing a report finding 
that while the concept of a national identity system was supportable, the 
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current proposals were not feasible with the benefits not outweighing the 
costs.114  
Critics also raised concerns about the security of the data and its ability to be 
compromised. In response, the government decided to build separate databases keeping 
the biographic details separate, physically and technologically, from the biometric data, 
consisting of fingerprints and photographs.115 This measure was taken to reassure the 
public that it was taking measures to mitigate the risks.116 In addition, the government 
stressed that the information would not be susceptible to hacking because the databases 
would not be available online.117 It appears, however, that the United Kingdom did not 
anticipate and address concerns raised by critics in a timely manner, vacillated in its 
implementation efforts, and fumbled badly on the societal acceptance issue.  
2. India  
The second case study of a national ID system is India. Within the last several 
years, India embarked on its first effort—an extremely ambitious one—to establish a 
national database of all citizens and distribute national identity cards to more than a 
billion people.118 Originally conceived as the multipurpose national identity card 
(MNIC), it was envisioned as a national register of citizens, a national register of non-
citizens, and a national register of residency. India’s government initiated a “pilot 
project” to introduce the MNIC in select areas of the country in 2009.119 The program, 
known as Aadhaar, or “foundation” in Hindi, began enrolling individuals in 2010 with 
the first Aadhaar number being issued on September 29, 2010.120 
114 Edgar A. Whitley, “The Identity Project: An Assessment of the UK Identity Cards Bill and Its 
Implications,” 2005, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/29117/. 
115 BBC, “In Full.” 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Taha Mehmood, “India’s New ID Card: Fuzzy Logics, Double Meanings and Ethnic Ambiguities,” 
in Playing the Identity Card Surveillance, Security and Identification in Global Perspective, ed. Colin J 
Bennett and David Lyon (London; New York: Routledge, 2008). 
119 Ibid., 114. 
120 Unique Identification Authority of India, “Aadhaar Press Release October 2012,” October 2012. 
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The program consists of the collection of 10 prints and iris scans of citizens, and 
associates them with a unique identifier into a “massive database.”121 Ultimately, 1.2 
billion Indian citizens will be issued a unique identifier, a random 12-digit number, by 
mail. Passports, driver’s licenses, ration cards, and government health-insurance cards 
could either have the numbers printed on them or embedded electronically.122 The 
program captures a mix of biometric data—digital photos, fingerprints, and iris scans. 
The program also collects a substantial amount of biographic information to include 
names, addresses, genders, dates of birth, and other information, such as caste and 
religion. It was decided to err on the side of collecting too much versus too little 
information because the enrollment process was relatively lengthy and only one 
opportunity was really available to collect the information.123  
At the same time, India had embarked on a parallel effort to create a National 
Population Register while issuing the identity cards, or MNICs, to the citizens of India. 
The Group of Ministers (GoM) determined that the efforts should fall within a new 
entity, the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), within the Planning 
Commission. According to the UIDAI, as of June 2013, over 360 million enrollments in 
the Aadhaar had been completed, and India was predicted to be on track to complete 600 
million enrollments by 2014.124  
Several factors motivated the effort to establish India’s national identity program. 
Those factors included enhancing security, gaining efficiencies in benefit distribution, 
and enhancing economic opportunities for people lacking access financial systems. The 
initial impetus for the pilot was the recommendation of the GoM that had been formed in 
2000 on the recommendation of the Kargil Review Committee. The committee’s purpose 
was to study the causes of the Kargil War between Pakistan and India, which for India, 
121 Amol Sharma, “India Launches Project to ID 1.2 Billion People,” Wall Street Journal, sec. 




124 Unique Identity Authority of India, “APNA AADHAAR,” June 2013, at p. 6. (the monthly 
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was a “big event” similar to 9/11 in the United States.125 One proposal was to take steps 
to issue ID cards to border villagers in certain vulnerable areas on a priority basis. The 
Indian government set up a pilot project in 2003 for the introduction of the MNIC in 
select districts.126 
In addition to the security related concerns, India has also been motivated by 
reasons related to economic development, and the efficient and secure distribution of 
benefits. According to the Wall Street Journal’s treatment of the issue.  
The country’s leaders are pinning their hopes on the program to solve 
development problems that have persisted despite fast economic growth. 
They say unique ID numbers will help ensure that government welfare 
spending reaches the right people, and will allow hundreds of millions of 
poor Indians to access services like banking for the first time. The Indian 
government is expected to spend as much as $250 billion over five years 
on programs aimed at the poor, including subsidies for food, diesel, 
fertilizer and jobs. But 40% of the benefits, as the system now stands, will 
go to the wrong people or to “ghosts” with fake identification papers, 
according to a report by brokerage firm CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets. 
Today’s ration cards, for example, are issued on paper, and are relatively 
easy to forge or doctor.127 
The effort is acknowledged to have a role in reducing fraud, but India has emphasized its 
role in economic development, noting that it has the potential to bring into the financial 
system the roughly two-thirds of Indian adults who do not have bank accounts.128 
Leaders of the effort believe that it can help the poor, who often have few or no 
documents to prove who they are or where they live. “You have a whole mass of people 
who are shut out of society. A lack of identity is a big source of exclusion. You’re giving 
them a key to social services.”129 
India’s efforts were facilitated to a large degree by a unique partnership between 
the government and a group of successful Indian entrepreneurs who, in a sense, applied 
125 Mehmood, “India’s New ID Card,” 114. 
126 Ibid. 




                                                 
their tech savvy to launch a type of national service project. To lead the project, India’s 
former Prime Minister selected Nandan Nilekani, formerly CEO of Infosys Technologies 
Ltd., who had helped pioneer offshore technology services. Nilekani, in turn, recruited 
fellow Indians with ties to the global technology industry, and asked tech companies, 
such as Intel, Google, Oracle Corp., and Yahoo, in November 2009, “to send Indian-
origin engineers to contribute to the cause, either on paid sabbatical or as volunteers. 
More than 20 people joined the effort.”130 
Several have leveled criticisms of the Aadhaar system, with some asserting that in 
India, individuals can prove their identities in a multitude of ways and that having so 
many options has made establishing their identity confusing. Critics note that the 
reliability of Aadhaar to establish a citizen’s identity is under a cloud as the card itself is 
not necessarily proof of citizenship.131 People who are not themselves citizens can obtain 
the card as it is compulsory to access various programs, such as obtaining driver’s 
licenses, opening bank accounts, and obtaining certificates related to birth, death, 
marriage, property registration, domicile, and income certificates.132  
Due to the broad range of transactions to which Aadhaar will be tied, critics also 
contend that it is not a voluntary system as the government has asserted. They note that 
while signing up is technically voluntary, any government agency or company will be 
allowed to require a unique ID as proof of identity. Critics assert, therefore, that it 
amounts to a de facto mandate for people to enroll.133 They also express concern that it 
could be used by businesses or the government to discriminate against individuals in the 
provision of services provided, and also note that it could also be a huge source for data 
130 Sharma, “India Launches Project to ID 1.2 Billion People.” 
131 Mail Online, “India’s Identity Crisis: Between Aadhaar, Passport, PAN and NPR, Why Are We 
Still Struggling to Prove Our Identities?,” March 22, 2013, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/ 
indianews/article-2297714/Indias-identity-crisis-Between-Aadhaar-passport-PAN-NPR-struggling-prove-
identities.html. 
132 Neha Pushkarna, “India’s Identity Crisis: Between Aadhaar, Passport, PAN and NPR, Why Are 
We Still Struggling to Prove Our Identities? Capital Hopes to Do Everything with Aadhaar,” Mail Online, 
March 22, 2013, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2297714/Indias-identity-crisis-
Between-Aadhaar-passport-PAN-NPR-struggling-prove-identities.html. 
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mining.134 Yet, many of the people for whom it would seem that obtaining such 
document would be most difficult, express the benefits of the system related to the 
efficient and secure distribution of goods and services. It is hoped that the IDs would 
keep people from cheating the welfare system and obtaining food rations for which they 
do not qualify. “It will take fraud out of the government schemes,” said Mr. Anjaiah, a 
citizen who relies on subsidies to feed his family. “Then it will be guaranteed I get what I 
deserve.135 
One issue that does not seem to be of concern with the program is the ability of 
the system to establish one-to-one correspondence accurately between real people and 
electronic identities on the CIDR (central ID repository). The government embarked on a 
proof of concept trial in 2010, and study of efficacy of the system after the enrollment of 
84 million residents. The fact that both fingerprints and irises were being captured 
appeared to significantly increase the levels of accuracy in enrolling residents.136  
3. South Africa 
In 1997, the government of South Africa, through its Department of Home Affairs 
awarded a contract for the development of an Automated Fingerprint Identification 
System (AFIS) database, which would then be combined with the country’s population 
register, followed by the issuance of identity cards to the entire population.137 South 
Africa’s national ID system was known as the Home Affairs National Identification 
System (HANIS). Yet, it is only very recently, since the summer of 2013, that these 
efforts, which are anchored by a Smart ID system, have been rolled out.138 Although 
134 Sharma, “India Launches Project to ID 1.2 Billion People.” 
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2012, http://dspace.thapar.edu:8080/dspace/handle/10266/1734. 
137 Breckenridge, “The Elusive Panopticon,” 39. 




                                                 
certain elements of the HANIS system had been previously been implemented, 
commenters have described the delays surrounding its implementation as a “debacle.”139  
South Africa embarked on its national identity card system as a result of national 
security concerns within South Africa in the 1980s.140 The government of P. W. Botha 
decided, in 1981, to issue a “single, fingerprint authenticated, identity document to all 
South Africans, white as well as black.”141 This decision stemmed from conflicts with 
the African National Congress that had staged attacks on oil refineries.142 With the 
military and certain government elements believing that South Africa was facing a Soviet 
inspired “Total Onslaught,” the national fingerprint register of all “white, Indian, and 
coloured South Africans” was a key element of the government’s strategy including its 
professed need to enhance the sophistication of identity documents.143 Over time, the 
justifications for the continuation of the identity system evolved to encompass things like 
“‘orderly public administration; for business or for identifying dead bodies,’” yet the 
objective of completing a national registration remained.144 Another driving force behind 
the HANIS project involved the intense discussions surrounding South Africa’s post-
Apartheid welfare system with “the first meaningful” discussions taking place in 1994 
related to the first social and economic policy. A need existed to distribute benefits to 
millions of poor South Africans, and do so in a way that was fair and identified only 
eligible South African recipients.145 The solution that emerged was to adopt an 
automated fingerprint identification system and an identity card.146 The current 
justification for the issuance of the Smart ID card is to address the issue of identity 
fraud.147 
139 Breckenridge, “The Elusive Panopticon.” 
140 Ibid., 41. 
141 Ibid.  
142 Ibid., 41–42. 
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One characteristic of South Africa’s system that received attention in press reports 
during the UK’s consideration of a national identity card is that only South Africa’s 
system combined smart card applications and identification technologies.148 It was held 
up as “an excellent example of the use of biometrics for purely civilian and humanitarian 
ends.”149 The South African model, unique in its combination of elements of 
photographic identification, biometric registration, and smart card applications, has been 
seen as an example worth examining more closely and possibly emulating.150 The current 
effort has the identification cards being issued free of charge to 16-year-old youth who 
are first time applicants.151  
Among the issues that have resulted in strong criticism, and controversy, was the 
procurement of the HANIS technology, and how the government handled that issue. 
Allegations of favoritism were raised in the awarding of contracts and critics have 
questioned the government’s decision to pursue smart-trip technology, as opposed to the 
then standard bar-code technology, given that at the time smart-trip technology was not 
dramatically more secure than bar-code technology.152 The decision to adopt smart-card 
technology resulted in the government making plans to use the card to host all key 
functions of government information processing relative to individuals; thus, making the 
card the “lynch-pin of a host of bureaucratic and commercial functions.”153 
The problem for South Africa as it sought to find the technical solution to 
implement its proposal was “the same issue that had bedeviled fingerprint classification 
and storage in general, and the construction of a centralized registries in particular, since 
the turn of the twentieth century: no uncontested standard existed for smart card 
148 Breckenridge, “The Elusive Panopticon,” 40. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Colin J. Bennett and David Lyon, Playing The Identity Card: Surveillance, Security and 
Identification in Global Perspective (New York: Routledge, 2008), 40, http://search.ebscohost.com/ 
login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=529287. 
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fingerprint identification, either in South Africa or internationally.”154 In other words, 
until an international standard was developed, manufacturers were promoting their own 
systems as the “ultimate solution.”155 In turn, a lack of standardization resulted, which 
critics contend leads to significant error rates.156 
Some say that South Africa’s implementation issues proved challenging precisely 
because the country had been such a rapid adopter of fingerprinting as a means of 
identification. Over the years, South Africa has adopted at least five separate nationwide 
systems adopted by different departments of the government independent of Home 
Affairs, to include police; social welfare, drivers’ licensing, and the courts and prisons.157 
This system created issues of compatibility, and large differences between the electronic 
storage required to retain the original fingerprint and its “mathematical template.” The 
reality initially encountered by the government was the fact that the smart cards have 
very limited capacity with budgetary constraints of large-scale identification projects 
forcing the adoption of the cheapest and the smallest cards.158 However, according to 
more current reports, the Smart ID cards are now equipped with microchips that contain 
the biographic information on the holder, and also contain the fingerprint image that 
allows the verification of identity by scanning the individual’s fingerprint and comparing 
it against the one contained on the card.159  
South Africa’s identification system evolved from being one intended to address 
security and control of the population, to become a key element in the efficient 
administration of public services. South Africa’s national ID system, while extremely 
delayed in its roll out, is widely recognized as one that combined smart card technology 
with unique biometric identifiers. Its rapid adoption of technology and the absence of 
154 Breckenridge, “The Elusive Panopticon,” 47. 
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standards, however, made it vulnerable to the dictates of vendors and resulted in a lack of 
standardization and duplicate systems. 
4. Germany 
Germany is known for having a long history of registering and identifying its 
citizens, which began in 1876 when the government took over the function of registering 
births, deaths, and marriages; a function previously performed by the churches.160 
National identity cards have had several iterations over the years beginning with their use 
during the Third Reich when the cards came into existence based on a law passed in 
1937, and served as proof of identity and citizenship.161 The cards captured fingerprints, 
which became mandatory for conscripts and the Jewish population.162 The identity card 
became mandatory for all persons age 15 and older starting in 1939.163 Subsequently, 
with the advent of World War II, citizens and persons in occupied territories were 
registered, and registration was most notoriously used to register Jewish citizens and in 
connection with facilitating their deportations, and with the administration of 
concentration camps.164  
Under German law, citizens must possess either a passport or an identification 
card. However, concerns over the use of a unique identifier in Germany, given its history, 
have led to the Federal Constitutional Court banning the use of the unique identifier for 
census purposes, as well as by the Federal Parliament. Although the German ID card has 
a unique registered number, it may not be used for any administrative purpose other than 
criminal or investigative purposes.165 Nevertheless, Germany has also introduced a 
160 Torsten Noack and Herbert Kubicek, “The Introduction of Online Authentication as Part of the 
New Electronic National Identity Card in Germany,” Identity in the Information Society 3, no. 1 (March 25, 
2010): 87–110, doi:10.1007/s12394-010-0051-1. 
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unique tax identification number, but its use is considered to be “sector specific.”166 The 
administration of the registration of citizens occurs at local municipality level, and until 
2006, had been regulated at the state level under a national framework document, and 
efforts had been made by some states to establish state level centralized registers. At that 
time, the legislative authority was transferred exclusively to the national level. Debate 
continues in Germany over the degree of desirable centralization.167 
Germany has moved to an electronic machine-readable ID card, with legislation 
enacted in 1987, governing its provisions.168 Germany’s new eID card, introduced for the 
purpose of facilitating online authentication, is smaller than the previous card, although 
for ease of use, and at the request of law enforcement officials, the photograph and type 
size were maintained. In addition, the card was equipped with radio frequency 
identification (RFID) technology to maintain conformity with Germany’s electronic 
passport; thus, both the ID card and the e-passport allow for the storage of biometric 
features, i.e., face photo, and fingerprints.169 The existence of the RFID technology 
allows the card to perform three functions: authentication, travel control, and e-signature; 
the authentication and e-signature features are opt-in features at the users’ discretion.170  
It is the view of this author that that REAL ID does not constitute a national ID 
system. Although some may resort to scare mongering on this issue just simply because 
they are opposed to government regulation in the area of identity documents, many 
people have genuine concerns, and fear, that REAL ID could be a significant step on the 
way toward a national ID. Therefore, the example of Germany, which the world 
recognizes as epitomizing the dangers of a national ID system under the control of a 
government bent on the oppression and commission of genocide against members of its 
population, bears examination for the caution with which it has approached the issue and 
sought to address concerns about the risks to individuals related to such a system.  
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One thing that the German government has done is give individuals some degree 
of control as to how the card would be used by the individuals and by others. For 
example, one of the principal purposes of the eID was to allow the use of digital 
signatures, and the facilitation of authentication of interactions between individuals, and 
business and government entities to help modernize public administrations and strengthen 
internal security. This gave greater assurance to business, and in turn, allowed\ 
individuals to have greater access to ebusiness applications.171 An example of granting of 
individual control to individuals is that in Germany, the eID could also serve as a travel 
document within the European Union (EU). Thus, German citizens could choose to use 
their e-passport for travel purposes, or use their e-ID for the same purpose. The 
requirement, however, was that the eID, if used as a travel document, would need to have 
the fingerprints embedded in the document. The Germans determined that they could 
allow individual citizens to decide whether they wanted to provide the fingerprints so that 
the card could embed that information into the card, and thus, facilitating its use as a 
travel document. Alternatively, the citizen could choose not to include the fingerprints, in 
which case, the e-ID could not be used for travel, and instead, the citizen would need to 
use the traditional e-passport. In addition, the government enlisted the assistance of 
service providers, and used them to test the electronic identification proof of the eID card 
so that the cards functioned as intended when unveiled in 2010.172  
C. CHAPTER RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REAL ID 
A number of takeaways and lessons learned from this comparison might have 
implications for the U.S.’ implementation of REAL ID and its efforts to gain societal 
acceptance of the effort by addressing concerns that REAL ID constitutes a national ID 
system. This issue will especially be important as DHS begins to enforce REAL ID and 
impose consequences on holders of non-compliant driver’s license and identification 
documents. Such efforts, in turn, will renew opposition to REAL ID and renew possible 
171 Noack and Kubicek, “The Introduction of Online Authentication as Part of the New Electronic 
National Identity Card in Germany,” 89. 
172 Ibid., 93. 
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challenges, legal, and otherwise, to its requirements. With that in mind, DHS would do 
well to adopt some lessons from the comparison countries. 
Get Out ahead of the Critics: (UK) 
Considerable opposition will be mounted against efforts to improve security when 
they impact individuals and by restricting them or imposing additional burdens. DHS 
must clearly communicate its message, educate the general public and the states, and 
address the challenges mounted by critics to ensure the public understands REAL IDs 
objectives and how the government has and will continue to respond to concerns.  
Proceed with Caution before Pursuing Anything Like an Identity Register: 
(UK) 
While not applicable to the REAL ID in its current form, one of the most 
controversial aspects of the most recent UK effort on a national ID system was the 
maintenance of a national register that would collect information on the entire population 
in a centralized manner. While not unusual in national ID systems, its existence proved 
particularly controversial and confusion and misinformation occurred as to whether 
REAL ID establishes a similar system. That misinformation needs to be confronted 
directly and firmly, while addressing why it is critical that states share information 
regarding applicants for driver’s licenses and identification documents. 
Enlist the Business Community, Particularly the Technology Sector, in 
Furtherance of the Effort: (India) 
This issue is particularly important when implementing complex systems that 
depend upon non-government systems and systems dealing with technology and 
implementation and adoption issues. Recent developments regarding surveillance 
activities of the National Security Agency (NSA) have eroded the trust between business 
and government on issues affecting individual privacy. However, DHS should enlist 
private entities in advising as to the best way to develop tools at both the federal and local 




 Set Standards for the Technology: (South Africa) 
As biometrically enabled ID cards need to distinguish between individuals 
presenting them to ascertain that the individual presenting the document is actually the 
individual to whom the card was issued, reliable technology is necessary to match the 
card quickly and accurately to the presenter, and is important for the system to be usable 
and accurate. Part of the implementation challenges for South Africa and others has been 
that the technology supporting the identity management and verification efforts was not 
standardized, and as a result, various incompatible systems were established that would 
not effectively interact with each other. 
Beware of Feeding the Beast of Business Interests: (South Africa) 
While the federal and state governments may do well to enlist the assistance of 
business, and will always be dependent upon its products and services to implement any 
effective government technology based program, let alone a national ID system, the 
management of how business supports critical government functions must be monitored 
to ensure that the government does not promote the spread of systems supporting 
incompatible and interoperable government functions. The government must also take 
care to ensure that business does not become itself too powerful in making use of that 
information about individuals in ways that could be seen by the public as threatening 
information security and individual privacy.  
Address Concerns Regarding the Accuracy of the System by Encouraging 
the Capture of Multiple Biometrics: (India) 
India found itself faced with the enrollment of an enormous population. The 
accuracy of the enrollment and of the matching of identity card to enrollees was 
legitimate concern and was critical to address for the system to be reliable and perform its 
intended purpose. India chose to collect more then one form of biometrics, to include 
fingerprints and iris scans. Proof of concept and post enrollment studies have reinforced 
the wisdom of that decision and have served to increase overall confidence in the 
accuracy of the system. The federal government should encourage the use of multiple 
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biometrics, as well as to ensure that confidence in the system’s accuracy grows and 
inaccuracies do not become a reason to oppose the system.  
Give People Choices Regarding the Use of Their Personal Information 
(Germany) 
Germany successfully implemented a national identity card notwithstanding its 
history and legitimate concerns of using identity documents to oppress its citizens. It has 
been careful to provide choices to the population regarding how much information it 
provides and how that information will be used. Giving citizens control over their 
information diminishes the ability of the government to abuse the identity cards, while 
empowering the citizens to make judgments about how much private information they 
want to provide for additional convenience. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The REAL ID Act has provided the United States the opportunity to enhance the 
security and reliability of state driver’s licenses and identity documents through the 
issuance of federal standards by DHS governing the issuance of those documents. Since 
the introduction of the legislation in Congress, critics have raised concerns that the 
program was establishing a national ID as part of a coercive identity regime. While the 
federal government continues to assert that REAL ID does not constitute a national ID 
scheme, this issue has been one contributing factor in the reluctance of many states to 
come into full compliance, thus weakening the efforts to address this vulnerability on a 
national basis. This chapter has sought to explain the claim that REAL ID is a national 
ID, the U.S. response to the claim, and shows how US. efforts differ from those of 
countries that have established or have sought to establish a national ID system. 
As DHS addresses the lingering concerns, and adopts measures to promote full 
implementation by the states, it would do well to study and learn from the experiences of 
the other countries. Doing so will allow it to undertake public messaging to distinguish 
the U.S. efforts from those of countries with national ID systems and help to promote 
societal acceptance. DHS and the states must engage with each other to ensure smart and 
effective implementation of the law to minimize the effects on privacy and security of the 
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information. DHS should also explore how best to fund, and allocate grants to the states 
to facilitate the acquisition of technical support. Technology investments and acquisitions 
should support verification activities in a manner that is integrated, and serves national 
security interests that protect privacy and information security.  
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IV. PRIVACY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH REAL ID 
As discussed earlier, deficiencies in the security of the issuance process related to 
state driver’s licenses and identification documents had enabled the hijackers to remain in 
the United States and access the air transportation system, raising concerns about the 
integrity of the issuance process. This situation led to the 9/11 Commission’s 
recommendations regarding the need for federal standards for the issuance of birth 
certificates and other sources of identification, such as driver’s licenses and state 
identification cards.173 As part of the federal efforts to set and implement such standards, 
DHS has required states to utilize technology to embed data in the MRZ of the 
identification documents.174 The MRZ refers to a specific physical area on the document 
or card where data is encoded in a machine-readable format.175 It allows the data 
appearing on the face of state-issued driver’s licenses and identification documents to be 
verified in real-time. This chapter addresses the following: the required data elements for 
REAL ID documents, the technology specified for the required MRZ (specified as 2D 
Barcode technology), how it compares to RFID technology—the most likely alternative 
to 2D Barcode technology, and the process through which DHS selected this technology 
and addressed privacy related concerns regarding its use.  
REAL ID requires state driver’s licenses and identity documents to include 
defined data elements and make them accessible through a common machine-readable 
technology. The use of machine-readable identity cards has increased significantly to 
allow the efficient transition from a manual to an automated authentication process.176 
The text information and biometric identifiers, such as facial image, signature, fingerprint 
173 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel. 
(Vulnerabilities include the submission of false documents to demonstrate residency, use by an imposter of 
documents relating to another individual, and tampering with legitimate documents to enable their use to 
demonstrate eligibility for state documents.) 
174 6 C.F.R. § 37.19. 
175 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, 13, 
44. 
176 Afzel Noore, Nikhil Tungala, and Max M. Houck, “Embedding Biometric Identifiers in 2D 
Barcodes for Improved Security,” Computers and Security 23, no. 8 (December 2004). 
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template, or iris template, are typically stored on the card and enable verification of the 
identity of the owner. The technical standards for the machine-readable technologies to 
be employed by the states are set forth at 6 C.F.R. § 37.19.177 For purposes of this 
discussion, it is sufficient to know that DHS established the Portable Data File 417 
barcode (PDF417) as the required technology to embed data into the MRZ.  
A. THE 2D BARCODE 
The PDF 417 is a type of 2D “stacked” barcode technology able to encode over 1 
kilobyte of data.178 Figure 1 shows an image of a 2D barcode.  
 
Figure 1.  PDF 417 2D Stacked Barcode179 
177 The standard specified is ISO/IEC 15438:2006(E) Information Technology—Automatic 
identification and data capture techniques—PDF417 symbology specification. 
178 Brendon Bass, “What Is an PDF417 Barcode,” Am Labels, December 15, 2010, http://www. 
support-amlabels.co.uk/2010/11/what-is-an-pdf417-barcode. 





                                                 
Recently, 2D barcodes with extended data capacity have been used to store 
information on ID cards compactly. According to one site, this barcode technology 
allows over 100 times more data to be stored as compared to traditional one dimensional, 
linear barcodes. Popular applications of this barcode technology include “mailing, 
logistics and inventory management.”180 The information can be stored securely and 
inexpensively and its advantages include the fact that information can be read from the 
labels using a “slightly modified handheld laser or linear CCD scanners.”181 
The PDF417 2D barcode is widely adopted by major industries and various 
national and international standards and industry organizations, such as the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI), the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), and the Association for Automatic Identification and Mobility (AIM), because 
of its extended data capacity and error correction capabilities.182 The correction code 
capability allows the information on the barcode to be read even when the barcode has 
been partially lost or destroyed.183  
According to one source, the PDF technology has become the preferred means of 
coding ID information inexpensively and with the capacity for a large amount of data.184 
The PDF approach is valuable in situations in which the database is not accessible at the 
point that the item will be read.185 Another advantage is the capability to store biometric 
data files, such as photographs, fingerprints, and signatures.186  
The REAL ID Act specified what minimum elements needed to be contained on 
the face of the cards, but it did not specify what data needed to be stored in the MRZ.187 
180 “PDF 417 2D Stacked Barcode.” 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid. (citing AIM, 1994). 
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid.  
185 Easesoft.net. “PDF417 Symbology,” February 24, 2013, http://www.easesoft.net/PDF417.html. 
(The PDF approach capability is consistent with the situation with REAL ID documents where, likewise, 
the database will not be accessible at the point at which the documents will be read, e.g., the TSA screening 
station, the federal building, or the nuclear facility.)  
186 Ibid. 
187 Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the REAL ID Final Rule,” 10. 
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However, the regulation specifies that PDF417 bar code standard must encode the 
following defined minimum data elements, seen as necessary for DMVs and law 
enforcement, within the state documents. 
• Expiration date 
• Full legal name, unless the state permits an applicant to establish a name 
other than the name that appears on a source document, pursuant to § 
37.11(c)(2) 
• Date of transaction 
• Date of birth 
• Gender 
• Address as listed on the card pursuant to § 37.17(f) 
• Unique driver’s license or identification card number 
• Card design revision date, indicating the most recent change or 
modification to the visible format of the driver’s license or identification 
card 
• Inventory control number of the physical document 
• State or territory of issuance188 
B. THE RULEMAKING PROCESS AND CONSIDERATION OF RFID AS A 
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGY 
DHS discussed the technology it would require for REAL ID purposes through 
the rulemaking process. DHS explained why it was requiring states to use the PDF 417 
2D barcode and also addressed why another technology considered, RFID, was not 
suitable for REAL ID purposes. The explanation was offered in the context of the PIA 
related to the rulemaking process. 
Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, DHS is required to have the DHS 
Chief Privacy Officer conduct a “privacy impact assessment of proposed rules of the 
Department.”189 In addition, pursuant to the e-Government Act of 2002, a PIA is required 
whenever federal agencies seek to develop or procure information technology that 
188 Department of Homeland Security, Final Rule. 
189 The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107–296 (November 25, 2002). 
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collects, maintains, or disseminates identifiable information.190 The Department of 
Homeland Security issued its PIA for the REAL ID final rule on January 11, 2008.191 
That PIA which was issued in advance of the Final Rule issued later that month, 
addressed the privacy implications of various aspects of the REAL ID rule raised by 
commenters during the NPRM. The PIA assessed five major privacy areas associated 
with the REAL ID Act and the proposed rule. The privacy area relevant to this discussion 
deals with the technology required by the REAL ID requirements. The issue was whether 
and how the information stored in the machine-readable zone (MRZ) on the cards will be 
protected from unauthorized use.192 
Among the issues addressed was the suggestion by commenters that DHS limit 
data elements to be included in the MRZ, and recommending instead, that the MRZ 
include only a pointer to a database where the information could be found and accessed 
only by law enforcement.193 DHS responded that while a pointer system might seem 
preferable, it would require a centralized national database to allow law enforcement 
from all jurisdictions to access the information, and furthermore, law enforcement would 
need access to technology to make such database information available on a mobile 
basis—something that not all law enforcement entities had the capability to access.194 It 
did, however, determine that while it would maintain the requirement to include the data 
elements in the MRZ, it would eliminate the name history as one of the required data 
elements.195 





191 Department of Homeland Security, Final Rule: Privacy Impact Assessment, January 11, 2008. 
192 Ibid., 3. 
193 Ibid., 10. 
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195 Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the REAL ID Final Rule, 10. 
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C. PROTECTION OF PII IN THE MRZ 
The PIA related to the NPRM clearly states that nothing in REAL ID required 
DHS to promulgate regulations setting federal standards for the protection of the privacy 
of individuals who apply for and receive driver’s licenses or state identification cards.196 
Nevertheless, the Chief Privacy Officer, through the PIA, noted that several references in 
the legislative history indicated that Congress intended for protection to be afforded.197 
The PIA noted that Congress expected this issue with respect to information contained in 
the MRZ, citing the following language from the Conference Report:  
There has been little research on methods to secure the privacy of the data 
contained on the machine-readable strip. Improvements in the machine 
readable technology would allow for less data being present on the face of 
the card in the future, with other data stored securely and only able to be 
read by law enforcement official.198 
According to the Chief Privacy Officer, this statement suggests that Congress wanted to 
secure the privacy of the data contained on the MRZ of the credential, and make it 
accessible only to law enforcement officials. 
DHS considered the findings of the Chief Privacy Officer, but determined that 
REAL ID does not authorize DHS to limit third-party private sector uses of the 
information appearing in the front of the REAL ID document or in the MRZ. It further 
recognized that the 2D Barcode might have vulnerabilities and technology limitations 
compared to other available technologies. It explained that it nevertheless selected the 2D 
Barcode because it was already in use by 45 jurisdictions and law enforcement across the 
country, and making a different technology choice could hamper law enforcement and 
prove to be an additional financial burden on the states. Instead, DHS emphasized that 
states could take action, through their own laws, to limit third-party use, citing the 
example of California, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Texas, which had taken action to 
196 Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the REAL ID Act: In 
Conjunction with the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and 
Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 3–4. 
197 Ibid., 5. 
198 Ibid., 4. (citing H.R. Rep. No 109–72 (2005) (Conf. Rep.). 
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limit third-party use of the MRZ.199 It further noted that the AAMVA had issued a model 
act limiting such use. That model legislation authorized the use of 2d bar code scanners 
by third-party users only for the limited purposes of age verification.200 
The PIA notes that the DHS Privacy Officer had “urged DHS to adopt encryption 
to protect PII on the MRZ from skimming by third parties other than law enforcement or 
DMVs.”201 Nevertheless, the NPRM PIA noted that to encrypt the data to prevent 
unauthorized third party access, it would be necessary to establish a cryptographic key to 
decrypt, and to provide that key to permitted parties to access the information. “The need 
for a key infrastructure to support access to encrypted 2D bar code data raises an 
important challenge for implementation of encryption.”202 
The NPRM had asked for public comment on the issues of: 1) whether 
implementing encryption was feasible from an operational and cost perspective, and 2) 
whether encryption could be deployed in a manner that would ensure access to the 
information by law enforcement.203 The PIA noted it was recognized that to implement 
encryption, it would be necessary to establish a “complex and comprehensive” exchange 
of encryption keys among all 56 jurisdictions involved in issuing and accessing REAL ID 
driver’s licenses and identification cards.204 Footnote 50 of the NPRM PIA describes the 
complexity as follows.  
With 2D bar codes, a symmetric cryptographic key system would need to 
be implemented. With a symmetric system, a multi-key or single key 
implementation could be used. In a multi-key implementation, although a 
larger the number of keys creates a more secure system, because a single 
key compromise does not compromise the entire system, this large number 
199 Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the REAL ID Act: In 
Conjunction with the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and 
Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 4. (citing H.R. Rep. No 109–72 
(2005) (Conf. Rep.). 
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Department of Homeland Security, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Privacy Impact Assessment, 
March 1, 2007, 16. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid.  
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of cryptographic keys would need to be accessible to the law enforcement 
personnel wherever they would be reading the driver’s license. A single 
key implementation would avoid the complexities of needing a key 
infrastructure, but his greatly increases the risk that this single key could 
be compromised. Although employing a single key greatly simplifies the 
procedure to make available the cryptographic key to law enforcement 
personnel, the compromise of this single cryptographic key would 
compromise all driver’s licenses created with it. In this case, encryption 
could create a false sense of security if a license holder thought his or her 
information was truly secure and it was not, because an unauthorized third 
party compromised the key. Not only do these implementation operations 
present operational and security risks, they also factor into the privacy 
risks with the selection of an implementation.205  
The NPRM PIA noted that under principles of data minimization protections, if 
encryption were to be used, then the MRZ should have fewer data elements and more 
limited personal information, especially the credential holder’s address.206  
Many comments were received both for and against encryption. DHS 
acknowledged that the potential to skim PII from the MRZ raises important privacy 
concerns, but it struck the balance in favor of the need for law enforcement to have easy 
access to the information, as well as complexities and costs of implementing an 
encryption infrastructure.207 Thus, DHS did not require encryption “at this time.” It 
noted, however, “if the States collectively determine that it is feasible to introduce 
encryption in the future, DHS will consider such an effort, so long as the encryption 
program enables law enforcement easy access to the information in the MRZ.” The PIA 
that accompanied the final rule indicates that DHS supports efforts to find technological 
improvements to protect the personal information on the MRZ, as well as state efforts to 
limit skimming of personal information from the cards.208  
205 Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the REAL ID Act: In 
Conjunction with the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and 
Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 4. 
206 Ibid., 17. 
207 Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the REAL ID Final Rule,” 14–
15. 
208 Ibid., 15. 
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Among those dissatisfied with the DHS response regarding how it sought to 
protect the personal information on the cards, was EPIC, which was among the 
commenters urging DHS to adopt encryption as a means of protecting information stored 
on the MRZ. In its report on REAL ID’s implementation issued in May 2008, EPIC 
expressed its disagreement with DHS’ decision to leave the information on the cards 
unencrypted. It noted that DHS did so notwithstanding the recommendations of 
“independent privacy and security experts and the agency’s own Privacy Office,” and 
thereby, created unnecessary security risks to individual privacy.209 EPIC’s report cited 
examples of cases in which unencrypted information had been accessed by unauthorized 
users, and indicated that while it anticipated DHS’ responses regarding the difficulties 
with the use of encryption.210 It criticized DHS for failing to consider an alternative that 
EPIC had proposed, which was to not enter any personal information onto the MRZ, but 
instead, embed a unique identifier into the MRZ, which would “point” to the records in a 
national database. Those records, in turn, would only be accessible via the use of a 
password or encryption.211 However, as DHS had noted in its responses to comments, 
such an approach would suggest the need for a national database, which DHS did not 
want to establish given concerns about creating a national registry or national ID.  
In addition to EPIC, the New York American Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU), 
has also been a vocal opponent of storing information in the MRZ, and raised concerns 
beyond those raised by EPIC. In its 2009 report setting forth its opposition to REAL ID, 
the NYCLU raised a wide-ranging, but arguably unsupported criticism, of the use of the 
MRZs on privacy grounds, including: 1) the MRZ makes the information readily 
accessible and able to be used by thousands of state and local officials, as well as private 
entities to easily track individuals; 2) the failure to encrypt the information allows anyone 
with a reader to access the information; 3) the unencrypted information contained in the 
databases and the MRZ is a treasure trove for identity thieves creating one-stop shopping 
for access to a wide variety of documents, including SSNs; and 4) the information 
209 EPIC: Real ID Implementation Review, 12. 
210 Ibid., 13. 
211 Ibid. 
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contained in the MRZ was of concern to labor organizations which claimed it could be 
used to do intrusive monitoring of workers including monitoring their trips to the 
restroom; and 5) the MRZ poses specific concerns for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) individuals whose entry into clubs and purchases could be used to 
expose their sexuality or discriminate against them.212 The NYCLU’s recitation of 
problems with the MRZ largely comes down to a concern about the absence of 
encryption, which DHS addressed in its rulemaking documents. It also tends to 
exaggerate the threat given that 2D Barcodes are unlike RFIDs that can be read from 
distances of a few inches, up to 20 to 30 feet away for “passive” tags, or as far away as a 
mile or more for some “active” tags.  
D. THE RFID AS AN ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGY 
Simultaneous with the efforts on REAL ID, DHS was seeking to implement 
enhanced driver’s licenses (EDLs), which did utilize RFID technology. The EDLs were 
developed to address the need for cross-border travel between the United States and 
Canada, due to the implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative 
(WHITI), which was a result of Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004.213 That legislation required that to cross the border between the United States and 
Canada, or between the United States and Mexico, persons seeking to do so would need 
to use a passport or secure documentation that established identity and status and 
nationality. For admission to the United States, U.S. citizens would need to establish 
citizenship. To accommodate this need, EDLs were developed using RFID technology. 
That technology allows the transmission of information electronically stored in tags in the 
document to be transmitted wirelessly.214 
DHS’ Customs and Border Protection has adopted RFID technology to enable a 
number of documents to be acceptable for WHITI purposes. Among those documents are 
212 Udi Ofer, Ari Rosmarin, and Michael Cummings, No Freedom Without Privacy: The REAL ID 
Act’s Assault on Americans’ Everyday Life (NY ACLU, February 2009). 
213 Public Law 108–458 (December 17, 2004). 
214 Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the REAL ID Act: In 
Conjunction with the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and 
Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes. 
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the U.S. Passport Card, Trusted Traveler Program cards (Global Entry, NEXUS, SENTRI 
and FAST), Enhanced Driver’s Licenses from issuing (Michigan, New York, Vermont 
and Washington), New Border Crossing Card, and New Permanent Resident Card (green 
card).215 
Views differ as to the risks to the privacy of individuals that accompany the use of 
RFID technology. Some view it as a significant risk to privacy and theft of the 
information.216 Others are less concerned about the risks of the technology and view it as 
valuable technology for secure identification purposes, while recognizing that adequate 
protections are necessary to ensure that PII is protected.217 Some researchers have 
asserted that from a privacy protection standpoint, the RFID technology, used in items 
like the U.S. E-passport, poses a greater risk to privacy due to issues with skimming, 
eavesdropping, and other measures that result in tracking and possible identity theft.218 
Significant differences currently exist between the technology needed to support 
REAL ID, from that which is needed for WHITI purposes. Principally, the reason for 
their different uses relates to the proximity within which the information is read. In the 
border crossing application, the information needs to be transmitted from a distance to 
allow the inspectors situated at the ports of entry to view information related to that 
traveler at the point that the traveler approaches the inspection location. In the current 
situation with REAL ID documents, it is not necessary to transmit the information from a 
distance, because the identification documents are presented for official purposes, are in 
close proximity to the government official seeking to view or scan the information from 
the document. Nevertheless, as DHS indicated, it was open to exploring further the utility 
and security of the RFID technology in connection with REAL ID documents. 
215 Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the REAL ID Act: In 
Conjunction with the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and 
Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes. 
216 Marci Meingast, Jennifer King, and Deirdre K. Mulligan, “Embedded RFID and Everyday Things: 
A Case Study of the Security and Privacy Risks of the U.S. E-Passport,” in RFID, 2007. IEEE 
International Conference on RFID, 2007, http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=4143504. 
217 Monica Nogueira and Noel Greis, “Uses of RFID Technology in U.S. Identification Documents,” 
University of North Carolina, Center for Logistics and Digital Strategy, 2009. 
218 Meingast, King, and Mulligan, “Embedded FID and Everyday Things,” 7–14. 
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E. ADDITIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTION MEASURES ADOPTED BY 
DHS 
Although the proposed rule had authorized states to access each other’s databases 
electronically, this provision was withdrawn in the final rule due to concerns raised by 
commenters, including states. Instead of specifically authorizing such access by states, 
the PIA accompanying the final rule explains that states may use existing processes to 
transfer information regarding a prior motor vehicle record when an individual seeks to 
move a license from one state to another.219  
To address concerns about including the address of certain categories of people 
for whom state laws authorize not disclosing that information, the final rule authorized 
the true address to only be maintained securely in the records of the state motor vehicle 
departments as opposed to being included on the face of the cards or captured in the 
MRZs.220  
F. CONCLUSION 
The events of 9/11, and the recognition of the need for more secure identification 
documents, resulted in a significant and controversial regulatory scheme to develop more 
secure state issued driver’s licenses and identification documents. A key consideration in 
the rulemaking process was determining the technology to be used by encoding 
information within those documents to enable the authentication of the document. DHS 
considered both 2D Barcode, as well as RFID technology, and ultimately, determined 
that the 2D Barcode technology best suited its operational needs while reducing risk to 
the security of the PII, and facilitating interoperability for law enforcement purposes. As 
the states begin to issue REAL ID compliant documents, as technology progresses, and as 
additional uses for the REAL ID documents become a possibility, it will be necessary for 
DHS to monitor the effect of the 2D Barcode standard. It may also be the case that as 
technology progresses and additional security measures are developed, RFID technology 
may be reconsidered as the acceptable technology standard. 
219 Department of Homeland Security, “Privacy Impact Assessment for the REAL ID Final Rule,” 12. 
220 Ibid., 10. 
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V. THE CLAIM THAT REAL ID VIOLATES THE TENTH 
AMENDMENT AND CONSTITUTES AN UNFUNDED MANDATE 
This chapter focuses on the claim that REAL ID violates the Tenth Amendment 
and constitutes an unfunded mandate. REAL ID has come under assault by a number of 
states, which have resisted its implementation and label it an intrusion into state 
sovereignty, as well as an unfunded mandate. One of the significant impediments to the 
full implementation of REAL ID is that the states, through the National Governor’s 
Association and similar entities, have asserted that REAL ID is an unfunded mandate.221 
It is very likely that as DHS enforcement efforts progress, states particularly opposed to 
REAL ID will likely engage in litigation seeking to challenge it as a violation of the 
Tenth Amendment. As for the claim that REAL ID constitutes an unfunded mandate, it is 
unclear how vulnerable REAL ID would be to any court action on that issue, but it needs 
to be recognized that implementation comes at considerable costs to states. The 
considerable expense of implementation efforts, and claims that the federal standards 
constitute an unfunded mandate, becomes a political rallying point that warrants attention 
from DHS.  
As an initial matter, it is necessary to address what the Tenth Amendment 
prescribes, and what is commonly understood to be an unfunded mandate. The Tenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides as follows:  
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.222 
The question for Tenth Amendment purposes is whether the federal government’s actions 
to set standards for the issuance of driver’s licenses and state identity documents 
constitutes sufficient interference with state powers by effectively commandeering state 
221 National Governors Association, National Conference of State Legislatures, and American 
Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, The REAL ID Act: National Impact Analysis,a September 
2006. 
222 U.S. Const. amend. X. 
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regulatory processes or functions.223 Alternatively, the tactic, embodied in both laws, of 
setting federal standards that the states must meet for the documents to be acceptable for 
federal purposes, as opposed to imposing direct prescriptions on the states, may 
sufficiently disentangle the federal government from state processes, such that the laws 
will survive a Tenth Amendment challenge—but it remains to be seen. 
Tenth Amendment principles have particular applicability in the context of 
discussions surrounding legislation like REAL ID, and the concept of unfunded 
mandates. It is generally in relation to the impact of federal legislative and regulatory 
requirements that many argue impose unfunded mandates on states. An “unfunded 
mandate” according to one source is defined as the following. 
A requirement set forth by a governing agency that does not provide any 
type of funding to facilitate the requirement. For example, “In order to 
comply with the unfunded mandate on security upgrades, the business will 
have to incur out-of-pocket expenses.224 
In a sense, an unfunded mandate can be seen by those who see a growth in federal 
intrusions into state sovereignty as adding insult to injury because it is viewed as 
imposing significant costs on states in addition to intruding upon the states through 
requirements that they are powerless to resist. This argument is commonly raised by 
critics of REAL ID, and has been stressed by one of the more vocal organization critics, 
EPIC. 
EPIC is among the principal opponents of REAL ID, and one that claims that 
REAL ID is an unfunded mandate on the states. EPIC issued a review of the proposed 
implementation of the REAL ID Act, in May 2008. In its May 2008 review of REAL ID, 
EPIC first took issue with the statement from DHS that REAL ID was a voluntary 
program and not mandatory.  
 
223 Garcia, Lee, and Tatelman, Immigration, 2. 
224 “What Is Unfunded Mandate? Definition and Meaning,” accessed December 16, 2013, 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/unfunded-mandate.html. 
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The Department of Homeland Security has repeatedly stated that REAL 
ID is not mandatory; therefore, it is not an unfunded mandate. However, in 
EPIC’s May 2007 comments on the draft REAL ID regulations, we 
explained the reasons why REAL ID is not a “voluntary” program.225 
EPIC’s argument that REAL ID imposes a mandate and is not voluntary stems not from 
any statutory or regulatory requirement for the states to comply, but rather from the 
pressure it claims is being applied to states and individuals. According to EPIC, states 
feel considerable pressure to implement REAL ID, particularly in the wake of DHS 
officials remarking that states that do not comply pose a risk to the nation. EPIC also 
points to the inconvenience faced by citizens in everyday transactions, such as air 
travel.226 In addition to the voluntariness aspect, EPIC also takes issue with the 
inadequacy of financial assistance provided by DHS, noting that DHS allocated $360 
million to the states for implementation effort, an amount that, according to EPIC, pales 
in comparison to the estimated 9.6 billion estimate for implementation.227 EPIC is 
making two separate but related points. One is the voluntariness aspect, and the second 
criticism that seems applicable relates to the costs imposed on the states, regardless of 
whether REAL ID is a mandated program. These two points are addressed in turn.  
It appears that at most, on the issue of pressure exerted by DHS, the strongest 
condemnation it can make of DHS efforts to persuade states is DHS’ statement that states 
may find noncompliance “an unattractive option” because of the inconvenience that 
citizens from noncompliant states would experience.228 EPIC’s assertion that that DHS’ 
expectation of “widespread” acceptance and the continued pressures and penalties on 
states cause it to remain convinced that the program is not voluntary.229 
225 EPIC: Real ID Implementation Review, 4. 
226 EPIC: Real ID Implementation Review. 
227 Ibid., 21. 
228 Ibid., 5. 
229 Ibid. 
 71 
                                                 
A. THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 
First, it must be understood that federal mandates, or requirements imposed on 
states or private entities that impose obligations or actions, are not necessarily prohibited, 
and is embodied in the legislation enacted to offer relief to states, localities, and business 
entities from unfunded federal mandates. That legislation is known as the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA).230  
The purpose of UMRA was to establish requirements for legislation and 
regulations that imposed enforceable duties on state, local, tribal governments or the 
private sector.231 To understand the issues better, a basic overview and background of the 
relevant legislation is warranted. Under UMRA, obligations imposed on state, local, or 
tribal governments, or on the private sector, are referred to as “mandates.”232 Further, the 
direct costs to entities required to meet the mandates are referred to as “mandated costs” 
which become “unfunded mandates” when the federal government does not cover those 
costs.233 The concern with unfunded mandates on the part of state and local entities arose 
in the 1970s, which was a period of extensive legislative activity on the part of the federal 
government in furtherance of various federal programs and activities. Many requirements 
or mandates imposed in furtherance of various government objectives were seen as being 
in furtherance of the national interest, such as a variety of social welfare programs.234  
The reason that the states and localities became concerned was that during this 
same period, the federal government shifted from its traditional reliance on “grant-in-aid” 
programs, which, in effect, subsidized states’ voluntarily efforts in furtherance of those 
programs, and instead, shifted to a model of imposing requirements under threat of civil 
fines or criminal penalties.235 State and local entities, and eventually, business entities as 
230 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Public Law 104–4, 109 Stat. 48, 104–4, 1995, 2. 
231 Robert Jay Dilger and Richard S. Beth, “Unfunded Mandates Reform Act: History, Impact, and 
Issues,” 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40957.pdf, 1. 
232 Dilger and Beth, Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. 
233 Ibid., 1. 
234 Dilger and Beth, Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. 
235 Ibid., 1–2. 
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well, mobilized against what they viewed as increasingly compulsory programs, viewing 
them as contrary to principles of federalism, which was viewed as encompassing 
cooperation, not compulsion, between the federal government, and state and local 
entities.236 This concern, in turn, fueled an effort by the states and localities, as well as 
business, to seek legislation to control the unfunded mandates. That effort culminated in 
UMRA, seen by supporters as a restoration of the balance between the federal 
government, and state and local entities, and a return to traditional principles of 
federalism.237 Opponents, however, viewed such mandates as necessary when voluntary 
actions by local governments or business failed to achieve the desired results.238 
UMRA identified eight statutory purposes to achieve its goal of addressing 
unfunded mandates. In general, the legislation sought to restore a partnership relationship 
between the federal government, and state, local, and tribal governments. It further 
established mechanisms by which greater information was made available regarding the 
anticipated effects and impact of legislation and regulations on those governmental and 
non-governmental entities that would be impacted by the complying with or 
implementing such mandates. It also sought to ensure that informed and deliberate 
decisions would be made by Congress regarding imposing mandates in any particular 
instance, and sought to have Congress consider whether it should provide funding. 
UMRA further required analyses of the impact of federal mandates, and created a 
procedural mechanism, i.e., a “point-of-order” vote in each chamber of Congress when 
considering legislation containing significant mandates without providing adequate 
funding for the entities subject to the legislation to comply.239 
More stringent requirements are placed on the federal government for legislation 
and regulations that under the law are considered to be “covered mandates,” i.e., those 
which are fully subject to UMRA. Those addition requirements include an assessment 
from the Congressional Budget Office of the costs imposed on the local entity or 
236 Dilger and Beth, Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 2. 
237 Dilger and Beth, Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. 
238 Ibid., 2. 
239 Ibid., 3. 
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business, which is subject to the covered mandate in proposed legislation, and a similar 
assessment from the federal agency when regulations are proposed. In addition, for laws 
considered a “covered mandate” on intergovernmental entities (but not on private 
entities), UMRA provides for a “point of order”—to each chamber of Congress—which 
allows each chamber to decline to consider the legislation because of its effect as an 
unfunded mandate.240 
B. APPLICABILITY OF UMRA 
UMRA generally applies to “any provision in legislation, statute, or regulation 
that would impose an enforceable duty upon state and local governments or the private 
sector.”241 However, the law provides for exceptions, and they are broad. It does not 
apply to “conditions of federal assistance, duties stemming from participation in 
voluntary federal programs, rules issued by independent regulatory agencies, or 
legislative provisions that cover individual constitutional rights, discrimination, 
emergency assistance, grant accounting and auditing procedures, national security, treaty 
obligations, and certain elements of Social Security legislation.”242 It would seem that 
REAL ID would arguably be covered under both the voluntary federal programs 
exception, as well as the national security exception. However, the issue is complex, and 
clarity on the concept of what constitutes an unfunded mandate has not been achieved 
given the historically “strong disagreements, among academics, practitioners, and elected 
officials over how to define it.”243 Nevertheless, when Congress sought to define 
“unfunded mandates” under UMRA, it defined it more narrowly than many state and 
local government officials had hoped.244 
While the applicability of UMRA to REAL ID seems doubtful, one benefit of 
UMRA for REAL ID, and other legislation deemed to be imposing costly and 
burdensome requirements on states, it does appear that UMRA has had the salutary effect 
240 Dilger and Beth, Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 1. 
241 Ibid., 4. 
242 Ibid. citing 2 U.S.C. sections 658(5)(A), (7)(A) and ((10), and 2 U.S.C. section 1503. 
243 Ibid., 5. 
244 Ibid. 
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of bringing increased attention to the fiscal effects of federal legislation and has fostered 
greater consultation and collaboration.245 It may also have served as a check on 
legislation either not proposed, or modified in some way. In support of this point, it is 
noteworthy that as of August 2013, pursuant to UMRA, the Congressional Budget Office 
has submitted 9,737 written cost estimates to Congress examining the costs imposed by 
specific bills, amendments, or conference reports on the private sector or state and local 
entities. Of those, 1,238 were found to have intergovernmental mandates. Only 13 of 
those in which the costs exceeded statutory threshold amounts were enacted.246 Among 
those laws were the predecessor provisions to REAL ID, within the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.247 Those provisions, like REAL ID, required that 
“state and local governments meet certain standards for issuing driver’s licenses, 
identification cards, and vital statistics documents” and estimated to cost those 
governments more than $100 million between 2005 and 2009, with thresholds being 
exceeded in at least one of the years.248  
As for its effect on REAL ID, it is clear that it did not prevent the legislation, and 
no litigation appears to have ensued that has successfully challenged REAL ID on that 
basis. It remains possible, of course, that states that have refused to comply might seek to 
bring such a challenge in the future, particularly when the graduated enforcement 
measures begin to take effect, and result in the rejection of non-compliant identification 
documents issued by states. It seems likely, however, that many years after its enactment, 
and after the expenditure of considerable time, effort, and money at both the federal and 
local level, that the act would not be struck down, nor would the courts be too likely to 
interfere in making radical changes to the program or to the federal government’s 
obligations.  
245 Dilger and Beth, Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 19–20 referencing observations by the National 
Conference of State Legislatures. 
246 Ibid., 20. 
247 Ibid., 21. 
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Nevertheless, the practical issue of concern raised by EPIC is how the states are 
going to pay for all of the changes to the driver license and identity document issuance 
systems, which is an issue of practical concern that needs to be addressed. It is obviously 
in DHS’ interests to have states be in a position to make the changes resulting from 
REAL ID. It should come as no surprise that the states and localities feel burdened by 
federal mandates and resist the loss of local control. The issue of federal mandates and 
regulation was discussed at a recent forum undertaken by for the Governance Matters 
segment of the State and Local Government Review with representatives of state and 
local government associations (the National Governor’s Association, National 
Association of Counties and National League of Cities).249 That forum, focused on 
current governance challenges for state and local government entities asked the 
association representatives to discuss their experience with the federal government on 
federal mandates. These officials do see a role for the federal government in terms of 
standard setting, but are of the view that the federal government can best assist those 
efforts by providing the necessary resources to assist the states and localities in getting 
the work done. A consensus was reached on this point among the participants, and REAL 
ID was cited as an example by John Thomasian, Director of the Center for Best Practices 
of the National Governor’s Association, one of the participants in the roundtable 
discussion: 
Most of the fights have been about regulations that have no money behind 
them. Take the ‘Real ID’ legislation, for example. This created a massive 
burden for States that they did not want, with little money to do it.250 
The next chapter addresses the funding that has been made available to states for REAL 
ID implementation. 
 
249 Bruce J. Perlman, “Governance Challenges and Options for State and Local Governments,” State 
and Local Government Review 42, no. 3 (December 1, 2010): 246–257, doi:10.1177/0160323X10390050. 
250 Ibid., 252. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
Significant opposition to REAL ID comes from states and organizations that see 
REAL ID as a usurpation of authorities reserved to the states, and as an unfunded 
mandate. These issues particularly appear to drive the opposition of states that have 
pursued legislation and other state level actions designed to defy REAL ID openly. While 
the federal government may ultimately prevail in its efforts to resist challenges based on 
the Tenth Amendment and unfunded mandates, the resulting battles may come at the 
expenditure of goodwill and collaboration on an effort that should be seen as mutually 
beneficial. In addition, failing to respond to, or address this concern could result in states 
lobbying Congress to loosen REAL ID standards.  
How to remedy this situation is unclear, and some states will nonetheless oppose 
federal efforts in this regard. Another factor in the opinion of those who deal regularly in 
intergovernmental relations (IGR) appears to be the deteriorating state of dialogue and 
trust between the different levels of government.  
According to our experts, the state of IGR could be better. Unfortunately, 
they do not believe that it is getting better. Moreover, due to the strains of 
the recession and reconfigured federal programs, it may be getting worse. 
All of them see this as an accelerated but not new phenomenon and crucial 
for State and Local, as well as Federal policies to work. Moreover, the 
fault is mostly the Federal Government’s in their view.251 
As noted by one participant in the Government Matters forum:  
The federal government has spent twenty to thirty years breaking the IGR 
system. It’s now at the point where officials at the different levels of 
government do not know how to talk to each other anymore.252 
While the federal government may win the battle, it also needs to win the war. 
Doing so in relation to the struggle between federal and state authority will entail 
recognizing that the states are largely concerned with resources and some a degree of 
autonomy in terms of how they address vulnerabilities in state licenses and identity 
documents. In that regard, DHS and the federal government’s efforts should be aimed at 
251 Perlman, “Governance Challenges and Options for State and Local Governments,” 250. 
252 Ibid., 250–251. 
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promoting compliance among the states with a mix of steady pressure to adopt the REAL 
ID standards coupled with flexibility, such as DHS has demonstrated to date. More 
importantly, however, DHS should aid the states by improving the tools that states can 
access to undertake the verification required by REAL ID, but also through direct grants 
and funding to give states the autonomy to improve their document issuance procedures. 
The next chapters discuss some of the assistance provided to states to facilitate 
compliance, the flexibilities afforded them to date, and how DHS seeks to manage 
enforcement efforts to get the states to the point of full compliance. 
 78 
VI. TOOLS AVAILABLE TO ASSIST WITH IMPLEMENTATION 
A. DHS’ SUPPORT FOR VERIFICATION PROGRAMS 
In addition to the state specific grants, DHS has provided approximately $63 
million to support verification technology infrastructure solutions including the 
development of a state-to-state system to address cross-state license fraud.253 These 
improvements allow the states to fulfill a key requirement of REAL ID, that a state “shall 
verify with the issuing agency, the issuance, validity, and completeness of each document 
required to be submitted by that person.”254 While the local state-grant programs will 
assist the state in complying, the development and improvement of mechanisms to 
improve verification require federal oversight and support for common solutions. The 
need for the verification tools predates REAL ID, and both the states and the federal 
government have sought to verify the validity of documents for other reasons. For 
example, the need to verify information presented for individuals to qualify for state and 
federal benefits, or to demonstrate lawful status in the United States has led to the 
development of such verification systems.255  
The following major systems and/or service providers, which pre-date REAL ID, 
facilitate key regulatory requirements of REAL ID, with the relevant provision 
referenced. 
(1) The Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) 
system. (States shall verify DHS documents through SAVE 6 CFR 
37.13(b)(1)) 
(2) The Social Security Online Verification (SSOLV). (States must 
verify SSNs with the Social Security Administration 6 C.F.R. 
37.13(b)(2)) 
(3) National Association of Public Health Statistics and Information 
Systems (NAPHSIS) and the Electronic Verification of Vital 
253 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Driver’s License Security. 
254 Department of Homeland Security, Secure Identification State Progress: Fiscal Year 2012 Report 
to Congress, August 28, 2012, 15 citing REAL ID Act Section 202(c)(3)(A). 
255 Ibid., 13, 15. 
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Events (EVVE) application; (States must verify birth certificates 
presented by applicants 6 C.F.R. 37.13(b)(4)) 
(4) American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators 
(AAMVA)/AAMVAnet. (States must verify REAL ID driver’s 
licenses and identification cards with the state of issuance 6 C.F.R. 
37.13(b)(5)) and (prior to issuing a REAL ID driver’s license DL 
or ID, a state must check with all other states to determine if the 
applicant holds another driver’s license or ID in another state256  
The verification of driver’s licenses among states has proven to be a particular 
challenge for the states, which is necessary to fulfill item 4, above; the REAL ID 
requirement that states ensure that applicants do not hold licenses in other states. The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) touched on this issue in its 2012 report 
entitled, Driver License Security: Federal Leadership Needed to Address Remaining 
Vulnerabilities. GAO distinguished between two types of license fraud requiring state 
verification activities. One form is in-state license fraud, which GAO noted was generally 
addressed by states using facial recognition programs.257 The second type of fraud is 
cross-state fraud, meaning fraud that occurs across state lines and involves the surrender 
of licenses from the holder’s previous state, which is committed by surrendering 
fraudulent licenses.258 This type of fraud is beset addressed using a photo-sharing 
program among the states. Thus, when a license is surrendered in the states in which the 
applicant seeks a new license, the image is cross-checked against the photo data of the 
state of original licensure. If no image exists, or if a different image is found that matches 
the applicant, then fraud is indicated.259 The state-to-state system could also detect the 
existence of licenses in other jurisdictions that have not been divulged.260 However, 
limitations to the ability of states to detect this type of fraud exist because a complete 
state-to-state system is not in existence although progress is being made. As GAO 
indicated, 23 states and the District of Columbia were participating in a photo-sharing 
256 Department of Homeland Security, Secure Identification State Progress: Fiscal Year 2012 Report 
to Congress, 15–16. 
257 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Driver’s License Security, 12. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Ibid. 
260 Ibid., 23. 
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program facilitated by AAMVA.261 GAO also noted that state efforts are underway to 
develop a solution to cross-sate licensing fraud using a state-to-state verification system. 
However, a pilot was not envisioned until 2015, with a fully populated system not 
anticipated until 2023.262 Until then, the more limited AAMVA program can address 
some of this fraud, but AAMVA has stated that it lacks the resources to expand the 
program to other states.263  
B. AN OVERVIEW OF THE VERIFICATION SYSTEMS 
Figure 2 shows the various electronic data validation and verification capabilities. 
Notably, the states proposed the architecture, which was endorsed by DHS and other 
federal agencies.264 It demonstrates how the various state and federal agencies and public 
associations and service providers interact and facilitate the verification of information 
between the service users and data owners. On the left side of the illustration are the state 
vital records agencies (VRAs), and the state driver license agencies (DLA), which verify 
the documents they receive through the service providers NAPHSIS and AAMVA, 
which, in turn, access information maintained by the data owners to provide verification 
to the VRAs and DLAs.  
261 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Driver’s License Security, 12. 
262 Ibid., 18–19. 
263 Ibid., 19. 
264 Department of Homeland Security, Secure Identification State Progress: Fiscal Year 2012 Report 
to Congress, 17. 
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Figure 2.  Infrastructure Solution of Electronic Data Validation and 
Verification265 
Through its funding and support of these systems, DHS has improved and 
strengthened the capability of the service providers to verify the information in an 
accurate and timely way. 
C. INCREASING PROGRESS TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE AND SECURE 
VERIFICATION SYSTEM 
Verifying Immigration Documents/Status 
Figure 3 shows that as of February 2012, 47 states have memoranda of 
agreements (MOAs) in existence with USCIS for access to the SAVE system. SAVE is 
used to verify immigration status that determines eligibility for state and federal benefits 
in other contexts, and in the REAL ID context, assists in fulfilling the requirement to 
265 Department of Homeland Security, Secure Identification State Progress: Fiscal Year 2012 Report 
to Congress, 15. 
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verify DHS documents, which in turn, demonstrate the immigration status of the 
individual.266  
 
Figure 3.  States with SAVE Memoranda of Agreement267  
States do pay a fee to access SAVE through memoranda of understanding 
(MOUs) with SAVE (via USCIS), but for a two-year period, a pilot project was being 
launched to allow states to access SAVE via AAMVAnet for them to integrate SAVE 
into their frontline operations.268 During that time, funding operations and maintenance 
of the system would be handled by the State of Mississippi, which is being done to 
incorporate SAVE into the state operations to make the verification process smoother for 
266 Department of Homeland Security, Secure Identification State Progress: Fiscal Year 2012 Report 
to Congress, 21. Since SAVE can address and verify only information related to U.S. citizens who possess 
DHS documents, such as certificates of naturalization, efforts are underway for USCIS to develop and pilot 
test a service that would verify U.S. passports to provide a conduit through USCIS to information 




                                                 
the states. USCIS is assisting in developing a way to allow states to access SAVE through 
the AAMVAnet communications network.269 
Verifying Social Security Numbers 
AAMVA developed what is known as the SSOLV system, under the authority of 
the SSA, to support real-time verification of SSNs.270 As shown in Figure 4, all 50 states 
and the District of Columbia require that SSNs be verified and use SSOLV. Two states 
were added since the publication of the REAL ID regulations, and the regulations 
extended the requirement for verification to the territories. Efforts are underway to extend 
access to the SSOLV system through AAMVAnet.271 
 
Figure 4.  Verification of Social Security Numbers272  
269 Department of Homeland Security, Secure Identification State Progress: Fiscal Year 2012 Report 
to Congress. 
270 Ibid., 19. 
271 Ibid., 19–20. 
272 Department of Homeland Security, Secure Identification State Progress: Fiscal Year 2012 Report 
to Congress, 20. 
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Verifying State Birth Certificates 
The ability to verify state birth certificates is key to the success of REAL ID. It 
also poses some of the most difficult challenges due to the inability to access electronic 
copies of records, and the poor quality of such records. For this reason, DHS has paid 
particular attention to this issue and has funded projects to improve access to such 
records.273 It has been recognized that the issuance of driver’s licenses has depended on 
the weak link of “breeder” or “seed” documents. The birth certificate, in particular, is 
often the least reliable document “because agencies have not kept consistent records and 
because the documents take so many different forms.”274 NAPHSIS supports states in 
verifying state vital records through a system known as EVVE application, which is most 
easily accessed by state Department of Motor Vehicles (DMVs) though the AAMVA 
network. Consequently, DHS is providing funding for projects to improve the 
accessibility of such records, improve the quality of the records, and correct errors in the 
data. As shown in Figure 5, the use of EVVE is widespread and growing.275 EVVE 
allows the states (and other entities, such as the federal government) to connect to EVVE 
to include digitized vital record checks into their identity verification processes. 
Technically, the states are not required to conduct such checks, and can claim compliance 
with the required security benchmarks of REAL ID, without them, but the intent of the 
federal government is that EVVE be used for that purpose. As a result, it has been 
funding the installation of EVVE to facilitate access by the states. Under REAL ID, $3.8 
million in funding was provided for this purpose.276 Part of the process for the states 
involves digitizing older records and cleaning up existing records.277 As a result of 
REAL ID, digitized identity verification through EVVE, as of December 2013, is used by 
273 Ibid., 22. 
274 Kelly Gates, “The United States REAL ID Act and the Securitization of Identity,” in Playing the 
Identity Card Surveillance, Security and Identification in Global Perspective, ed. Colin J Bennett and 
David Lyon (London; New York: Routledge, 2008), 227. 
275 Department of Homeland Security, Secure Identification State Progress: Fiscal Year 2012 Report 
to Congress, 23. 




                                                 
50 states and territories, with two additional jurisdictions in progress (Maine and Puerto 
Rico).278  
 
Figure 5.  EVVE Implementation—December 2013279 
A significant increase occurred from the implementation status as of June 2012, 
contained in the DHS state progress update, which showed that 43 states and territories 
were online, six were in progress, and eight had yet to begin any implementation.280 (See 
Appendix B.) 
However, five states (New York, Texas, Washington, Idaho, and New 
Hampshire) have not yet accessed vital records through EVVE, which represents a 
278 NAPHSIS, “EVVE,” accessed February 5, 2014, http://www.naphsis.org/Pages/EVVE.aspx. 
279 NAPHSIS, “EVVE.” 
280 Department of Homeland Security, Secure Identification State Progress: Fiscal Year 2012 Report 
to Congress, 23. 
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substantial number of driver’s licenses and state identification documents.281 This tool 
has seen a substantial increase in use among states and territories since the creation of the 
EVVE office 2005. As recently as February 2011, only 28 states were online with the 
EVVE system.282 
An additional digitization effort that would identify additional fraud involves 
linking digitized birth and death records in the system. It has been estimated that the cost 
to do so would be approximately $102 million.283 One area of opportunity for the federal 
government to assist states would be to pursue funding for such efforts. The IRTPA’s 
Section 7211 authorized federal grant programs that would help states to “meet federal 
standards.” Although the authorization to appropriate funds ran out in 2009, it would be 
worthwhile to pursue the reauthorization of such grants, and seek appropriations to fund 
the grants.284 
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Many critics of REAL ID indicate that states are incapable of verifying the 
documents presented to them, but as discussed above, cooperation between states and the 
federal government has significantly strengthened such capabilities. Due to the need for 
states to verify eligibility for state or federal benefits, systems had already been 
developed to facilitate verification. Since REAL ID was enacted, steady and ongoing 
progress continues, and additional efforts are being made to improve state access to the 
systems. 
The tools to assist states with complying with REAL ID exist, and are widely 
available, although improvements are necessary and continue to be made. Aside from 
increasing the ability of states to verify documents for purposes of the REAL ID 
281 It is not apparent from the information reviewed to date, why New York and Texas are not yet tied 
into the EVVE system, given the volume of transactions and their vulnerability to fraudulent documents. It 
would not seem to be attributable solely to size, since California is tied into the system. Given the risks 
posed by fraudulent documents, and the risks to New York, in particular, this anomaly merits additional 
research. 




                                                 
requirements, these tools serve another valuable purpose, which is also key to the utility 
of REAL ID. They assist the states in addressing fraud committed using fraudulent state, 
and immigration documents, passports, and Social Security cards. 
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VII. FUNDING ASSISTANCE AND FLEXIBILITY ON DEADLINES 
FOR THE STATES 
The final rule sets out the law’s requirements, It also addressed the more than 
21,000 public comments received, many of which focused on the costs to the states. The 
final rule indicated that DHS had made changes from the proposed rules to assist the 
states in addressing costs. First, DHS indicated it was making approximately $360 
million available to assist states with $80 coming from direct REAL ID grants, and an 
additional $280 million in general funding as part of the Homeland Security Grant 
Program. It also announced that costs were reduced by 73 million due to measures that 
were taken in the final rule to address costs, i.e., giving the states additional flexibility in 
issuing licenses to older Americans. This flexibility would allow states to enroll 
individuals younger than 50 until December 1, 2014, while enrollment of other 
individuals would be required by December 1, 2017, at which time, state-issued licenses 
and ID cards that were non-compliant with REAL ID, would be rejected for any official 
federal purpose.285  
A. EXTENSIONS OF COMPLIANCE DATES AND A MOVE TOWARD 
ENFORCEMENT 
1. A Series of Extensions 
The law, as originally designed, required states to comply with REAL ID by May 
11, 2008. Through a series of at times confusing regulatory waivers and extensions, the 
full compliance deadline was ultimately moved to January 15, 2013, with an 
announcement being made in December 2013 that DHS would begin enforcing REAL ID 
in 2014. The complex, but interesting series of communications by DHS, steadily nudged 
states toward compliance while providing incentives and threatened penalties for non-
compliance, merits brief discussion.  
The final regulations gave DHS the authority to consider requests for waivers 
filed by the states and provided that such waivers would be granted, if the state seeking 
285 Department of Homeland Security, Final Rule. 
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the extension offered “adequate justification for noncompliance.”286 The final regulations 
further elaborated upon the extension process that would extend the date by which full 
compliance was expected, to May 11, 2011, if states seeking extensions were able to 
meet an interim, material compliance deadline of January 1, 2010.287 (See Appendix C 
for a Chart on State Compliance Milestones.) 
Following the publication of the final regulations, Secretary of DHS Michael 
Chertoff was very visible in public defending and advocating on behalf of REAL ID. 
Secretary Chertoff initially took a hard line on compliance and the states’ need to adhere 
to the deadlines. At one such event, dubbed a “Pen-and Pad Briefing,” Secretary Chertoff 
responded to a question about what would happen to states that did not meet the deadline 
He stated:  
What’s going to happen is this. Now, first, let me make it clear. I’m not 
bluffing about May 11, [the compliance date] and even if I were inclined 
to be a bluffer, which I’m not, the law makes it clear. The law passed by 
the Congress is: On May 11th, if you don’t get a waiver, then you’re going 
to have—a driver’s license will not be acceptable for federal purposes as 
an ID.288 
Thus, DHS allowed states to submit, no later than March 31, 2008, requests for 
extension that would last until, but no later than December 31, 2009. It seems likely that 
Secretary Chertoff knew that the states would seek the waivers from compliance and that 
his main objective may have been to ensure that the states did not simply just ignore the 
deadline but sought waivers. This objective was achieved, as seen in Figure 6, which 
shows the jurisdictions that had sought, and were granted, the initial waiver and extension 
for compliance to December 31, 2009. 
286 The REAL ID Act of 2005, Section 205(b). 
287 Department of Homeland Security, “Final Rule.” (The particular provision regarding extensions 
was codified at 6 C.F.R. 37.63). 
288 Department of Homeland Security, DHS Press Release: Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary 
Michael Chertoff at Pen and Pad Briefing on the Department’s Fifth Anniversary, March 6, 2008. 
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Figure 6.  Initial Waiver and Extension for Compliance to December 31, 
2009289 
As can be seen, all jurisdictions sought, and were granted, extensions by the Bush 
administration, to December 31, 2009. 
Subsequently, DHS, seeing that states would have difficulty achieving full 
compliance, and in an attempt to give effect to the waiver provision, bifurcated the 
requirements for states. It kept the full compliance date at May 11, 2011, but allowed 
states to demonstrate that they were materially compliant by January 1, 2010, based on 
meeting certain benchmarks. Furthermore, states could seek an extension beyond that 
date if they submitted, by December 1, 2009, a “Material Compliance Checklist” 
demonstrating their commitment to complying with the regulations. This was intended to 
reward states making progress toward compliance.290 (See Appendix D for synopsis of 
material compliance benchmarks.) If material compliance were demonstrated, the state’s 
extension would then last until no later than May 10, 2011 for full implementation. DHS, 
however, learned that 46 of 56 jurisdictions were unable to establish material compliance, 
and thus, stayed the material compliance deadline through the publication of a final rule 
in the Federal Register on December 29, 2009, staying the January 1, 2010 material 
compliance deadline.291 DHS’ change to the compliance deadlines had the effect of 
bifurcating the requirements. First, DHS required states to demonstrate that they were in 
289 Stewart Baker, Assistant Secretary for Policy, “Real ID,” March 20, 2008, DHS Leadership 
Journal Archive http://ipv6.dhs.gov/journal/leadership/labels/Real%20ID.html. 
290 Department of Homeland Security, Secure Identification State Progress: Fiscal Year 2012 Report 
to Congress, 4. 
291 Ibid. 
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material compliance by January 10, 2010, and they would then need to achieve full 
compliance by May 11, 2011., which was further amended in December 2009, by 
indefinitely suspending the date by which states had to demonstrate material compliance.  
Finally, DHS promulgated a final rule on March 7, 2011 that extended the date for 
full compliance and change it to January 15, 1013.292 This deadline was not further 
extended, but DHS then announced its intention to begin a gradual enforcement of the 
provisions of REAL ID, which it announced in December 2013, and which is discussed 
next. 
2. Enforcement Comes at Last? 
Most recently, DHS, on December 20, 2012, announced that it would begin to 
phase in the enforcement of REAL ID. The announcement indicated it would do so in a 
phased manner, with four distinct phases of enforcement, the first being restrictions on 
the use of non-compliant IDs for access to the DHS Headquarters facility, known as the 
Nebraska Avenue Complex (NAC). The enforcement schedule, set forth below, calls for 
a graduated enforcement, with each phase beginning with a period of public notice 
followed by a specified date when full enforcement begins. Each successive enforcement 
phase carries with it higher level consequence and impact upon the public, and 
culminates—no sooner than 2016—with full enforcement of the requirement to present 
REAL ID compliant driver’s licenses for the purpose of boarding federally regulated 
aircraft.293 This graduated enforcement, while perhaps excessive in its length, given DHS 
statements about how close most states are to full implementation, may prove to be a 
wise approach. 
In support of its announcement regarding the phased enforcement, DHS published 
a brief and helpful overview of the planned enforcement that contained two useful visuals 
to inform the public and the states regarding 1) its enforcement timetable, and 2) the 
292 Government Printing Office, “Federal Register, Volume 76 Issue 44 Minimum Standards for 
Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes,” March 
7, 2011, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-03-07/html/2011-5002.htm. 
293 “DHS Releases Phased Enforcement Schedule for REAL ID.” 
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current status of state compliance with REAL ID requirements.294 Those visuals are 
reproduced in Figure 7. The first image is DHS’ chart showing the four phases of 
implementation, to include the following. 
• The four phases of enforcement 
• The enforcement action being taken 
• The commencement date of public notice 
• The commencement date of full enforcement 
 
Figure 7.  Enforcement Phases and Dates295 
As can be seen, DHS’ plan is to do graduated and cumulative levels of enforcement, 
beginning with relatively low impact consequences affecting a limited population, and 
eventually culminating in the restriction of the ability of residents of non-compliant states 
to use their state issued identification documents for the purpose of boarding federal 
aircraft. This latter enforcement measure is the most well-known and anticipated 
consequence with a high impact on the general public. Notably, DHS does not commit to 
a date certain for that consequence, noting that it would occur “no sooner than 2016.” 
DHS plans to undertake an evaluation following the implementation of the first three 
enforcement phases, to “assess the effects of enforcement and the progress of states in 
meeting the standards of the act.”296 That assessment will inform its decision prior to 
setting the date for full compliance with phase 4, and will “inform a fair and achievable 





                                                 
timeline.”297 In each phase, DHS plans to precede the particular enforcement mechanism 
with a three-month advance notification period. How much public education and outreach 
DHS will undertake during that time remains to be seen. It is anticipated, however, that 
for a smooth implementation to occur, and to minimize the effects of the enforcement 
mechanisms, a fair degree of coordination with the states would occur, particularly those 
not yet compliant with REAL ID.  
DHS’ release of its phased enforcement plan was also accompanied by an updated 
listing of the status of the states and territories showing their status as being either non-
compliant or a compliant/extension state. Compliant states are those that have met all of 
the REAL ID requirements, and extension states are those that have sought extensions, 
which are currently valid through October 10. 2014.298 As full enforcement begins, 
residents of compliant/extension states can continue to use their state documents as 
before, but residents of non-compliant states “will need to follow alternative access 
control procedures for purposes covered by the Act.”299 Figure 8, supplied by DHS in 
connection with its announcement of the beginning of phased enforcement sets forth, in 
an easy to distinguish manner, the non-compliant states from the compliant/extension 
states. 




                                                 
 
Figure 8.  Non-compliant and Compliant/Extension States300 
DHS puts a positive spin on the status of the states, noting that as of December 
20, 2013, “approximately 75% of all U.S. drivers hold licenses from jurisdictions that 
have met REAL ID standards, or have received extensions.301 While it is true that those 
drivers can be assured of no adverse consequences as a result, the reality is that the 75% 
300 Department of Homeland Security, “REAL ID Enforcement in Brief.” 
301 Ibid. 
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figure comes from 41 states, and of those, 21 have been deemed fully compliant. Adding 
the number of non-compliant states to the number that are the beneficiaries of extensions, 
yields a total of 35 states and territories still not in compliance. It is, undoubtedly, DHS’ 
expectation that the extension states will be encouraged to pursue more active measures 
to bring themselves into compliance during the course of the phased enforcement. The 
greater challenge, of course, is to persuade those non-compliant states, particularly those 
that are defiantly so, to pursue the necessary steps to come into compliance. The 
possibility—or even the likelihood—also remains of a confrontation, likely in the form of 
a legal challenge sometime down the line on the part of some or all the states that 
continue to oppose the REAL ID requirements. While this author believes that the 
likelihood of success of such a challenge is low, the fact remains that a victory for DHS 
many years down the line will simply result in significant delays in shoring up 
weaknesses in the nation’s license and non-driver license identification system. Those 
weak links have been, and will continue to be exploited by those who mean harm to 
individuals, institutions, and possibly, to the nation’s security.  
B. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Given the enormous scope and the complexity of the task for the states to come 
into full compliance, and the internal dynamics within states in addressing REAL ID, it is 
not surprising that the regular extension requests were made, and subsequently, granted.  
Although it is not clear that these requests were done for this reason, granting the 
extension requests it also appears, in retrospect, to have been a move that may ultimately 
help to achieve full compliance. Moreover, it has been the back and forth between the 
states and the federal government, and the measures taken by both in fashioning 
responses to the legislation that reflects the truly interesting evolution regarding driver’s 
license and identification card security. Compliance could not be achieved without 
substantial effort on the part of both the states and the federal government.  
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VIII. FINANCIAL SUPPORT PROVIDED BY DHS TO THE STATES  
A. DHS HAS PROVIDED SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT TO ENCOURAGE 
COMPLIANCE BUT THE TRUE COSTS OF REAL ID 
IMPLEMENTATION ARE UNKNOWN  
Under the REAL ID Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security is authorized to 
make grants to states to assist them in conforming to the law’s minimum standards.302 In 
addition, Congress authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year (FY) from 2005 
through 2009, “such sums as may be necessary to carry out this title.”303 DHS addressed 
the cost issue in a press release dated January 11, 2008, accompanying the announcement 
of the impending publication of the final rule, noting that DHS was making $360 million 
available to assist states with REAL ID implementation. Of that total, $80 million would 
be in the form of dedicated REAL ID grants and another $280 million would be in the 
form of general funding under the Homeland Security Grant Program.304 
Congress and the Executive Branch both recognized that compliance with REAL 
ID was going to require considerable funding at both the federal and local level. 
Substantial changes were being required of the state DMV system regarding their 
issuance of driver’s licenses and identity documents. Those changes included modifying 
procedures and making the necessary technical modifications to facilitate identity and 
document verification requirements. During the rulemaking process, DHS published a 
substantial treatment of the costs associated with REAL ID in its regulatory evaluation 
accompanying the final rule. DHS indicated that the evaluation provided a 
“comprehensive, rigorous, and exhaustive” evaluation of the benefits and costs of the 
final minimum standards for state-issued driver’s licenses and non-driver identification 
cards under REAL ID.305  
302 The REAL ID Act of 2005, 302. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Department of Homeland Security, DHS Releases REAL ID Regulation, January 11, 2008. 
305 Department of Homeland Security, Regulatory Evaluation Final Rulemaking 6 CFR Part 37, 
January 17, 2008, 1. 
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In estimating the costs, DHS noted that REAL ID implementation reflected a joint 
state, federal, and public effort that would be executed over an 11-year period of time. 
Overall, DHS estimated the 11-year cost of the final rule at “less than $10 billion, of 
which less than $4 billion are States costs” and determined that it would result “in an 
average marginal cost of $8.31 per card issuance to the States.”306 The DHS assessment 
anticipated that two phases of expenses would be necessary. The first phase would 
encompass years one through four during which time states would be making changes to 
their business process and making investments to meet the standards of REAL ID, with 
states working to meet standards of material compliance and beginning to enroll 
applicants by January 1, 2010.307 The second phase would encompass years four through 
eleven, during which time states would continue to enroll applicants and would begin 
issuing fully compliant licenses no later than May 11, 2011.308 DHS noted between the 
time of the notice of proposed rulemaking and the final rule, that it had adjusted some of 
its assumptions, which resulted in reallocating certain costs or reducing it in others. For 
example, DHS recognized that “most if not all” states would be unable to meet the May 
2008 deadline, and would seek extensions, which would necessarily redistribute costs to 
subsequent years.309 DHS also adjusted its assumption that 100% of the candidate 
population would seek REAL ID compliant documents, instead determining that 75% 
would do so.310 The brief treatment in this paper of the regulatory assessment and the 
combined organization estimates of the costs does not begin to explain the complexity 
and detailed treatment of the costs, and the assumptions made and findings adopted by 
DHS. Those interested in having a better understanding of the complexity and detailed 
work that went into that assessment should consider reading the entire regulatory 
assessment document. (See Appendix E for the extended Table of Contents of the 
Regulatory Evaluation)  
306 Department of Homeland Security, Regulatory Evaluation Final Rulemaking 6 CFR Part 37. 
307 Ibid., 1. 
308 Ibid. 
309 Ibid., 2. 
310 Ibid. 
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Aside from the federal government, the states have also provided an assessment 
of costs. Anticipating the costs that would have to be borne by states, three influential 
groups with strong interests in REAL ID, had set forth their own estimate of the costs two 
years earlier. The National Governor’s Association, AAMVA, and the National Council 
of State Legislatures issued a joint report in September of 2006 based on a survey of 
DMV officials using a 114 multi-part questions survey answered by 47 of 51 DMV 
officials surveyed. The organization’s report found as follows. 
Based on the results of that survey, NGA, NCSL and AAMVA conclude 
that Real ID will cost more than $11 billion over five years, have a major 
impact on services to the public and impose unrealistic burdens on states 
to comply with the act by the May 2008 deadline. The organizations also 
provide practical and cost effective solutions for Congress and the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to address these shortcomings 
and meet the objectives of the act.311 
As can be seen, the report estimated costs of approximately 11 billion for successful 
implementation, yet it does not break this figure out between costs to the federal 
government versus costs to the states, which leaves the impression that the organizations 
considers these to be costs to the states. If so, the estimates are much higher than those 
estimated by DHS to be costs incurred by states. The report appears to be less detailed 
and precise and more based upon self-reported estimates by states, which may or may not 
precisely done, or be estimated on the high side. As will be seen, some believe that the 
estimated costs were exaggerated. Yet, these early estimates by DMV officials still reflect 
the considerable costs associated with REAL ID. 
It is likely that both the DHS and the state entities missed the true cost, and it is 
perhaps likely that the federal government’s estimates were low, and those of the states 
and their affiliated organizations were high. While the final costs may never be known, it 
is useful to examine how much federal aid has been provided to states compared to what 
the federal government estimated it would cost, and what forms that aid has taken. 
311 National Governors Association, National Conference of State Legislatures, and American 
Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, “The REAL ID Act: National Impact Analysis.” 
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B. GRANTS AND OTHER FORMS OF STATE ASSISTANCE 
Federal assistance has been provided to the states through three distinct, but 
integrated assistance programs: 1) FEMA grants totaling approximately $200 million for 
individual state projects to improve the security of their documents, facilities, systems 
and business processes, in a manner consistent with REAL ID, 2) FEMA targeted grants 
to five states in a demonstration project designed to upgrade the network of state-owned 
and operated systems that states already use to verify and exchange information with 
federal and state agencies,312 and 3) USCIS support of almost $10 million in projects to 
develop and deploy cost-effective methods to verify lawful presence electronically, U.S. 
passports, and SSNs, pursuant to the requirements of REAL ID.313 
DHS, reported in its 2012 progress report that in June 2008, FEMA announced 
the initial REAL ID grant awards.314 (Appendix F is FEMA’s notice regarding the 
availability of the 2008 grant funding that totaled over $79 million)315  
Figure 9 shows the number and allocation of grants by DHS to the states. Two 
states, Montana, and Oklahoma, did not receive grants, as they sought no grants. They 
took a principled position perhaps, given their declared intention not to adhere to the 
REAL ID requirements. 
312 States participating in the demonstration project included Mississippi, Kentucky, Indiana, Florida, 
and Nevada. 
313 Department of Homeland Security, Secure Identification State Progress: Fiscal Year 2012 Report 
to Congress, iii. 
314 Ibid., 2. 
315 Federal Emergency Management Administration, Grant Programs Directorate Information 
Bulletin No. 277 January 28, 2008: Consolidation of Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 REAL ID Funding Availability, 
January 28, 2008. 
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Figure 9.  Number of Grants Awarded, FY2008–FY2011316 
The financial support offered to the states by DHS has been substantial although 
not at the level to cover the full cost originally estimated in the DHS rulemaking, as 
endorsed by the Congressional Budget Office of the 3 billion estimate associated with 
state costs. Since 2008, FEMA had awarded the states more than $263 million in REAL 
ID and Driver’s License Security Grant Program funding. As reported by DHS, the 
support given to states falls within two types, 1) individual projects, whereby DHS funds 
projects consistent with REAL ID, and 2) projects identified by the states through grant 
applications and that encompass a range of improvements at the state level.317 The 
projects supported have encompassed areas such as the following:  
• Card security upgrades 
• Equipment upgrades 
• Facility upgrades 
• System and IT infrastructures upgrades 
316 Department of Homeland Security, Secure Identification State Progress: Fiscal Year 2012 Report 
to Congress, 15–16.  
317 Ibid., 13–15. 
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• Licenses issuance and business process security upgrades 
• Employee programs 
• Training on fraudulent documents 
• Background checks on employees  
• Electronic verification and document applicant source documentation 
• Verification of social security numbers 
• Verification of lawful status through use of SAVE program 
• Verification of U.S. passports 
• Public service campaigns to educate the public318 
C. SOME BELIEVE IMPLEMENTATION COSTS MAY HAVE BEEN 
LOWER THAN ESTIMATED 
Nine years after the passage of REAL ID, with the experience of implementation 
efforts and expenditures to date, it would be prudent to assess the current status of states’ 
costs to implement REAL ID, relative to federal funding needed in the form of grants, 
and specific appropriations for state and federal implementation efforts. At least one 
commenter believes that the costs of implementing REAL ID have proven to be much 
lower than original estimates, and that in fact, in some situations states have returned 
unspent grant money to the federal government, or have successfully implemented REAL 
ID at much lower costs than projected. Janice Kephart, a frequent commenter on issues 
related to REAL ID, who, at the time was the Director of Security Policy at the Center for 
Immigration Studies, wrote a Backgrounder document on REAL ID implementation in 
January 2011, addressing, among other things, implementation costs as they had 
developed, relative to the projected costs. She wrote the following regarding the REAL 
ID implementation costs.  
Perhaps most remarkable about REAL ID implementation to date, from 
the states where REAL ID expenditures have been made public, is that the 
costs for compliance are coming in nowhere near the $11 billion price tag 
that the NGA, NCSL, and AAMVA presented in the 2006 National Impact 
318 Department of Homeland Security, Secure Identification State Progress: Fiscal Year 2012 Report 
to Congress, 14–15. 
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Statement….This number now appears to have been grossly 
exaggerated.319  
She noted that in three states (Delaware, Maryland, and Iowa) the implementation costs 
were roughly double what the federal government had allocated through federal grants; in 
other words, in those states, local resources comprised half the implementation cost.320 
Kephart notes that two states, Florida and Alabama, were outliers with Florida apparently 
being over-funded with REAL ID grants, and Alabama spending over $15 million, with 
only approximately $2 million coming from REAL ID grants.321 If Alabama’s costs, 
which were considerably more, were extrapolated to all states, then, according to 
Kephart, the cost would, in fact, approach the amount estimated by the National 
Governors Association (NGA), National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) and 
AAMVA.322 However, Alabama’s situation was not typical, and in her view, it appeared 
that in most states, the situation would be more like that in Delaware and Maryland, 
where the states had to contribute about one-half of the implementation costs. For the 
most part, according to Kehpart, state costs have been lower than expected. For those 
wishing to see a more detailed treatment of this issue, Kephart’s article includes a very 
useful chart that displays, by state, where the state finds itself relative to its connectivity 
to verification systems, and how much each state has expended to implement REAL ID 
or achieve its benchmarks. (That chart is reproduced in Appendix G.)  
Kephart’s principal point is that while outlier states in terms of REAL ID 
implementation costs do exist, most states will find themselves in situations closer to that 
of Delaware and Maryland in which the implementation costs were about double the 
amount given to the states in grants, and in some situations, state implementation costs 
have roughly matched the grant allocation. She makes the following cogent points 
relative to Congress’ funding of implementation costs going forward.  
319 Kephart, “REAL ID Implementation: Less Expensive, Doable, and Helpful in Reducing Fraud.”  
320 Ibid., 7. 
321 Ibid. 
322 Ibid., 7–8. 
 103 
                                                 
If Congress feels that splitting the costs with the states is sufficient, then 
the federal government has fully funded REAL ID at this point. . . If states 
successfully seek full funding, Congress is halfway there, and full REAL 
ID implementation is –at least from a financial and technical point of 
view—doable and in sight. Congress should be careful to look at real cost 
figures from state Departments of Motor Vehicles before making a 
decision.323 
Consequently, it seems that the claim that federal funding of REAL ID implementation 
costs incurred by states has been grossly inadequate requires a closer examination, and 
should not be taken at face value as DHS assesses state needs for additional funding.  
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
A major argument in opposition to REAL ID has been that it was extremely 
expensive to implement, with the costs falling disproportionately to the states. To add to 
the difficulty for the states, and the general perception surrounding the issue, the federal 
regulations became effective in 2008, at the beginning of the economic downturn from 
which the country has yet to fully recover. Logically, implementation would have placed 
an additional burden on already stressed state budgets. It is no wonder then, that the 
challenges between the states and the federal government, fiscally, politically, and in 
terms of legitimate debates based on federalism principles, set up a perfect storm of sorts 
for federal state relations related to REAL ID. It seems, however, that an assessment of 
the true costs of REAL ID implementation, and the proper allocation of those costs 
between the federal and state governments is in need of a fresh look to determine the 
proper level of continued aid to the states going forward.  
The perceptions about federal efforts to assist the states with funding REAL ID’s 
implementation has been one of the important factors that have affected state views 
regarding REAL ID and how the states have reacted to the law. To that end, since the 
law’s passage, DHS has provided states with a variety of grants and other means of 
support to facilitate their compliance. How the states reacted to REAL ID is reflected in 
the next chapter, which examines state reaction on a macro level, and the subsequent 
323 Kephart, “REAL ID Implementation: Less Expensive, Doable, and Helpful in Reducing Fraud, 8. 
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chapter, which examines more closely how three particular states addressed the 
implementation challenges.  
 105 
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IX. THE REACTION OF THE STATES TO REAL ID 
A. SOME STATES REBELLED 
As the previous chapter demonstrated, significant grant money has been awarded 
to the states, and many states have been working to come into compliance, despite 
protesting against unfunded mandates and asserting that compliance would be too costly 
to implement. Nevertheless, many states are still significantly opposed to REAL ID. In 
fact, it is probably fair to say that several states rebelled against the law and did so not 
just through the public statements of their elected leaders, such as former Governor Mark 
Sanford (R-SC) and Senator John Tester (D-MT).324 They have done so through more 
substantial measures including legislative enactments and non-binding resolutions. Major 
concerns of the states have related to the costs of upgrading their license issuance systems 
and the previously discussed concerns about REAL ID being an unfunded mandate.  
In terms of state reaction to REAL ID, some states are more aggressive in 
demonstrating their opposition to the requirements of REAL ID. The opposition from 
governors and state officials has spanned across political parties. Two state officials, in 
particular, Senator John Tester (D-MT), and Mark Sanford (R-SC), were particularly 
vocal opponents of REAL ID and spoke of their states’ opposition to REAL ID at a Cato 
Institute forum on REAL ID.325 During the forum, held on May 7, 2008, Senator Tester 
stated: 
Montana’s politics features a mix of prairie populism, tax-hating 
conservatism, and leave-me-alone libertarianism. Some folks even manage 
to be all of those things at one time. So getting a unanimous vote in the 
state legislature is a pretty rare thing. But, that is what happened last year 
when 150 members—100 in the House and 50 in the Senate—joined the 
governor in opposing REAL ID. There were no votes in favor of REAL 
ID.326 





                                                 
Fourteen states have passed legislation prohibiting their states from complying 
with the provisions of REAL ID. Figure 10, from AAMVA, reflects, in blue, the states 
that had adopted anti-REAL ID legislation as of August 2012.327  
 
Figure 10.  Anti-REAL ID Legislation As Enacted in States 
Similarly, the NGA has also been vocal in expressing its views on REAL ID and 
advocating for additional funding, as well as state involvement in implementing the law. 
When REAL ID passed in 2005, the NGA issued a statement expressing its opposition to 
the legislation noting that:  
It would repeal the framework that Congress established under the 
Intelligence Reform Act to involve states in developing workable and 
effective national standards for state driver’s licenses and identification 
cards; 
Several of the requirements, particularly those having to do with 
verification of documents used to acquire an ID, are either technologically 
or fiscally prohibitive;  
As governors evaluate and review the implications of the unfunded federal 
mandates imposed by REAL ID, they encourage the U.S. Department of 
327 The American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, “2012 State Status of Real ID,” 
August 2, 2012, http://www.aamva.org/. This map includes two additional states—Utah and Virginia—as 
having enacted state laws prohibiting compliance. The discrepancy is not explained in the documents, and 
further research is necessary to reconcile the difference between the two sources. 
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Homeland Security to draw upon the expertise and perspective of 
governors to develop mutually agreed-upon regulations.328 
(See Appendix H for a detailed chart dated from the National Conference of State 
Legislatures identifying the different types of legislative actions taken by the states as of 
June 2012).329 Those actions include legislation enacted; approved concurrent/joint 
resolutions; and approved House or Senate resolutions. It should be noted that the 
landscape is constantly changing with states shifting between the different categories 
depending on the activities of its elected officials. It will also be interesting to observe 
how it may change as the federal government begins to enforce the REAL ID provisions 
by rejecting state identification documents for federal official purposes.  
When the history of the REAL ID Act and its origins is examined, the partial 
irony of the states that have defied the REAL ID provisions cannot be escaped when 
considering the states themselves, through their motor vehicle administrators, were 
leading the push for enhanced standards for driver’s licenses. In response to the 9/11 
attacks, AAMVA, which is the umbrella organization for the nation’s departments of 
motor vehicles, the heads of which are political appointees, issued a report that made a 
series of recommendations as to how enhance driver’s license administration and identity 
security. The prominence and influence that AAMVA has traditionally had on this issue 
is reflected in the fact that when predecessor legislative efforts to REAL ID were 
considered and then enacted, AAMVA was specifically mentioned in the legislation as a 
necessary entity to consult with the federal government on the issue of developing 
standards for, and enhancing the integrity of state licenses and identification documents. 
AAMVA continues to serve as a liaison between the state DMVs and DHS in issues 
related to the implementation of REAL ID.  
328 National Governor’s Association, “National Governor’s Association Statement on Passage of 
REAL ID,” May 12, 2005, http://www.nga.org/cms/home/news-room/news-releases/page_2005/col2-
content/main-content-list/title_nga-statement-on-passage-of-real-id.html. 
329 National Conference of State Legislatures, “The REAL ID: State Legislative Activity in 
Opposition to REAL ID,” June 2012, http://www.ncsl.org/documents/standcomm/sctran/REALID 
ComplianceReport.pdf. 
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B. SOME STATES COMPLIED 
Notwithstanding the very vocal and direct action in opposition to REAL ID, the 
majority of states have made progress on its implementation.330 The REAL ID 
regulations have a complicated method of gauging compliance by the states. The 
regulation established the concept of “material compliance” with the REAL ID 
requirements by which states’ progress is measured against 18 benchmarks that 
correspond to the regulatory requirements. The concept was developed as a way to 
“recognize and reward” states for making significant progress toward meeting the full 
regulatory requirements.331 
Congress required the DHS Office of Policy to submit a report, addressing, 
among other things, the progress of each state in implementing the REAL ID Act’s 
requirements.332 That report was submitted to Congress on August 28, 2012. It reflected 
that 21 states would meet, or had committed to meet, all 18 material compliance 
benchmarks by January 15, 2013, with an additional five states committing to meet all 
benchmarks, but indicating that they would not meet the January 15, 2013 deadline.333 
Two types of grants, FY 2008 REAL ID Demonstration Grants, and FY 2009 Driver’s 
License Security Grant Program, grants from the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), required the states to submit status reports on their efforts to meet 15 of 
the 18 material compliance benchmarks.334  
330 Department of Homeland Security, Secure Identification State Progress: Fiscal Year 2012 Report 
to Congress, ii, (For purposes of REAL ID and the report, the word state encompasses the 56 jurisdictions 
covered by the REAL ID Act, and thus, includes the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. 
territories of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and Commonwealth of the Northern 
Marianas). 
331 Ibid., 4. 
332 Senate Committee on Appropriations, Senate Report 112–74, September 7, 2011, 11. 
333 Department of Homeland Security, Secure Identification State Progress: Fiscal Year 2012 Report 
to Congress, 9. 
334 Ibid., 6. 
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C. SOME STATES SOUGHT ALTERNATIVES TO REAL ID 
NCLS is a bipartisan organization established in 1975 to support, defend, and 
strengthen state legislatures.335 That organization has been generally opposed to REAL 
ID, and on August 15, 2013, it issued the following policy statement as one of the annual 
policies adopted by the NCSL Standing Committee on Natural Resources and 
Infrastructure. 
NCSL urges Congress and the administration to continue to work with 
NCSL and its members on alternatives to the REAL ID. NCSL supports 
efforts to extend existing deadlines until obstacles to implementation are 
addressed. In addition, NCSL supports the use of waivers by the Secretary 
of the Department of Homeland Security, for states that have adopted 
other forms of compatible identification. NCSL urges Congress and the 
Administration to work with NCSL and its members to adjust Title II of 
the REAL ID Act and develop solutions in conjunction with NCSL that 
recognize national security but do not impede the sovereignty of state 
licenses or place a federal agency or agent as a permanent and ongoing 
authority for determining state license uses and requirements.336 
The NGA also spoke out in favor of alternatives to REAL ID. While continuing to 
support the need for secure driver’s license and identification documents issued by the 
states, the NGA nonetheless, tried to persuade Congress and the administration to pass 
legislation that would, according to the NGA, give states more flexibility to address the 
issue, provide funding for implementation and greater privacy protections, and which 
would relieve them from using verification systems not in place.337 
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
It is perhaps not an understatement to say that the states, and the organizations 
that represent their interests, have not been enthusiastic supporters of REAL ID. While 
9/11 brought into full focus the problems that existed in the state system of issuing 
335 National Conference of State Legislatures, Resources for State Legislators and Legislatures About 
NCSL, n.d. 
336 National Conference of State Legislatures, “NCSL IN DC, Task Forces, Policies Natural 
Resources and Infrastructure,” accessed December 15, 2013, http://www.ncsl.org/ncsl-in-dc/task-
forces/policies-natural-resources-and-infrastructure.aspx#real id. 
337 Governor James H. Douglas and Governor Joe Manchin III, National Governor’s Association 
Letter to Congress Urging Enactment of PASS ID Legislation, November 18, 2009. 
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identification documents, the states did not support the attendant costs and loss of 
autonomy they felt REAL ID represented. Nevertheless, the reaction of states has varied 
with most states moving to implement REAL ID, by taking advantage of grant programs 
and other available resources. However, a determined group of states has been openly 
hostile to the law and has taken measures available to them through the passage of laws at 
the state level to directly prohibit compliance with REAL ID, or at least, express 
disagreement with REAL ID, and an intention not to comply with the law.  
Whether the states opposing REAL ID will persist in that opposition as DHS 
begins its phased enforcement of REAL ID requirements, remains to be seen. If any do 
continue to reject compliance with REAL ID, it is probable that the result will be 
litigation by a state or group of states seeking to strike down REAL ID as being in 
violation of the Constitution and an unfunded mandate. As will be discussed, DHS should 
seek to avoid such a confrontation with the states, by taking a variety of measures to 
appeal to the states and their citizens about the importance of REAL ID. One of those 
benefits relates to the increasing, and increasingly recognized problem of document 
fraud, and especially identity theft, which is the subject of the next chapter. 
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X. DOCUMENT FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT 
On January 16, 2008, the Record newspaper of Bergen County, New Jersey 
published an editorial by then DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff. In that editorial, 
Secretary Chertoff addressed concerns, among them privacy concerns, related to the 
implementation of REAL ID.338 Among the primary reasons he urged full 
implementation of the law, was to address the problem of identity theft. 
Your privacy truly is at stake in the REAL ID debate. But in my view, it’s 
the opponents of secure identification who pose the greatest risk. Without 
REAL ID, you are far more likely to endure one of the worst privacy 
violations - having your identity stolen.339 
The problem of insecure documents, including driver’s licenses, represents a 
vulnerability being exploited by individuals and criminal organizations, and contributes 
to the growing and extremely costly problem of identity fraud, which encompasses 
identity theft. The CRS distinguishes the two by describing identity fraud as “the 
umbrella term that refers to a number of crimes involving the use of false identification—
though not necessarily a means of identification belonging to another person.”340 Identity 
theft is “the specific form of identity fraud that involves using the personally identifiable 
information belonging to another person.”341 
Document fraud is of particular relevance to discussions surrounding REAL ID. 
Identity theft often manifests itself in the taking of personally identifiable documents to 
create fake or counterfeit birth certificates, licenses, and Social Security cards. These 
documents, in turn, can be used to obtain government benefits using the victim’s name, 
as well as allow unauthorized aliens to remain in the United States and obtain 
employment. In addition, and as has been illustrated in the past, identity theft can 
338 The Record, “The REAL ID Solution: Are You Who You Say You Are?” January 16, 2008, 
LexisNexis Academic. 
339 Ibid. 
340 Finklea, Identity Theft: Trends and Issues, 3. 
341 Ibid. 
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facilitate terrorism.342 The identity fraud and theft problem has manifested itself in a 
variety of ways, which have federal officials alarmed, and serve to emphasize why the 
problem of breeder documents, including insecure identity documents like driver’s 
licenses, are exacerbating the problems. 
Identity fraud and identity theft are recognized as threats to national security, 
individual security, and institutional security, such as banking, healthcare and 
commercial institutions.343 Identity theft is also widely recognized as an international 
problem, whose objectives are often the acquisition of government services and 
documents. Stolen identities are used to access government benefits, health services, tax 
refunds, and obtain driver’s licenses, passports, and other forms of government 
documents.344 Driver’s license related identity fraud is an especially pernicious problem 
because perpetrators often “use drivers’ license information to engage in other fraudulent 
activity and take advantage of the widespread use of drivers’ licenses for authentication 
purposes.”345 It is also seen as a problem of growing concern in terms of the influence of 
organized crime groups both domestic and international.346 
A. THE SCOPE OF THE IDENTITY THEFT PROBLEM IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
In 2012, 16.6 million people, or approximately 7% of all persons in the United 
States age 16 or older, were victims of identity theft.347 The Identity Theft Supplement 
(ITS) for 2012, a part of the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), also 
estimated that direct and indirect losses from identity theft in 2012 totaled $24.7 
342 Finklea, Identity Theft: Trends and Issues, 19–20. As noted in the CRS report, former Attorney 
General John Ashcroft noted that an Algerian national had stolen the identities of 21 members of a health 
club, and transferred the identities to an individual later convicted of the plot to bomb LAX in 1999. 
343 Finklea, Identity Theft: Trends and Issues. 
344 UNODC, “Handbook on Identity-Related Crime 2011,” accessed August 22, 2013, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/tools-and-publications.html, 118. 
345 Ibid., 119. 
346 Ibid. 
347 Erika Harrell and Lynn Langton, “Victims of Identity Theft, 2012,” Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
December 2013, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit12.pdf. 
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billion.348 To put the scale of the losses from identity theft in perspective, the losses in 
2012 from all other property crimes (burglary, motor vehicle theft, and theft) totaled $14 
billion. Thus, as noted in the ITS, identity theft losses exceeded those from burglaries and 
theft by more than four times, and losses from motor vehicle thefts by more than eight 
times.349 
The problem of identity theft also appears to be growing. The 2008 ITS for 
Victims of Identity Theft estimated that in the preceding two years, 11.7 million persons, 
representing 5% of the U.S. population over the age of 16, had been victims of identity 
theft, with a corresponding direct and indirect losses estimated to be 17.3 billion over that 
two-year period.350 Some uncertainty exists as to whether in more recent years the 
occurrence of identity theft is increasing, decreasing, or changing in significant ways. 
Despite growing concerns about identity theft, between FY 2009 and FY 2010, the 
number of identity theft cases and associated prosecutions decreased relative to FY 2008. 
Varying explanations for this decrease have been posited, including speculation that that 
fewer incidents have occurred, or that fewer law enforcement resources are being devoted 
to the issue. However, some research indicates that the number of individuals victimized 
has increased but that the perpetrators are better able to evade law enforcement, that law 
enforcement resources dedicated to the issue have decreased, or that the prosecutions 
have shifted to address cases of aggravated identity theft.351 It is worth noting that 
estimates of identity theft losses are compiled by different sources and some variation 
348 Harrell and Lynn Langton, “Victims of Identity Theft, 2012.” 
349 Ibid. 
350 Lynn Langton and Michael Planty, Victims of Identity Theft, 2008, National Crime Victimization 
Survey, Bureau of Justice Statistics, December 2010. 
351 Finklea, Identity Theft: Trends and Issues, 16–17 Aggravated identity theft refers to the form of the 
crime introduced by the Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act that brings enhanced penalties under the 
law when the offense is committed in connection with other federal offenses. (Public Law 108–275). The 
offenses include theft of public property, thefts by bank officers or employees, theft from employee benefit 
plans, theft of Social Security and Medicare benefits, several immigration related fraud offenses, and 
specific violations related to terrorism. 
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may occur between the sources.352 Nevertheless, the estimated costs of identity theft are 
substantial.  
One area in which identity theft is clearly increasing is that of identity theft used 
to obtain tax refunds fraudulently. Government officials note that close to $3.6 billion in 
fraudulent tax refunds were obtained in tax year 2011.353 According to tax officials, the 
problem has grown exponentially in the last three years, which caused nearly 1,500 
investigations to be launched last year, up from just 276 in FY 2011.354 A particularly 
troublesome issue associated with identity theft is seen in the weaknesses being exploited 
in the ITINs. It is now known that that the application process for ITINs is subject to 
fraud. State driver’s license bureaus are allowing ITINs to be used by illegal aliens to 
obtain driver’s licenses even though the ITINs are only to be used only as a taxpayer 
identification number and not as proof of identity.355 Since the majority of readers are 
likely unfamiliar with the ITIN number, some background may be helpful.  
Individuals employed in the United States are required to have a valid SSN for 
employment.356 The SSN is required to be used to file tax returns, to report income, and 
for record-keeping purposes. Persons required to file tax returns are required to include 
an identifying number. That number included on the tax returns is known as the taxpayer 
identification number.357 For most people, the number included is the SSN. In 1996, the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) created the ITIN to provide tax identification numbers to 
people who do not have or are not eligible to obtain an SSN. Individuals receiving an 
352 For example, the CRS cites to a source that put the estimated cost of identity theft to Americans in 
2010 at $37 billion. This estimate, citing Javelin Strategy & Research, 2011 Fraud Survey Report: 
Consumer Version, February 2011, would seem to indicate, when compared to the BJS estimate for 2012 
that identity theft actually decreased in 2012. 
353 Matt Zapotosky, “IRS Tax Refund Thieves Increasingly Use Stolen Identities to Divert Money to 




355 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, Substantial Changes Are Needed to the 
Individual Taxpayer Identification Number Program to Detect Fraudulent Applications, 29. 
356 Ibid., 2. 
357 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, Substantial Changes Are Needed to the 
Individual Taxpayer Identification Number Program to Detect Fraudulent Applications. 
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ITIN should be either someone residing in the United States but not authorized to work, 
or a nonresident of the United States.358  
In July 2012, the Treasury Department’s Inspector General for Tax 
Administration (TIGTA) issued a report regarding the absence of adequate measures to 
prevent fraud in the acquisition of ITINs. The report, launched in response to 
congressional inquiries based on whistleblower complaints, uncovered a number of 
management failures that had gutted anti-fraud measures in the ITIN process. It also shed 
light on the pernicious problem of fraud in the ITIN application process and why it 
matters. Perpetrators of fraud are exploiting vulnerabilities in the program, which serves 
to undermine a substantial tax related program that puts revenues at risk through 
fraudulent refunds or credits.  
The TIGTA report demonstrates that between October 2007 to April 2010, the 
Wage and Investment Division, which administers the ITIN program, identified tens of 
thousands of fraudulent ITIN tax returns with erroneous tax refunds totaling more than 
$43 million dollars.359 TIGTA also determined that inadequate procedures were in place 
to verify each applicant’s identity and foreign status, and recited various 
recommendations made in the past that had not been followed, and existing processes in 
place that created identity theft vulnerabilities.  
TIGTA also noted that what had been intended as a number to be used for filing 
tax returns for people ineligible for a Social Security card, was increasingly being used as 
a federal identification number for non-tax purposes. TIGTA noted that the use of the 
ITIN for various non-tax purposes increased the need for adequate processes to ensure 
that only eligible individuals receive the ITINs.360 The fraudulent acquisition and use of 
ITINs, and the improper acceptance of ITINs as proof of identification by states when 
issuing identification documents, highlight the vulnerabilities, to both the financial 
system, and the integrity of the identity document issuance process by states. REAL ID 
358 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, Substantial Changes Are Needed to the 
Individual Taxpayer Identification Number Program to Detect Fraudulent Applications, 2. 
359 Ibid., 13. 
360 Ibid., 29. 
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would have additional benefits in stemming these types of activities by helping to ensure 
that the identity documents presented to acquire an ITIN were reliable, and that the 
identity documents issued by states are issued under more rigorous processing 
requirements than currently exist, and which, are clearly being exploited. 
In addition to the specific ITIN fraud, the TIGTA has also examined the issue of 
the impact of identity theft in the tax administration system in general. It has estimated 
that for processing year 2011, the IRS identified 2.2 million tax returns as fraudulent. Of 
those, approximately 940,000 tax returns involved identity theft, and were associated 
with $6.5 billion in associated fraudulent tax refunds involving identity theft.361 
While the impact of identity theft on the fraud is associated with tax 
administration, it is also the case that the issue of identity theft and document fraud has a 
nexus to illegal immigration and facilitates the stay of persons illegally in the United 
States. Illegal immigrants or others may use stolen identities to obtain employment and 
then disappear without paying taxes that leaves the victim with a large outstanding tax 
bill. One U.S. taxpayer was reportedly faced with a $1 million back-tax bill, even though 
she was a stay-at-home mother. An investigation later found that 218 illegal immigrants 
were using her SSN. From 2002 through 2005, multiple identity criminals used the name 
and SSN of a Mexican-American factory worker to get jobs in Kansas, Texas and New 
Jersey. The victim had to deal with repeated allegations of under-reported income and 
long delays in receiving tax refunds owed to him.362 
Finally, and potentially most significant from the standpoint of national security, 
is the problem of identity fraud and theft in connection with the acquisition of U.S. 
passports. In July 2010, the GAO testified before Congress in connection with its efforts 
to conduct undercover testing to identify vulnerabilities in the Department of State’s 
361 Testimony of the Honorable J. Russell George Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration: 
Identity Theft and Tax Fraud (Washington, DC, 2012). 
362 “Handbook on Identity-Related Crime 2011,” 119 citing to Kevin McCoy, “Identity Thieves Tax 
the System,” USA Today, April 10, 2008. 
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(DOS) passport issuance processes.363 This testimony was a follow-up to a 2009 GAO 
audit.364 This type of vulnerability is extremely significant given the desirability of and 
privileges afforded to holders of U.S. passports. As the GAO noted, people who seek to 
acquire U.S. passports through fraud are typically doing so to conceal involvement with 
serious crimes, such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, money laundering, or murder. The 
GAO concluded that DOS remained vulnerable to fraud as the results of its testing 
showed that five of seven U.S. passports were issued, despite the existence of multiple 
indicators of fraud or identity theft in each of the applications.  
B. FEDERAL RECOGNITION OF AND EFFORTS TO ADDRESS 
DOCUMENT FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 brought increased attention to those issues, but the 
federal government has been aware of the problem of document fraud and its facilitation 
of false identities and identity theft for some time, and has sought to identify and tackle a 
myriad of issues to address identity theft. Interestingly, identity theft itself was not made 
a federal crime until 1998.365 With the increase in Internet use and associated identity 
theft crimes, calls were made for more effective laws to address the issue, which resulted 
in a series of laws enacted between 1998 and 2008.366 The 1998 legislation known as the 
Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act became effective in October 1998. The 
law established identity theft as a federal crime, and charged the Federal Trade 
Commission with the responsibility of accepting complaints from victims, sharing 
information with federal, state and local agencies, and assisting victims of identity 
theft.367 
363 Statement of George Kutz, Managing Director, Forensic Audits and Special Investigations, 
General Accountability Office, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, 
Committee on the Judiciary (July 29, 2010). 
364 Ibid. 
365 Finklea, Identity Theft: Trends and Issues, 3. 
366 Ibid., 3–4. 
367 Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, Public Law 105–318, 112 Stat. 3007, 1998, 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-105publ318/html/PLAW-105publ318.htm. 
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Some assert that the problem of identity theft can be curtailed through greater 
efforts to secure the identification document issuance process.368 The call for improved 
verification procedures and improvements to the issuance process of driver’s licenses and 
identity cards has been longstanding and repeated. The GAO offered testimony on the 
issue of identity document vulnerabilities in September 2003, and shortly thereafter on 
September 15, 2003, it issued a report specifically examining the issue of identity 
document vulnerabilities and ways to improve the verification and issuance process. 
On September 9, 2003, the General Accountability Office (GAO, then known as 
the General Accounting Office), provided testimony before the Senate Committee on 
Finance. In that testimony, GAO’s Managing Director of the Office of Investigations 
testified about the various GAO studies, which demonstrated the security vulnerabilities 
that existed due to the ease with which counterfeit identification could be produced and 
used to create fraudulent identities.369 The vulnerabilities identified were associated with 
a variety of critical functions and activities, such as the following. 
• Firearms purchased from federal firearms licensees using bogus 
identification370 
• Breaches at federal agencies and airports371  
• Purchase of firearms using a counterfeit federal firearms license372 
• Counterfeit documents used to enter the United States from certain 
western hemisphere countries not detected373 
• SSNs: Ensuring the Integrity of the SSN374 
368 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Driver’s License Security. 
369 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 
Security: Counterfeit Identification and Identification Fraud Raise Security Concerns, (2003). 
370 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Firearms: Purchased from Federal Firearms Licensees 
Using Bogus Identification, (2001). 
371 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports, 
(2000); U.S. Government Accountability Office, Security Breaches at Federal Buildings in Atlanta, 
Georgia, (2002). 
372 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Counterfeit Documents Used to Enter the United States 
from Certain Western Hemisphere Countries Not Detected, (2003). 
373 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Purchase of Firearms Using a Counterfeit Federal 
Firearms License, (2002). 
374 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Social Security Numbers: Ensuring the Integrity of the 
SSN, (2003). 
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The testimony offered by the GAO in September 2003 to the Finance Committee 
noted three overall findings from its special investigations: 1) government officials 
generally did not recognize counterfeit documents when presented, 2) some government 
officials failed to follow security procedures and seemed unaware of the possibility of 
identity fraud, and 3) identity verification procedures were inadequate.375 The 
recommended solutions included improving verification procedures to minimize 
vulnerabilities posed by such documents.376 
The GAO explained the problem the problem faced by the state DMVs as follows.  
Driver licensing agencies face the challenge of determining whether the 
identity documents individuals provide (1) are authentic and contain 
information that agrees with the issuing agency’s records and (2) actually 
belong to the person presenting them.377 
That GAO report examined two principal vulnerabilities in the driver’s license 
application and issuance process. One was the need to verify SSN information presented 
by driver’s license applicants, by cross checking that information with the SSA, using a 
service provided by SSA to state DMVs for that purpose.378 The second vulnerability 
was that states lacked a systematic means to exchange driver’s license information. This 
deficiency, in turn, made states susceptible to issuing driver’s licenses to individuals by 
accepting false out-of-state licenses, and by issuing licenses to individuals using the 
identity information of others and presenting it as their own.379 The report noted that 
GAO’s own investigators were able to obtain driver’s licenses in states whose practices 
they examined by using counterfeit out-of state driver’s licenses, other fraudulent 
documents, and the SSNs of deceased persons.380 
375 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 
Security: Counterfeit Identification and Identification Fraud Raise Security Concerns, 1. 
376 Ibid., 4. 
377 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Social Security Numbers: Increased SSN Verification and 
Exchange of States’ Driver Records Would Enhance Identity Verification, (2003), 5. 
378 Ibid. 
379 Ibid., 16. 
380 Ibid., 3. 
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According to the GAO, the use of the SSN verification service varied widely, and 
inadequate and inconsistent verification measures resulted in the ability of perpetrators of 
fraud to obtain state issued driver’s licenses by presenting fraudulent documents and SSN 
information related to deceased individuals.381 Aside from SSA related 
recommendations, the report—issued a year-and-a-half before the passage of REAL ID—
also made recommendations for consideration by Congress related to the ability of 
licensing bureau employees to have access to means of verifying information presented, 
and the ability of states to exchange driver’s license information. 
The report discussed various measures individual states were taking to verify 
information presented to them using private vendors or through negotiated agreements 
with DHS to access data to verify immigration information. Nevertheless, the GAO found 
that states lacked a systematic means to exchange information on all drivers nationwide, 
which the GAO found limited the states’ ability to deter fraud and identity theft.382 
The problem this posed, as identified to the GAO was as follows.  
Numerous officials in the states we visited told us that having a more 
efficient means of electronic interstate communications, that included the 
electronic transfer of identity information such as digital photographs and 
signatures, would improve the integrity of their licensing process. 
Officials in the states we visited were particularly concerned about 
individuals using licenses issued by other states as identity documents and 
their inability to quickly query all states’ databases to corroborate key 
information. As a result, states are limited in their ability to determine 
whether other states’ identity documents are authentic or to identify 
multiple individuals using the same personal identifying information in 
other states.383 
Among the measures taken to address identity theft was the passage of the REAL ID Act, 
which was intended to improve the accuracy, and reliability of identification documents 
that state governments issue.384 In addition, in 2006, President Bush issued an Executive 
381 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Social Security Numbers: Increased SSN Verification and 
Exchange of States’ Driver Records Would Enhance Identity Verification, 15. 
382 Ibid., 20. 
383 Ibid., 21. 
384 The President’s Identity Theft Task Force, Combating Identity Theft: A Strategic Plan, April 2007, 
43. 
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Order 13402, which, among other things, established the President’s Task Force on 
Identity Theft. The task force developed a strategic plan for addressing identity theft.  
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The discussion of these various reports highlights the prevalence of identity theft 
abusing such programs by those who seek to steal, and hide their true identities. These 
activities pose significant risks to the integrity of the programs being exploited, and incur 
huge costs for the government, and the individuals whose identities are stolen or who 
otherwise are harmed by these activities. These activities are only some of the activities 
being perpetrated using identity theft and fraud, and highlight those that represent 
government programs. An entirely different sphere of identity theft poses problem for 
non-governmental programs, such as commercial transactions, and other private 
interactions.  
As early as 2003, and reiterated as recently as its report in 2012, the GAO has 
identified a need for concerted action led by the federal government to improve the 
exchange of driver record data among the states to curtail the problems associated with 
fraudulent documents, noting:  
We recognize that potential barriers related to system’s design, funding, 
privacy rights, and states’ willingness to use such a tool have yet to be 
fully resolved. However, given the potential economic and national 
security implications associated with identity theft at the point of driver 
licensing, sustained leadership at the federal level could be the catalyst for 
needed change. 
In light of the homeland security implications associated with states’ 
inability to systematically exchange driver license identity information and 
the need for sustained leadership in this area, the Congress, in partnership 
with the states, should consider authorizing the development of a national 
data sharing system for driver records.385 
The GAO’s recommendation regarding the exchange of state information, which it 
called, “a matter for congressional consideration” was, along with efforts by the 
AAMVA, and the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation regarding federal standards, were 
385 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Social Security Numbers: Increased SSN Verification and 
Exchange of States’ Driver Records Would Enhance Identity Verification, 23. 
 123 
                                                 
motivators for REAL ID. However, as has been discussed, the legislation did not 
establish a nationwide registry; yet, it did require and facilitate the sharing of records 
among the states. 
While REAL ID will not eliminate identity theft and fraud, its requirements create 
a more secure environment for identity document issuance and verification. 
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XI. STATE CASE STUDIES 
This chapter presents case studies of three categories of states that demonstrate 
the range of compliance or non-compliance by the states with REAL ID standards, to 
include states that complied early, states that have worked steadily toward compliance 
despite obstacles, and states that have defied compliance. The chapter examines, from 
publicly available information, factors that contributed to the states’ current compliance 
status with REAL ID. Delaware was an early adopter of the REAL ID standards and was 
in the first group of states found by DHS to be fully compliant with REAL ID. New 
Jersey is a state that has made steady and incremental progress toward REAL ID. It was 
on the cusp of compliance in October 2012, but external factors intervened and halted its 
progress. Finally, Maine represents the handful of holdout states that have defied DHS 
and have not only asserted its intention to not comply with REAL ID, but has taken 
affirmative action in the form of passing state laws to prohibit compliance. The REAL ID 
experience of each state is instructive as to the factors that contributed to each state’s 
approach and compliance status. Those experiences are presented to identify issues that 
have arisen, identify lessons learned, and flag issues for DHS attention that may allow it 
to tailor its approach to such states and facilitate and nudge them toward full compliance. 
A. DELAWARE 
1. Early REAL ID Efforts by Delaware 
The State of Delaware’s efforts are examined first. Delaware has proven to be one 
of the states that has undertaken to implement the REAL ID provisions fully, and has 
proven to be a leader in those efforts, having been among the first group of states to be 
found in full compliance with the provisions. Although it was an early adopter, Delaware 
had been an early advocate for the states in terms of their concerns with REAL ID. It had 
raised those concerns to Congress, asking that states be relieved from fully implementing 
REAL ID provisions until the following concerns were addressed. 
• States were provided with funding  
• The necessary databases were established to support state efforts 
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• Workable deadlines were identified 
• States were provided with flexibility to assist them in complying with the 
federal mandate and lessen the “drastic impacts” on their citizens386 
2. Best Practices/Efforts by Delaware to Nudge Public Compliance 
An examination of Delaware’s DMV website demonstrates that Delaware has 
undertaken clear efforts to inform the public and project the image of a secure driver’s 
license as something beneficial both to the public and individuals. For example, the logo 
on the DMV website page that discusses the REAL ID requirements is labeled, iDelaware 
Card with the words “iD” and “Card” appearing in red color font, thus reading, “iD 
Card.” The logo contains the slogan, “A Lifetime of Security” and contains the image of 
a Delaware driver’s license secured by a padlock, which further increased the image of 




Figure 11.  Image and Logo of a Delaware’s Driver’s License387 
Further, the Delaware DMV website page addressing REAL ID is user-friendly, 
laid out with a listing of frequently asked questions, and with a section designed to 
directly address misconceptions about REAL ID, entitled, “Federal Identification 
Standards Facts and Myths,” which lists a variety of things that the REAL ID compliant 
license “does not” do. Interestingly, among the myths it seeks to debunk is the notion that 
386 Governor Ruth Ann Minner, Will REAL ID Actually Make Us Safer: Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Hearing May 2007 (Washington, DC, 2007). 
387 State of Delaware Division of Motor Vehicles, “Graduated Driver License,” accessed July 9, 2013, 
http://www.dmv.de.gov/services/driver_services/drivers_license/dr_lic_secure_dl_get_started.shtml. 
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the secure licensing process does not “control, restrict, or affect” gun sales.388 The 
website’s main page on secure ID also has easy to navigate buttons labeled as follows. 
• Get Started 




The site also contains a link to the relevant provision of Delaware Administrative 
Code, 2217 Driver License and Identification Card Application Procedures for Delaware 
Compliant and Delaware Non-Compliant Identification Documents, which sets forth 
Delaware’s detailed administrative code provisions relating to compliant and non-
compliant driver licenses and identification cards.  
In addition to the information contained on the DMV site, Delaware has also 
taken advantage of other commonly accessed state resources to disseminate information 
to the public about REAL ID. For example, it has responded to inquiries related to REAL 
ID on the Delaware Division of Libraries’ site where it maintains a blog, and has posted a 
response to an inquiry related to REAL ID.389 The state has also provided a high degree 
of transparency and communication to the public, by issuing a press release in April 
2009, and announcing its intention to begin issuing its secure driver’s license and ID card 
system later that year to comply with REAL ID.390 Delaware’s press release, issued 
seven months before it anticipated beginning the new process for secure driver’s licenses, 
noted that it had awarded a contract for the program, and named the company that had 
been awarded the contract.391 
388 State of Delaware Division of Motor Vehicles, “Graduated Driver License.” 
389 Division of Libraries’ Blog, “Q: ‘What Is a Federally Compliant Delaware Driver’s License (and 
ID)?,’” accessed December 23, 2013, http://library.blogs.delaware.gov/2012/10/07/federally-compliant-de-
drivers-license/. 
390 Delaware Department of Transportation, “Press Release: DMV Announces New Secure Driver 




                                                 
The press release also contained a fact sheet, and within that fact sheet it noted 
that in order to protect its residents against identity theft, it was also implementing a 
facial recognition system. This is something not required by REAL ID, but which 
demonstrates the seriousness with which Delaware has approached the issue of secure 
identification documents.  
3. Leadership Matters: DMV Chief, Jennifer Cohan  
One of the major reasons that Delaware has been a leader in REAL ID 
compliance has to do with the efforts of Jennifer L. Cohan, Delaware’s Director of the 
Division of Motor Vehicles, who has been in the position since 2007. In Delaware, the 
Director of the DMV is not a political appointee. The current governor, Jack Markell, is a 
Democrat elected in 2008. The DMV falls within the DOT, a cabinet department 
requiring state Senate confirmation, led by Secretary Shailen P. Bhatt.392 The DMV is an 
agency under DelDOT, and lists as its first key objective: 
Issue secure and accurate driver license and identification cards while 
ensuring those individuals obtaining Delaware credentials are representing 
their identity accurately, are in the country legally, meet all the 
requirements for obtaining driving privileges and have demonstrated their 
Delaware residency.393 
Prior to assuming leadership of the DMV, Cohan has held a variety of other positions 
within the DMV and within the State of Delaware.394 She has been a leader on issues 
associated with secure driver licenses and identity cards, having appeared as a speaker 
before AAMVA and at think tank events, such as a program on REAL ID hosted by the 
Heritage Foundation. Ms. Cohan participated in a panel discussion on REAL ID held at 
the Heritage Foundation in Washington, DC, and co-sponsored by the Coalition for 
Secure Driver’s Licenses (CSDL). Ms. Cohan emphasized that Delaware felt that 
392 State of Delaware, “Delaware Department of Transportation—Secretary,” accessed January 31, 
2014, http://www.deldot.gov/home/secretary/. 
393 State of Delaware, “Delaware Department of Transportation—Divisions,” accessed July 9, 2013, 
http://www.deldot.gov/home/divisions/. 
394 State of Delaware, DelDOT Newsroom, Press Release: The American Association of Motor 
Vehicle Administrators Welcomes Delaware Director of DMV as Chairwoman of the International Board 
of Directors, September 4, 2013. 
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implementing the law was the right thing to do in terms of identity protection for its 
citizens.395 She noted the effectiveness of Delaware’s REAL ID implementation efforts 
in addressing identity issues, observing that in examining its driver’s license records as 
part of the compliance process, it identified over 1,300 imposters as having obtained 
driver’s licenses in recent years and that “most of these people had on average between 
nine to twenty different identities. Some of those people were actually in major crime 
syndicates.”396 She also touted the fraud deterrence as a result of Delaware’s compliance 
efforts noting that previously the state would generally identify three to four weekly 
attempts to obtain documents fraudulently. After it began its compliance efforts, it only 
saw six attempts in the past year.397  
AS DMV Director, Ms. Cohan has taken a very pragmatic approach to the 
implementation of REAL ID, explaining in an interview why Delaware chose to pursue 
early implementation when the state had several years to comply with the law. 
The reason we started now is because we don’t have the resources to have 
everyone come in at one time. If we start now everyone has five years to 
come in during their normal renewal periods. When it’s your time, we’ll 
send you a letter telling you everything you have to bring. It’s completely 
optional for our customers, they don’t have to get one, but if they don’t 
they have to use a passport to get on an airplane or to get in federal 
buildings. And it’s definitely cheaper for our customers to do it this 
way.398 
Delaware also took advantage of the federal funding provided to states to help it make the 
transition to more secure identity documents. Cohan stated that Delaware had received $1 
million dollars from the federal government and had used that money to upgrade its 
computer system, which facilitated the issuance of more secure documents.399 While 
initially it would be more of a hassle for residents because of the need to present an 
395 The Heritage Foundation, “REAL ID Realities: Perspectives on the Future of the REAL ID 
Program,” accessed February 1, 2014, http://www.heritage.org/events/2013/01/real-id. 
396 Ibid. 
397 Ibid. 
398 Doug Denison, “Newsmaker Q&A: Jennifer Cohan, Director of the Delaware Division of Motor 
Vehicles,” Dover Post, August 24, 2010, http://www.doverpost.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?avis=DE. 
399 Doug Denison, “Delaware DMV Unveils New Secure ID Cards,” Middletown Transcript, June 16, 
2010, http://www.middletowntranscript.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?avis=DE. 
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original birth certificate or passport along with a social security card and evidence of state 
residence, future renewals would be aided by the computer system, and the use of facial 
recognition technology to retrieve previous record would make renewals a more efficient 
for residents.400 
4. Delaware’s Efforts and Leadership Have Been Recognized 
The non-profit group CSDL recognized Delaware DMV efforts for a secure 
driver’s license on May 29, 2012, when its employees received the organization’s 
“Identity Security Award” at a presentation made by CSDL’s President, and attended by 
the Delaware’s Governor, DOT Secretary and DMV Chief.401 Delaware was the 9th state 
to have been presented with the award.402 Some background on CSDL is appropriate 
given the role this organization has played in promoting state DMV practices that address 
document security and measures to prevent identity theft since its founding in November 
of 2001. As noted in the organization’s website:  
In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in 
New York City and Washington, DC, it was revealed that 18 of the 19 
terrorists involved in the 9/11 attacks held over thirty valid driver’s 
licenses and ID cards issued by five states. The reason that the terrorists 
had obtained so many state IDs was to escape detection by airport security 
systems that use passport data to check foreign visitors against federal 
watch lists.403 
The organization was clearly motivated by the 9/11 attacks, and its concern with 
the “apparent indifference by state and federal officials to this security vulnerability.”404 
The organization describes itself as a non-partisan, not for profit entity, interested in 
crime prevention. Its objective is to raise public awareness about states with weak 
identity document issuance systems that pose risks of terrorism and a variety of crimes 
400 Denison, “Delaware DMV Unveils New Secure ID Cards.” 
401 Delaware Department of Transportation, “Press Release: Division of Motor Vehicles Receives 
Award for Outstanding Fraud Protection of State Residents,” May 29, 2012, http://www.deldot.gov/ 
home/newsroom/release.shtml?id=4370. 
402 Ibid. 




                                                 
and to highlight efforts of states relative to their efforts on REAL ID. It also notes that it 
has been a vocal supporter of REAL ID and urges states to improve the security of their 
state issued driver’s licenses.405 One of its major activities has been to examine the 
practices of the state motor vehicle administrators and how they are implementing REAL 
ID, engage with the states, and highlight their efforts regarding secure identity document 
issuance. It includes information of this nature on its website, and it also recognizes states 
for their efforts at improving the security of its licensing practices.406 
Ms. Cohan’s influence has been recognized within the community of motor 
vehicle and licensing administrators. At the AAMVA’s 80th Annual International 
Conference, held in August of 2013, Ms. Cohan was elected as the chairwoman of 
AAMVA’s International Board of Directors.407  
5. Media Coverage in Delaware 
Delaware’s media has not expressed open hostility toward REAL ID, such as has 
been the case with other states. Rather, the news outlets, at least print media, have taken a 
more cautious, wait and see approach. Rather than any fundamental disagreement with 
REAL ID, the media’s coverage has focused more on inconvenience to the citizens of 
Delaware, as reflected in a News Journal editorial dated May 25, 2008, which predicted 
lines at DMV offices, a variety of implementation headaches, and impacts on civil 
liberties, even while acknowledging the terrorism-related concerns that led to the law. 
The editorial did not so much oppose REAL ID, as it expressed skepticism about the 
ability of DMV officials to implement the law effectively and affordably. 
With a year and a half to go before Real ID is supposed to be ready to roll, 
it’s time to decide if it’s really possible to link up such a fail-safe system, 
and at what price. And will the government back up a federal security 
405 Coalition for a Secure Driver’s License, “About Us.” 
406 Ibid. Although the CSDL appears to be an important voice in discussions concerning secure driver 
license practices, its website is not as robust as it could be and does not appear to maintain the most current 
information available; in part, due to the fact that it maintains separate subscriber content. 
407 State of Delaware, DelDOT Newsroom, Press Release: The American Association of Motor 
Vehicle Administrators Welcomes Delaware Director of DMV as Chairwoman of the International Board 
of Directors. 
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commitment with the right amount of money? If this is only going to be an 
unreliable make-work project, pull the plug.408 
A year-and-a-half later, the News Journal observed that Delaware was one of the 
few states that had come into compliance with REAL ID, and had not raised objections to 
the law. It noted that the state’s size and federal subsidies would allow the state to roll out 
the new, secure identification documents with relative ease, while at the same time noting 
with approval, the introduction of alternative legislation to REAL ID, known as PASS 
ID.409  
Another editorial reflecting Delaware’s implementation efforts was one appearing 
on July 24, 2010, shortly after the states’ roll out of REAL ID. In that editorial, objections 
were not to the law itself, but rather to the states’ early implementation efforts during 
which staffing shortages were not addressed that led to two to three hours waits at the 
DMV offices.410 Thus, at least in Delaware, REAL ID did not experience overt hostility 
to the implementation efforts, and was able to overcome early skepticism about its ability 
to make its efforts efficient, and thus, address early editorial objections, and the 
criticisms. 
6. Delaware Has Unique Advantages Aiding Its Implementation Efforts 
While Delaware has benefitted from strong leadership on the issue of secure 
identification documents, it is, of course, a small state, and does not have all of the 
challenges of others states. For example, the DMV website indicates that it has 650,000 
licensed drivers in the state, a number that is much smaller, of course, than that of many 
408 The News Journal, “Real ID Has So Many Pitfalls And Not Enough Money To Back It Up,” May 
28, 2008, LexisNexis Academic. 
409 The News Journal, “Proposed Changes in Secured ID Could Make Law More Workable,” October 
20, 2009, LexisNexis Academic. 
410 The News Journal, “DMV Must Get a Handle on Real ID to Ease Delays,” July 24, 2010, 
LexisNexis Academic. 
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other states.411 By way of comparison, Maine, also a small state population wise, has 
over 1 million licensed drivers, and New Jersey has nearly 6 million drivers.412 
B. NEW JERSEY 
After being on its way toward achieving compliance with REAL ID, New 
Jersey’s implementation effort stopped in its tracks in October 2012, in the wake of 
litigation brought by the ACLU, which had won a temporary court order in May of that 
year blocking the implementation of the law on the basis of privacy concerns, and due to 
the court’s determination that insufficient public input had been sought prior to New 
Jersey’s implementation.413 After extensions of the court order based on ongoing 
settlement discussions between the parties, New Jersey agreed that it would not take any 
further action to implement its roll out of Tru-ID, its name for its REAL ID compliant 
licenses, until it engaged in rulemaking.414  
1. New Jersey’s Attempt to Implement REAL ID 
Prior to the ACLU lawsuit, New Jersey seemed well on its way toward pursuing 
full implementation of REAL ID. On April 2, 2012, New Jersey announced its intention 
to adjust the issuance process for its driver’s license and non-driver IDs to bring the state 
into compliance with REAL ID, beginning with document renewals in July 2012.415 New 
Jersey’s TRU-ID program, scheduled to begin May 7, 2012, was to replace New Jersey’s 
existing renewal program, known as the 6 Point ID Verification. TRU-ID licenses would 
411 State of Delaware, “State of Delaware Division of Motor Vehicles—About DMV,” accessed July 
9, 2013, http://www.dmv.de.gov/. 
412 State of Maine, “Secretary of State Matt Dunlap Takes Oath for Third Term,” accessed February 
23, 2014, http://www.maine.gov/sos/news/2009/sosthirdterm.htm; State of New Jersey, Motor Vehicle 
Commission, “Chief Administrator,” accessed March 2, 2014, http://www.state.nj.us/mvc/About/Chief 
Administrator.htm. 
413 Mike Frassinelli, “N.J. Drops Plan to Require Extra Documents to Get Driver’s License,” accessed 
September 14, 2013, http://blog.nj.com/ledgerupdates_impact/print.html?entry=/2012/10/nj_drops_plan_ 
to_require_addit.html. 
414 Ibid. 
415 State of New Jersey, Motor Vehicle Commission, “Media Release: Christie Administration 
Announces New ‘Skip the Trip’ Drivers License and ID Mail Renewal Service for New Jerseyans New 
Process to Aid Implementation of Federal REAL ID Standards,” April 2, 2012, http://www.state.nj.us/mvc/ 
PressReleases/archives/2012/040212.htm. 
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be distinguishable by what the press release called “the federally mandated designation of 
a gold star” in the upper right-hand corner. The “gold star” comes from a publication 
created by DHS to assist states, entitled “REAL ID Mark Guidelines” (October 2008) that 
provided DHS recommendations for the licenses.416  






Figure 12.  New JerseyTRU-ID Information and Image of Driver’s License417 
New Jersey’s Chief Administrator of the Motor Vehicle Commission (MVC), 
Raymond P. Martinez, stressed that residents would not encounter major changes as the 
state implemented REAL ID, noting:  
416 Honolulu Star-Advertiser, “State Driver’s Licenses, ID Cards Do Not Conform to Federal,” 
accessed February 16, 2014, http://www.staradvertiser.com/news/20110428_State_drivers_licenses_ 
ID_cards_do_not_conform_to_federal_rules.html; Department of Homeland Security, Secure Identification 
State Progress: Fiscal Year 2012 Report to Congress, 3. 
417 State of New Jersey, Motor Vehicle Commission, “TRU-ID,” accessed February 8, 2014, 
http://www.state.nj.us/mvc/Licenses/truid.htm. 
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Although the federal government has laid out new identity requirements, 
it’s important to note that TRU-ID is not that different from the six points 
that we’ve all become accustomed to presenting. With documents like 
your official birth certificate, social security card and mail from your bank 
and utility company, you’ll be able to meet the new requirements.418 
New Jersey was also launching an effort to renew licenses by mail, the purpose of 
which was to facilitate the implementation of Jersey’s TRU ID program by reducing the 
number of persons appearing at MVC offices by postponing for four years the need for 
citizens to visit a MVC office in person.419 New Jersey MVC officials stressed that no 
leeway existed in terms of compliance with the REAL ID requirements, and noted that its 
efforts were geared at ensuring that New Jersey residents were in possession of REAL ID 
compliant licenses at the time that the federal government began enforcing REAL ID. 
They also emphasized that that the current efforts were a culmination of efforts that New 
Jersey had begun two years previously to enhance security features of its driver’s licenses 
to begin its compliance with REAL ID.420 
2. The ACLU Lawsuit 
The ACLU’s litigation against TRU-ID was filed in May 2012, as a request for a 
temporary restraining order, the purpose of which was to seek an immediate halt to the 
program, scheduled to begin on May 7, 2012.421 The lawsuit was filed shortly after the 
ACLU had sent a letter to the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey MVC on late April 
2012 that raised many of its concerns about Tru-ID.422 The ACLU letter noted that 
REAL ID had been rejected in 25 states, and sought a meeting to discuss New Jersey’s 
418 State of New Jersey, Motor Vehicle Commission, “Media Release: Christie Administration 
Announces New ‘Skip the Trip’ Drivers License and ID Mail Renewal Service for New Jerseyans New 
Process to Aid Implementation of Federal REAL ID Standards.” 
419 Ibid. 
420 Ibid. 
421 ACLU-NJ, ACLU-NJ, et Al. v. Raymond P. Martinez, Et al. Civil Action No. ___, Brief in Support 
of Order to Show Cause with Temporary Restraints, May 3, 2012. 
422 Deborah Jacobs, Executive Director, “Letter from the ACLU-New Jersey to Raymond P. Martinez, 
Chief Administrator New Jersey Motor Vehicles Commission,” April 23, 2012. 
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implementation plan for TRU-ID.423 It does not appear that the meeting took place, and 
the lawsuit was filed, which led New Jersey to delay the implementation of Tru-ID.424  
In October 2012, the court order issued in accordance with the State of New 
Jersey’s agreement not to pursue its defense of the litigation, agreed instead that it would 
pursue rulemaking if it wished to pursue the program. The ACLU held a press conference 
to speak out about the court decision and the delay in TRU-ID implementation. “I am 
thrilled to see implementation of the REAL ID Act toppled in New Jersey,” said Deborah 
Jacobs, the former ACLU-NJ executive director who served as an individual plaintiff in 
the case. “I hope the state’s attempts to implement the REAL ID Act are now over, and 
we can join the majority of the states in our nation that have rejected the federal law as 
overly invasive and expensive.”425 
3. Basis of the Lawsuit and New Jersey’s Next Steps 
The main thrust of the New Jersey ACLU’s challenge to TRU-ID centered on the 
claim that it violated New Jersey’s Administrative Procedures Act, which according to 
the ACLU, “dictates any new rule or regulation requires, at minimum, public notice and 
the chance for citizen review.” The ACLU further alleged that New Jersey had released 
“minimal information” about TRU-ID before the planned implementation and “sought no 
input from the public, legislators or stakeholders.”426 
Whether other states pursue court action to halt the implementation of REAL ID 
remains to be seen, but it may be instructive to examine the basis of the lawsuit, New 
Jersey’s response, and what is happening now in New Jersey after its decision to stop 
pursuing TRU-ID. To prepare for litigation against the state of New Jersey, the ACLU 
had filed a request for documents under New Jersey’s Open Public Records Act (OPRA), 
423 Jacobs, “Letter from the ACLU-New Jersey to Raymond P. Martinez, Chief Administrator New 
Jersey Motor Vehicles Commission.” 
424 State of New Jersey, Motor Vehicle Commission, “TRU-ID Requirements Delayed Due to ACLU 
Court Motion,” Noodls, accessed January 12, 2014, http://www.noodls.com/viewNoodl/14226686/state-of-
new-jersey-motor-vehicle-commission/tru-id-requirements-delayed-due-to-aclu-court-motion. 




                                                 
on April 9, 2012 that sought information regarding what regulations New Jersey had 
promulgated regarding TRU-ID. It is apparent that the ACLU was seeking to establish 
that New Jersey had not promulgated any regulations. The State of New Jersey replied to 
the document request, noting, “TRU-ID is the program under which the State of New 
Jersey will implement the federal REAL ID Act and the accompanying regulations.”427 It 
further provided the ACLU with existing regulations promulgated by the MVC under the 
New Jersey Administrative Code “concerning identity requirements for obtaining a driver 
license or ID, which permits the MVC to make changes to the list of acceptable identity 
documents.”428 Thus, New Jersey’s position was essentially that no new rulemaking was 
required as it already had existing authority to make the changes it was making to the 
eligibility for and issuance process relating to New Jersey state identification documents.  
It appears that New Jersey had a plausible legal argument against the ACLU 
challenge. It is not apparent why it did not more aggressively defend against the lawsuit, 
or what effect its abandonment of the lawsuit will have on its ability to be found to be in 
full compliance with REAL ID. Furthermore, it is not clear if the lawsuit reflects a new 
tactic on behalf of REAL ID opponents, of pursuing litigation under unique state level 
requirements, or to what extent those efforts would succeed. Instead of defending TRU-
ID, New Jersey pursued its efforts under its existing 6-Point ID System. Notwithstanding 
the litigation, New Jersey has been particularly proactive in efforts to address fraud 
associated with state ID documents and has taken a variety of other measures that appear 
to have given the state and DHS some confidence that New Jersey is materially compliant 
with REAL ID. 
4. New Jersey’s 6 Point ID System 
Due to the settlement of the litigation, New Jersey continues to maintain its 6 
Point ID licensing system. New Jersey’s website provides links to a brochure and a link a 
tool where persons seeking licenses and identification cards will be guided through the 
427 Joseph F. Bruno, MVC Custodian of Records, Office of Legal and Regulatory Affairs, New Jersey 
Response to ACLU Open Public Records Act Request, April 24, 2012. 
428 Ibid. 
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system, to demonstrate their eligibility for the license. As can be seen from the logo, and 
the accompanying explanation of the 6 Point ID System, New Jersey still stresses the 
security aspects of the program, and the website notes that the 6 Point ID verification 




Figure 13.  New Jersey’s 6 Point ID System 
A review of what that entails is useful to compare it to REAL ID requirements. 
According to the State of New Jersey’s Motor Vehicle Commission, to obtain licenses 
and permits, individuals are required to prove their identity.430 New Jersey established 
the 6 Point ID Verification System to help prevent identity theft by requiring that licenses 
only be issued upon presentation of proper legal requirements and verification of the 
documents.431 Individuals are advised that they must prepare information prior to visiting 





                                                 
the MVC, and that it may require special document requests from other state agencies.432 
Individuals demonstrate eligibility for a NJ license or identity document by presenting 
documents that demonstrate their eligibility to be licensed in New Jersey. New Jersey’s 
licensing requirements consists of three elements. Individuals must present proof of 
residence, and they must present, pursuant to New Jersey state law, a SSN, which New 
Jersey advises will be checked against the records of the SSA.433 The third requirement 
relates to the need to establish an identity.  
Residents must accumulate a total of six points, which is accomplished by 
presenting a combination of primary and secondary documents to demonstrate their 
identity by selecting a combination of documents specified by the MVC with individuals 
being required to provide at least one primary document and one secondary document. 
The primary documents include some for U.S. citizens and some for non-citizens, but 
secondary documents do not distinguish between U.S. citizens and non-citizens. Each 
category of document has a point scale, and individuals must accumulate six points to be 
eligible for a New Jersey license or identification document.  
5. New Jersey’s Anti-Fraud Efforts 
Despite New Jersey’s setbacks with the litigation, it nonetheless is one of the 
states closest to compliance based on the affirmative actions it has taken to improve the 
security of its driver’s license system. Actions commenced even prior to the passage of 
the REAL ID Act. The non-profit group CSDL recognized New Jersey’s efforts for a 
Secure Driver’s License in October 2011, which awarded its National Security 
Excellence Award. The award was given for New Jersey’s efforts in the furtherance of 
secure driver’s license credentialing: 1) the security and integrity of the new enhanced 
digital driver license (EDDL), 2) the introduction of fraud prevention measures, and 3) 
the implementation of an effective identity verification process.434 
432 Ibid. 
433 State of New Jersey, “New Jersey 6 Point ID Brochure,” June 14, 2013, 
http://www.state.nj.us/mvc/pdf/Licenses/ident_ver_posterpint.pdf.”  
434 State of New Jersey, Motor Vehicle Commission, “MVC Honored with National Security 
Excellence Award,” October 5, 2011, http://www.state.nj.us/mvc/PressReleases/archives/2011/100511.htm. 
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Upon receiving the award, the New Jersey’s Director of the Office of Homeland 
Security affirmed New Jersey’s commitment to secure identity documents by stating:  
Receiving this award affirms the correctness of the state’s strategy to 
adopt a secure driver license [that] guards against fraud. The Enhanced 
Digital Driver License prevents criminals from furthering their illegal 
activities through identity theft, which helps keep us safer.435 
The press release that announced New Jersey’s recognition by CSDL noted that the 
EDDL had been implemented in all 39 of New Jersey’s driver’s license offices as of May 
2011, and built on New Jersey’s efforts starting with the release of its first digital driver’s 
license in 2004.436 According to the press release, the EDDL “is also considered 
materially complaint under REAL ID standards.”437  
In the area of secure identity documents, New Jersey has gone above and beyond 
measures taken by other states, and the MVC website notes that it has been recognized as 
having “one of the top two most thorough and secure ID verification policies in the 
country.”438 New Jersey has established itself as a leader in the effort to take a full range 
of security measures as demonstrated through the examples of the EDDL and the 
adoption of facial recognition technology.  
6. The Enhanced Digital Driver’s License 
The EDDL, while similar in appearance to the old license, “features more than 25 
covert, overt and forensic features designed to reduce the fraud and abuse through 
updated technology and enhanced security features that are known only to the MVC and 
its law enforcement partners.”439 New Jersey unveiled the EDDL on May 11, 2011 and 




438 State of New Jersey, Motor Vehicle Commission, “What Is the MVC?,” accessed February 23, 
2014, http://www.state.nj.us/mvc/About/AboutMVC.htm. 
439 State of New Jersey, Motor Vehicle Commission,” MVC Honored with National Security 
Excellence Award.” 
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noted that the enhanced driver’s license was necessary because, as stated in the MVC 
press release: 
The driver license is no longer a simple card that proves you are legally 
entitled to operate a motor vehicle, it is now the primary source of 
identification for most Americans and a source (breeder) document used 
for so many other pieces of identification.440 
The importance of the EDDL to New Jersey’s anti-fraud and crime-fighting efforts was 
highlighted by the appearance of the New Jersey Attorney General, Paula T. Dow, at the 
press conference who emphasized the importance of the EDDL to law enforcement 
efforts stating: 
I want to commend the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission for its 
hard work in the creation of this new Enhanced Digital Driver License, as 
well as the multitude of law enforcement agencies that will assist in the 
investigation of those who seek to fraudulently obtain this new license, 
This cutting edge form of identification is one more tool available to all 
levels of law enforcement to stay one step ahead of criminals.441 
The MVC press release indicated that the software MVC was going to use for the EDDL 
would allow the MVC to take clear and accurate photos of each driver’s license 
applicant.442 
7. New Jersey’s Use of Facial Recognition Technology 
At the time of the award, the EDDL project team was involved in the early stages 
of implementing facial recognition technology to review over 16 million photo records. It 
would enable New Jersey, which in the coming year, was to implement central issuance 
of driver’s licenses, to check for fraud, and catch that fraud before the licenses were 
issued to the applicant. Since that time, New Jersey has begun to see significant benefits 
from its use of facial recognition technology, which it refers to as Operation Facial Scrub 
440 State of New Jersey, Motor Vehicle Commission, “NJ Motor Vehicle Chief, Attorney General and 
Homeland Security Director Unveil the State’s New, More Secure Driver License,” May 11, 2011, 
http://www.state.nj.us/mvc/PressReleases/archives/2011/051111.htm. 
441 Ibid. 
442 State of New Jersey, Motor Vehicle Commission,” MVC Honored with National Security 
Excellence Award.” 
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that uses the technology to identify people seeking to obtain New Jersey driver’s licenses 
using fraudulent identities.443 Since its inception, New Jersey’s Attorney General’s 
Office has filed 107 cases, with 69 filed during the last year. The announcement noted 
that the program has allowed it to “scrub” the nearly 23 million images for duplicates and 
through that process, New Jersey has identified 1.8 million records for further scrutiny, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/16/rules-that-keep-feds-from-trolling-
facebook-twitte/?page=1which ultimately resulted in 5,000 suspension cases being 
identified that required re-verification. It has also led to 2,100 cases identified for 
administrative suspensions, and 985 cases were referred for possible criminal charges, 
which has led to a partnership between the Attorney General’s office and the county 
prosecutors.444 In addition to its efforts to address fraud within its state, New Jersey also 
shares information on fraud cases “via a secure website with the FBI’s Joint Terrorism 
Task Force,” as well as 23 state and federal partners and benefit providers, to include the 
DOS passport security, the SSA, and New Jersey’s Departments of Labor and Human 
services to allow those entities to pursue cases involving fraud.445 
8. New Jersey’s Anti-Fraud Prosecutions 
New Jersey officials have highlighted the problem of crime associated with 
identity theft by using two major operations as examples of the problem of crime 
associated with false identification documents. The largest prosecutions have been 
Operation Southern Drawn and Operation White Cloud, which, according to the MVC, 
have shown the direct relationship between fraudulent identification documents and the 
sale of stolen cars, car hijackings, and the sale of illegal drugs and guns.446 
443 State of New Jersey, “Press Release: Attorney General & MVC Chief Announce New Charges 
Resulting From High-Tech Program ‘Operational Facial Scrub’ to Detect False Driver’s Licenses,” 
February 20, 2014, http://www.state.nj.us/mvc/PressReleases/archives/2014/022014a.htm. 
444 State of New Jersey, “Press Release: Attorney General & MVC Chief Announce New Charges 
Resulting From High-Tech Program ‘Operational Facial Scrub’ to Detect False Driver’s Licenses.” 
445 Ibid. 
446 State of New Jersey, Motor Vehicle Commission, “MVC Honored with National Security 
Excellence Award.” 
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On April 14, 2011, the New Jersey State Police issued a media release associated 
with these two large scale operations that resulted in the arrest of 13 people for crimes 
including the illegal sale of guns, drugs, and fraudulent IDs, and for auto theft by car-
jacking.447 In addition to the sale of fraudulent IDs, the illegal sale of drugs and 17 guns 
were facilitated by the use of the fraudulent identification documents. The media release 
included the following statements made by Peter T. Edge, special agent in charge of U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) 
in Newark, and MVC Chief Administrator Raymond P. Martinez, highlighting the role of 
fraudulent identity documents in facilitating criminal activity. 
Document fraud and weapons trafficking is an extremely lucrative crime 
that can be challenging to investigate, but HSI agents, working with state 
and local law enforcement officials are determined to bring these criminals 
to justice. Fraudulent documents may be used to gain employment in 
critical infrastructure industries, obtain financial benefits and entitlements 
that are intended for U.S. citizens, and is a severe threat to our national 
security. 
The MVC has zero tolerance for document fraud, abuse and identity theft 
and we remain vigilant in our effort to further protect the licensing 
process,” said. “Today we stand tall with our law enforcement partners 
with the knowledge that when we work together, we will protect the 
integrity of our licensing system and the personal information of New 
Jerseyans.448 
This investigation, which began in August 2010, uncovered a group of people 
making money through several different criminal enterprises. The investigation showed a 
relationship between the sales of fraudulent identification documents, the sale of stolen 
cars, carjackings, and the purchase of firearms from North Carolina.449  
447 New Jersey State Police, 2011 News Release: 17 Guns Seized, 13 Arrested in Co-Op Cases 





                                                 
9. New Jersey’s Media Coverage 
New Jersey’s newspaper editorials have diverged with each other on the issue of 
REAL ID with some favoring state implementation of REAL ID compliant standards and 
others opposing them. In addition, some editorial boards have themselves changed 
position on REAL ID. For example, shortly before the passage of REAL ID in 2005, 
several editorial boards took issue with the fact that REAL ID was about to be enacted on 
the basis of crafty maneuvering on the part of its sponsors, thereby passing an extensive 
mandate on states, and overriding efforts within and among states and the federal 
government to collaborate on setting standards to issue more secure licenses. The 
editorial boards of the Bergen County Record, and the Newark Star-Ledger generally 
took this approach.450 Two years later, the Star-Ledger went further, and in two editorials 
two months apart, called for New Jersey to join other states in a revolt against REAL ID, 
and for Congress to repeal the law.451  
However, several years later, the New Jersey newspapers diverged. On April 3, 
2012, an editorial in the Record from Bergen County, New Jersey noted with approval, 
New Jersey’s effort to launch the TRU-ID, New Jersey’s version of REAL ID.452 The 
editorial, while cautioning that the state needed to avoid implementation glitches that had 
led in the past to long lines, expressed its disagreement with the actions of 13 states that 
had passed laws prohibiting compliance with REAL ID. It explained its position noting: 
We disagree. A more uniform driver’s license system is necessary. 
Allowing each state to use its own formula makes it easy for would-be 
terrorists to head to the place with the laxest rules to get or renew a 
license. Putting a driver’s license on par with a passport makes sense.453  
In an editorial dated May 14, 2012, the Newark Star-Ledger urged that New 
Jersey withdraw from efforts to implement TRU-ID by citing its implementation costs 
450 The Record, “A License for Trouble and a Boon for Identity Theft,” May 6, 2005, LexisNexis 
Academic; see also, The Star-Ledger, “The Party of Centralized Power” July 19, 2005, LexisNexis 
Academic. 
451 The Star-Ledger, “Revoke Driver’s License Law,” March 4, 2007, LexisNexis Academic. 
452 The Record, “A Better License,” April 3, 2012, LexicNexis Academic. 
453 Ibid. 
 144 
                                                 
and what it termed its ultimate cost to privacy and security.454 As previously discussed, 
New Jersey did just that, and has returned to its 6 Point Verification system. This issue 
has not been covered in the media since that time—even following DHS’ announcement 
in December 2013 regarding phased enforcement. 
C. MAINE 
The State of Maine has been an outspoken opponent of REAL ID, while at the 
same time, demonstrating the clear vulnerabilities that exist in the state licensing systems 
that led to REAL ID’s passage and that have persuaded even opponents to address 
weaknesses in their state licensing systems. Maine was one of the states that actively 
resisted implementation of the law by initially passing a non-binding resolution asking 
Congress to repeal it, and asserting the Maine Legislature’s refusal to implement the 
law.455 It then passed an outright prohibition on implementing REAL ID. Maine law 
continues to prohibit state officials from complying with REAL ID requirements. 
However, the vulnerabilities of its licensing system, coupled with some degree of public 
pressure, have caused Maine to take what might be seen as a schizophrenic approach 
toward the issuance procedures for state driver’s license and identity documents. It also 
appears that Maine’s shifts are largely attributable to interesting, and shifting electoral 
politics in the state, including some infighting within the Democratic Party in Maine, and 
public pressure, that appear to have heavily influenced the state’s approach to REAL ID. 
The following discussion sets forth Maine’s REAL ID journey.  
1. Maine’s Shifting Approach on Document Security 
In January 2007, the Maine Legislature passed a nearly unanimous non-binding 
resolution urging Maine to reject REAL ID that alleged that it would be costly and 
difficult to implement, with costs estimated to reach $185 million during the first five 
454 The Star Ledger, “Revoke This License Plan New Jersey Should Back Out of Federal ID 
Program,” May 14, 2012, LexisNexis Academic. 
455 Glenn Adams and The Associated Press, “Maine Says No Thanks to ID Act; U.S. Law 




                                                 
years, and predicting that it would invite identity theft.456 The Senate Majority Leader, a 
Democrat, and sponsor of the resolution, expressed her view that REAL ID “will do 
nothing to make us safer, but it is our job as state legislators to protect the people of 
Maine from just this sort of dangerous federal mandate.”457 The Secretary of State, 
Matthew Dunlap, whose office administers state driver’s licenses in Maine through the 
Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV), issued a statement supporting the state legislature that 
cited an imbalance between security and privacy caused by REAL ID. 
Maine lawmakers have delivered a clear signal to the Congress that the 
implications of Real ID are unacceptable. Lawmakers in Maine understand 
that security is a critical priority, but so is privacy, and most importantly, a 
security system should actually provide security. It is not at all clear that 
after all the expense and tribulation for citizens that Real ID would present 
that we would really be no safer.458 
The statement also criticized REAL ID in comparison to the previous efforts of Maine 
Senator Susan Collins to implement document security efforts through the 2004 IRTPA, 
which has been previously discussed. In contrast to REAL ID, the 2004 law had a 
stakeholder process that “was designed to be implemented by the states in an absorbable 
way” but was replaced by Real ID.459  
At the same time it was passing the non-binding resolution, the Maine legislature 
was introducing a companion piece of legislation that directed the Secretary of State to 
refuse to implement REAL ID.460 Enacted into law in 2007, it reads as follows:  




458 State of Maine, “Maine Rejects Real ID Act: Joint Resolution Refutes Plan for National 
Identification Cards,” January 25, 2007, http://www.maine.gov/sos/news/2007/RealIDAct.html. (Although 
the statement is a bit unclear in its syntax, the Secretary of State was clearly expressing his disagreement 
with REAL ID). 
459 Ibid. 
460 Adams and Press, “Maine Says No Thanks to ID Act; U.S. Law Cumbersome, Costly Says 
Lawmakers.” 
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The State may not participate in the federal REAL ID Act of 2005, 
enacted as part of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for 
Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Public Law 
109–13. The Secretary of State may not amend the procedures for 
applying for a driver’s license or nondriver identification card under this 
chapter in a manner designed to conform to the federal REAL ID Act of 
2005. 
Maine is among a core group of states that have passed similar legislation to prohibit its 
state officials from taking action in furtherance of REAL ID. 
2. The Political Backdrop Behind Maine’s Positions on REAL ID 
An interesting dynamic in Maine has been the influence of the state’s electoral 
politics on its approach to REAL ID. Maine’s political party’s strength shows periods of 
stability, but recent electoral swings in Maine, which have shifted control of key political 
offices, alternating between the Republicans and the Democrats, have had an effect on 
legislative and policy approaches to REAL ID. The legislature was controlled by 
Republicans following the 2010 elections, and returned to Democratic Party control 
following the 2012 elections. Prior to 2010, Democrats controlled all the major state 
offices in Maine.461 However, even when controlled by Democrats, the changes resulting 
from the political and policy shifts have been dramatic, and even some shifts occurring 
when only one party was in control, have no doubt proven confusing for state licensing 
officials, as well as the citizens of Maine.  
3. Once Again--Leadership Matters: Secretary of State Matthew Dunlap  
In Maine, the Secretary of State is responsible for administering the licensing of 
drivers, and is elected by the legislature. The current Secretary of State, Matthew Dunlap, 
began a second non-consecutive term in January 2013. He first served as Secretary of 
State beginning in 2005, serving until 2009, when the control of the Maine legislature 
reverted back to Republican control for two years. Dunlap was the Secretary of State at 
461 Wikipedia, s.v. “Political Party Strength in Maine,” last modified August 19, 2013, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_party_strength_in_Maine; see also Maine.gov website, which 
contains election results information by year and office but does not show political party shifts 
http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/prior1st.htm.  
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the time of the non-binding resolution in 2007. The official website indicates that he has 
been actively involved in discussions surrounding identity security issues and makes 
clear that he favors the approach taken in the IRTPA with its negotiated rulemaking 
approach. Secretary of State Dunlap has a vested and understandable interest in that 
process, as the website and a Bangor Daily News article note that he had been personally 
involved in those efforts as a representative.462  
The Secretary of State position in Maine is political in the sense that the 
politically elected members of the state legislature elect the Secretary of State. While it is 
not unusual to have such positions be political, it appears that Dunlap has played a 
particularly active role on the REAL ID issue, and much of the opposition to REAL ID 
has occurred under his watch as the official responsible for driver licensing issues in 
Maine. Dunlap is a long-time political figure in Maine politics, having run for and been 
elected to the legislature for four terms beginning in 1996, and then being elected 
Secretary of State by the legislature beginning in 2005, and commencing a non-
consecutive term in January 2013. It also appears that Dunlap aspires to higher political 
office, having run unsuccessfully in the 2012 primary for the Senate seat then occupied 
by Olympia Snowe.463 
Dunlap has been an outspoken opponent of REAL ID, and the Secretary of State’s 
official website makes frequent references to that opposition, including his receipt of the 
ACLU’s highest award, given in recognition to his opposition to REAL ID.464 The 
website notes that the ACLU cited Dunlap’s opposition as “truly a patriotic act,” and 
quoted from Dunlap’s statement at the time of the award that:  
I am truly honored to receive this award. Maine’s political and community 
leaders have recognized REAL ID for what it truly is- a poorly thought out 
policy that fails to achieve its’ supposed primary goal of improving 
462 The Bangor Daily News, “Dunlap Named to Serve on Federal Committee,” accessed March 8, 
2014, http://archive.bangordailynews.com/2005/04/14/dunlap-named-to-serve-on-federal-committee/. 
463 Pollways, “Democrat Dunlap Declares,” accessed March 8, 2014, http://pollways.bangordaily 
news.com/2011/11/02/national/democrat-dunlap-declares/. 
464 State of Maine, Department of the Secretary of State, “Maine Civil Liberties Union Award,” 
January 11, 2008, http://www.maine.gov/sos/news/2008/MaineCivil.html. 
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national security, while at the same time creating enormous concerns 
about the privacy of all Americans.465 
The website highlights Dunlap’s role in opposing REAL ID, the role of the legislature in 
passing the non-binding resolution in 2007, and later passage of the law to prohibit the 
state from expending state monies to comply with REAL ID.466 The site also touts 
Dunlap’s “prominence in the national debate” as a consultant role for ABC News on 
matters related to REAL ID, and points readers to his upcoming televised remarks on the 
ABC show, “World News Tonight.”467 He appears clearly to be a politician who has 
higher political aspirations, and may have found an issue with REAL ID that has 
resonated in Maine, or at least contributed, to a conflicted approach for the state. 
However, circumstances in Maine have evolved, which demonstrate political shifts and a 
conflicted approach for the state on the issue of REAL ID. 
4. Security Vulnerabilities Exposed—Leading to a Gradual Shift 
Notwithstanding its open defiance of REAL ID, Maine was forced to address 
vulnerabilities in its licensing system in 2008 because of the discovery that individuals 
were exploiting vulnerabilities in the states’ driver’s license issuance system, as well as 
pressure resulting form media coverage of those vulnerabilities. The specific 
vulnerability that Maine sought to address stemmed from a 2006 investigation conducted 
by the BMV, in conjunction with federal officials, into the transport of possible illegal 
aliens from Poland into Maine, via New York for the purposes of procuring Maine 
driver’s licenses and state identification documents.468 Maine convened a working group 
under the auspices of the Secretary of State’s office, which prepared a report dated 
December 5, 2007, and presented it to the Secretary of State.469 The report discussed the 
problem of how non-residents individuals of Maine could easily obtain driver’s licenses, 
465 Ibid. 
466 Ibid. 
467 State of Maine, Department of the Secretary of State, “Maine Civil Liberties Union Award.” 
468 Maine Department of Secretary of State, Report of the Working Group Convened by the Secretary 
of State to Examine Laws Governing Eligibility and Documentation Requirements for Driver’s Licenses 
and Non-Driver Identification Cards, December 5, 2007. 
469 Ibid. 
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and made recommendations on how to address the problem, primarily thorough 
legislative changes.470  
In early 2008, the Bangor Daily News published a series of editorials highlighting 
recent embarrassments whereby individuals had been encouraged to come to Maine to 
obtain state issued driver’s licenses because Maine did not check to see whether 
applicants for driver’s licenses actually lived in Maine. One editorial urged the passage of 
a state law designed to ensure that individuals seeking licenses were, in fact, residents of 
Maine and supported additional state measures consistent with REAL ID 
requirements.471 A similar editorial, issued two months later, reiterated its support for 
changes in Maine licensing and detailed the exchanges between the Governor’s office 
and DHS officials that resulted in Maine proposing to make changes to its licensing 
procedures in exchange for an extension for Maine to avoid consequences from attaching 
to its failure to conform to REAL ID.472 
5. Maine Tightens Its Driver License Issuance Process 
The recommendations in the report became the basis of the modifications to the 
state’s eligibility requirements for driver’s licenses and identity documents. One action 
taken by Maine was to pass Public Law Chapter 648 in 2008. That law required 
applicants for a Maine license to establish that they are lawfully in the United States.473 
The law took effect in November 2008, and as explained by the Secretary of State, made 
Maine driver’s licenses valid only for the period of time that the individual was lawfully 
in the United States, with the validity of the driver’s license expiring on the same date as 
did the individual’s eligibility to remain in the United States.474 The Secretary of State’s 
office made public appearances and issued notices advising Maine citizens of the new 
470 Ibid. 
471 The Bangor Daily News, “Driver’s License Fix,” accessed December 29, 2013, http://archive. 
bangordailynews.com/2008/02/25/drivers-license-fix/. 
472 The Bangor Daily News, “License Failures,” accessed December 29, 2013, http://archive. 
bangordailynews.com/2008/04/09/license-failures/. 
473 State of Maine, “Secretary Dunlap Details New Requirements for Issuing Driver Licenses and 
State ID Cards,” November 14, 2008, http://www.maine.gov/sos/news/2008/new-dl-requirements.htm. 
474 Ibid. 
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requirements, and urged them to satisfy the lawful presence requirement by obtaining a 
certified copy of their birth certificate noting that it was the most common and easiest 
way to a lawful presence requirement.475 It also advised the public that it was a separate 
requirement to the need under Maine law, to establish residence.476 These requirements 
under Maine law stemmed from concerns that persons not resident in Maine, generally 
illegal aliens, were exploiting Maine’s lax requirements for the issuance of driver’s 
licenses and identification cards. 
Legislation Enacted by Maine in Furtherance of REAL ID Requirements 
and Rolling Back Provisions Enacted by Maine to Comply with REAL ID  
The Maine legislature took the following key steps toward implementing key 
provisions of REAL ID through its passage in 2008 of legislation known as An Act to 
Enhance the Security of State credentials. 
• It required that state credentials only be issued to individuals determined 
to be lawfully in the United States 
• It required Maine to tie the expiration of the document to the period of 
authorized stay in the United States 
• It directed Maine officials to take a variety of actions to ensure that 
duplication of state credentials did not occur. To that end, the legislation 
called for Maine to use technology, such as facial recognition and 
biometric technology (fingerprints), and directed the Maine officials to 
explore ways to maintain and keep basic records of the photographs taken 
at the time that people applied for a state driver’s license or non-driver 
identification card.477  
Maine’s current BMV website states that to get a Maine license, individuals must 
prove the following. 
• That they are residents of Maine 
• That they are citizens or are lawfully in the United States 
475 State of Maine, “Secretary of State Matt Dunlap Reminds Motorists of Requirements for Obtaining 
Driver Licenses and State ID Cards,” May 7, 2009, http://www.maine.gov/sos/news/2009/legal-presence-
reminder.htm. 
476 Ibid. 
477 State of Maine, “Secretary Dunlap Details New Requirements for Issuing Driver Licenses and 
State ID Cards.” 
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• That they have a Social Security number if one is not already on file; and 
if ineligible for a Social Security number, present immigration documents 
to help the BMV establish the ineligibility 
• That their name change, if any, was legal by presenting appropriate 
documentation478 
Nevertheless, the changes Maine made to its laws were made only grudgingly, in 
recognition of the fact that strong views existed in Maine against REAL ID and support 
for the law’s repeal. Therefore, the statutory amendments included a provision that stated 
that if REAL ID were repealed, the Maine laws should be restored to what they were 
prior to the passage of REAL ID.479 
6. Emerging Divisions Among Maine Democrats  
By June 2008, Maine’s governor at the time, Democrat John Baldacci, found 
himself in the awkward position of defending Maine’s application for, and receipt of 
REAL ID demonstration grant program funding in excess of $1 million dollars.480 This 
action, seen as inconsistent with Maine’s state law prohibiting compliance with REAL 
ID, caused Baldacci to defend the application for the funding noting that the program’s 
description specifically noted that states did not have to be REAL ID compliant to access 
the funds.481 His public statement reflected the state’s ambivalence on the issue of REAL 
ID, the Governor noted:  
This is not about being compliant with a national ID system; this is about 
strengthening Maine’s driver’s licensees. I am determined we are going to 
do it and comply with the existing laws on the books.482 
Further reflecting the tensions within the state on this issue, as well its complicated 
electoral politics, it appears that Secretary of State Dunlap was not made aware of the 
478 State of Maine, “Obtaining a Driver’s License,” accessed March 8, 2014, http://www.maine.gov/ 
sos/bmv/licenses/getlicense.html. 
479 Maine State Legislature, “An Act to Enhance the Security of State Credentials, Maine Revised 
Statutes Annotated,” 2008, http://www.mainelegislature.org. 
480 Mal Leary and Capitol News Service, “Maine Receives $1M Real ID Grant,” The Bangor Daily 





                                                 
grant application, and that it was sought by the state’s Public Safety Commissioner, at the 
governor’s direction, and without Dunlap being consulted.483 Dunlap told the Bangor 
Daily News that the first he first heard of the grant application from the paper’s inquiry, 
and only thereafter, was made aware of the grant when the governor’s chief of staff sent 
an email attaching the DHS grant news release from DHS. The Public Safety 
Commissioner disagreed, however, that Dunlap was unaware.484 It would be fair to say, 
that close coordination did not occur on the REAL ID demonstration grant between the 
Governor’s office and the Secretary of State whose office oversees driver’s license 
issuance.  
Adding to the controversy on the grant issue is the fact that the documentation 
submitted in support of the grant identified a possible use of the purchase of software 
commonly used for facial recognition purposes, which is often used to identify whether a 
photograph matches that used on license under another name. This potential use of the 
grant funding was troubling to the Maine ACLU’s Executive Director, Shenna Bellows, 
who stated: 
We are concerned that both the governor and Commissioner Jordan are 
going against the will of the public and the Legislature in moving 
apparently … full steam ahead in implementing Real ID. “That’s why we 
are supporting the people’s veto of Maine’s Real ID law. Governor 
Baldacci and Commissioner Jordan are willingly embracing biometric 
technology and the Real ID privacy nightmare.485 
7. The Pendulum Swings Back: The Fight to Roll Back REAL ID 
Compliance Measures  
Nevertheless, Maine began another period of swings in the other direction and 
momentum swing in the other direction toward the limitations on REAL ID compliance. 
Yet, this issue caused significant ambivalence. Among REAL ID related editorials from 
the Bangor Daily News was one urging against the passage of a state bill that would have 
rolled back some of the measures taken the previous year to tighten the license issuance 
483 Ibid. 
484 Ibid. 
485 Leary and Capitol News Service, “Maine Receives $1M Real ID Grant.” 
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process in Maine. While the editorial still generally opposed the REAL ID law, it 
acknowledged that improvements were needed, and measures undertaken by Maine in 
furtherance of REAL ID should not be undone.486 
In 2011, at a time when Republicans controlled both the governor’s office and the 
legislature, Maine took actions to both strengthen document security and bring itself 
closer to compliance, while also pursuing legislation that did the opposite. In March 
2011, Maine’s Republican Secretary of State, rolled out newly designed driver’s licenses 
and identity documents, which incorporated a variety of security features recommended 
by AAMVA including ghost portraits, security indicia, and barcodes to protect against 
counterfeiting and forgery photo substitution, and cannibalization of cards (see Figure 
14).487  
 
Figure 14.  Sample of a Maine Driver’s License488 
Maine’s BMV website currently emphasizes the enhanced security features of the 
new driver’s license design and recognizes the multiple uses of driver’s licenses, to 
include entry into secure facilities. It notes that Maine has taken advantage of “state-of-
the art” technology to enhance the security of the driver’s license to include the use of 
486 The Bangor Daily News, “Revisit Real ID,” accessed December 30, 2013, http://bangordailynews. 
com/2009/04/30/opinion/revisit-real-id/. 
487 State of Maine, “Secretary of State Summers Reveals Newly Designed Driver’s License and 
Identification Cards,” March 22, 2011, http://www.maine.gov/sos/news/2011/newdriverlicense.htm. 
488 State of Maine, “Obtaining a Driver’s License.” 
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digital images and signatures that will increase the security of the license and make it 
more trustworthy in daily use.489  
A couple of months later, on May 25, 2011, Maine enacted a law introduced as 
“An Act to Protect the Privacy of Maine Residents under the Driver’s License Laws.”490 
The law amended Maine laws to address the privacy of personal information relating to 
state identity documents. It also had the effect of repealing a number of the very 
provisions that had been enacted to further compliance with REAL ID. The summary 
accompanying the legislation describes the legislation as follows: “This bill is a partial 
repeal of current Maine law enacted to comply with the requirements of the federal 
REAL ID Act of 2005.”491 The legislation summarized as follows implemented a variety 
of provisions, some of which are in direct conflict with REAL ID requirements.  
• Repeals the requirement that the Secretary of State issue driver’s licenses 
and non-driver identification cards only to individuals who present 
documentary evidence of legal presence in the United States 
• Exempts SSNs in the possession of the Secretary of State from the 
definition of “public records” under Maine’s freedom of access laws 
• Provides that the Secretary of State may not disseminate SSNs to any 
entity without legislative authorization 
• Restricts the distribution and retention of digital information used to 
produce a license 
• Prohibits the Secretary of State from the use of biometric technology, such 
as retinal scans, facial recognition or fingerprint technology, but not 
including digital photographs in the production or storing of license 
information 
• Repeals the requirement that the Secretary of State participate in the 
federal Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements Program, the 
489 Ibid. 
490 Maine State Legislature, “An Act to Protect the Privacy of Maine Residents Under the Driver’s 
License Laws, Maine Revised Statutes Annotated,” 2011, http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/ 
display_ps.asp?paper=HP0803&PID=1456&snum=125&sec0; Maine State Legislature, “Summary of LD 
1068 (HP 803): An Act To Protect the Privacy of Maine Residents under the Driver’s License Laws,” 
accessed January 19, 2014, http://www.mainelegislature.org/LawMakerWeb/summary.asp?LD=1068 
&SessionID=9. 
491 Open States, “Bill Text-HP 803-Maine 125th Legislature (2011–2012),” accessed January 29, 
2014, http://openstates.org/me/bills/125/HP803/documents/MED00003463/. 
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centralized database system used and maintained by the U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services 
• Repeals the requirement that the Secretary of State study the most cost-
effective technology to prevent driver’s license or non-driver identification 
card duplication 
• Provides that cost savings as a result of this act must be allocated to the 
Highway and Bridge Capital program within the DOT 
• Does not change the current requirement that an applicant for a Maine 
driver’s license or non-driver identification card must provide proof of 
residency 
• Repeals the requirement that a license or non-driver identification card of 
a noncitizen or legal permanent resident expires at the end of the 
licensee’s authorized duration of stay in the United States492 
As can be seen, a number of the provisions conflict with REAL ID requirements; in 
particular, those limiting the ability to verify lawful status, or tie the expiration of the 
licenses to the period of authorized stay, and the limitation on use the use of biometric 
technology for the production or storage of license information. The Maine legislature’s 
actions in defiance of REAL ID were the beginning of a series of actions reflecting 
Maine’s vacillation regarding REAL ID. The many groups that came together to oppose 
REAL493ID in Maine reflect the civil liberties and libertarian strains that oppose REAL 
ID and which encompass groups ranging from the Maine Civil Liberties Union (MCLU), 
to the Cato Institute.494 The MCLU stressed that REAL ID served as a “one stop shop” 
for identity thieves because the cards would have embedded addresses and could be read 
by scanners.495  
Despite Maine’s strident position in opposition to REAL ID, Maine has had to 
grapple with the exploitation of its lax licensing procedures by those who would take 
advantage of its vulnerabilities. Those vulnerabilities ultimately led the Secretary of State 
to convene a working group to make recommendations for legislative improvements to 
492 Ibid. 
493 Leary and Capitol News Service, “Maine Receives $1M Real ID Grant.” 
494 Adams and The Associated Press, “Maine Says No Thanks to ID Act; U.S. Law Cumbersome, 
Costly Says Lawmakers.” 
495 Ibid. 
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address these vulnerabilities. As a result, Maine has also passed other laws to strengthen 
its driver licensing procedures regarding eligibility for driver’s licenses in Maine.  
8. Maine’s Privacy Related Concerns About REAL ID  
It appears that a major concern in Maine, and voiced by Secretary of State 
Dunlap, relates to threats to privacy. Those concerns appear to be exaggerated, but they 
appear to be genuinely held concerns. Maine’s website makes broad claims against 
REAL ID, including the statement of the MCLU, that REAL ID would be “a huge threat 
to individual liberties,” and that threats from identity thieves would be exacerbated 
because “REAL ID Act links driver’s licenses and state ID cards to a national 
database.”496 The latter assertion has been repeatedly rejected by DHS in its rulemaking 
documents and its related PIAs. Nevertheless, Maine has taken additional actions to 
strengthen protections for the privacy and security of driver’s license information. On 
May 25, 2011, the governor signed into law measures designed to protect the privacy of 
Maine residents under the driver’s license laws.497 The principal law, known as “An Act 
To Protect the Privacy of Maine Residents under the Driver’s License Laws,” did the 
following. 
• Treats digital images and digitized signatures used to produce a license as 
confidential information that may only be distributed for use by a law 
enforcement agency in executing its functions or as otherwise authorized 
under the provisions of 18 United States Code, Section 2721. 
• Authorizes the Secretary of State to store, record, and retain digital images 
and digitized signatures only for producing a license.  
• Prohibits the Secretary of State from using biometric technology, 
including, but not limited to, retinal scanning, facial recognition or 
fingerprint technology, to produce a license or non-driver identification 
card. This subsection does not apply to digital images.  
• Prohibits the Secretary of State from disseminating information collected 
under subsection 6 to any entity without specific authorization from the 
Legislature and provides for civil penalties of up to $500 per violation.498  
496 State of Maine, “Maine Rejects Real ID Act: Joint Resolution Refutes Plan for National 
Identification Cards.” 
497 Maine State Legislature, “Summary of LD 1068 (HP 803): An Act To Protect the Privacy of Maine 
Residents under the Driver’s License Laws.” 
498 Open States, “Bill Text-HP 803-Maine 125th Legislature (2011–2012). 
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Maine’s experience is representative of the tensions and splits within a core group 
of states, and the consequences of its electoral shifts demonstrate a particularly tricky 
challenge for DHS as it seeks to encourage states to implement the law fully. The shifting 
state position also presents uncertainty for residents of such states. 
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XII. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
This paper has undertaken a broad examination of REAL ID; the controversy and 
concerns surrounding the legislation; responses to those concerns by DHS and others; and 
the progress by states on implementation efforts. It has also gone deeper into the 
controversies surrounding the legislation and the state implementation efforts by 
undertaking case studies of three states that are arrayed along the continuum of 
implementation milestones. The case studies demonstrate how different states have 
addressed REAL ID requirements, and explore how some of the issues of concern, 
interest groups, State leaders, and local politics have affected state implementation 
efforts. This thesis has also examined how DHS has attempted to address state concerns, 
and examined measures it has taken to facilitate and encourage State compliance, and 
how it is now approaching enforcement of REAL ID a means of brining all states into 
compliance. The following is an analysis of various issues examined in this paper, with 
the objective of making findings regarding how issues have been addressed and how and 
why compliance has been achieved or has proven elusive. That analysis and those 
findings will, in turn, inform the recommendations for DHS which follow in the final 
chapter. 
A. REAL ID IS A NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE TOOL TO ADDRESS 
THE PROBLEM OF INSECURE IDENTITIES 
This paper began by stating that it would address the question of whether REAL 
ID was an effective and necessary solution to the problem of insecure driver’s licenses 
and identity documents. It is this author’s view that given the potential threats to national, 
individual, and institutional security, REAL ID is a necessary tool to address the threats 
facilitated by of insecure identity documents, and that properly implemented it can be an 
effective way to address the range of threats. Given the complexities of the interrelated 
problems of document fraud, false identities and identity theft that can be used to further 
criminal behavior and terrorism, a strong measure like REAL ID was necessary. 
However, calling REAL ID the solution is too heavy a burden for a legislative scheme to 
bear. This is particularly so when the true measure of success against insecure licenses, 
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and ID cards lies in full and consistent implementation of the law across the country. 
Without consistency in implementation, vulnerabilities remain due to the persistence of 
weak links in the issuance of state identity documents. The success of REAL ID as a 
partial solution depends on the collective actions of all 56 states and territories, the efforts 
of DHS officials, and the support of other federal agencies, members the Congress, and 
the various Governors and State legislatures. All of those entities have to work 
collectively toward the same objectives in order to effectively address the problems 
posted by insecure state identity documents. This does not mean, however, that they 
should not work to address the concerns that have been raised and work toward 
acceptable solutions, recognizing that there are deep seated, sincerely held, and legitimate 
concerns with the REAL ID requirements. 
B. DHS HAS WORKED TO ADDRESS THE RANGE OF CONCERNS 
RAISED BY CRITICS REGARDING THE LEGISLATION AND ITS 
IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES, BUT MUST DO MORE 
Another question posed was whether DHS has effectively addressed state 
concerns related to REAL ID’s implementation, such as: concerns about establishing a 
national ID card; threats to the federal/state balance of power contemplated by the Tenth 
Amendment; perceived threats to privacy; and the implementation costs. It is apparent 
that the uncertainty and concern that remains about these aspects of REAL ID have 
proven to be the most significant drivers of state opposition. DHS efforts to address the 
concerns are a work in progress and it remains to be seen whether DHS will effectively 
respond to and mitigate those concerns. There are encouraging signs, however, and DHS 
seems to have taken some measures to respond to concerns while giving states needed 
flexibility and time. By any measure, the changes required by REAL ID were substantial 
and its impact on individuals and States has been great. DHS has sought to respond to 
those concerns through its rulemaking efforts. Those efforts were extensive, while at the 
same time being relatively efficient and timely for a rulemaking effort of its size and 
scope. The REAL ID rulemaking, in the opinion of this writer, has been comprehensive, 
and largely transparent in identifying and responding to a range of significant issues 
posed by the law. DHS published an NPRM on March 9, 2007, processed over 21,000 
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comments related to the proposed rule, and published the final Rule on January 29, 2008. 
The rulemaking was accompanied by extensive Privacy Impact Assessments, as well as a 
detailed Regulatory Evaluation document of nearly 200 pages, published on January 17, 
2008. in conjunction with the final rule. The latter document presents the benefits and 
costs of the minimum-standards required for driver license and ID card issuance under 
REAL ID. 
There are major issues and concerns that DHS has sought to address through 
rulemaking and through the resources and support it has provided. It has been a mixed 
outcome so far in terms of DHS’ ability to successfully address the concerns. The 
complexity and importance of these issues to States indicate that while much has been 
done, more can and should be done while recognizing that some Sates will never be 
satisfied with DHS efforts.  
C. REAL ID IS NOT A NATIONAL ID BUT CAUTION IS WARRANTED 
First, on the issue of whether REAL ID establishes a national ID, DHS has made 
repeated efforts to reject the notion that it was seeking to establish a national ID, whether 
in the form of a card, or a system of interconnected system of registries. This thesis 
addressed this issue by examining the traditional definition of a national ID system, 
examining the opinions of experts regarding what constitutes a national ID and what does 
not. It also compared REAL ID requirements to actions taken in furtherance of national 
ID systems by other countries for the purpose of clarifying the distinctions between 
actual national ID systems and the REAL ID requirements. The public perception and, as 
importantly, the political debates surrounding this issue remain mixed, with some 
emerging consensus that REAL does not constitutes a national ID.  
Nevertheless the idea that REAL ID imposes a national ID system persists largely 
in jurisdictions that by their history, and often their politics, oppose federal regulatory 
measures and prefer as little federal intrusion as possible into what they see as Sate 
functions—such as driver licensing requirements. This opposition is represented by the 
handful of hold-out states that have passed states laws prohibiting compliance with 
REAL ID, with Maine representing those states in the case studies. This thesis has 
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addressed how traditional national IDs differ from REAL ID compliant documents. It has 
also sought to identify measures that DHS could take to reject basic elements of a 
national ID system, while at the same time making State licensing and identification 
systems more secure and less prone to errors, which are legitimate concerns with large, 
government run systems containing personal information.  
D. REAL ID DOES NOT VIOLATE TENTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES 
OR CONSTITUTE AN UNFUNDED MANDATE, BUT FUNDING IS A 
KEY ISSUE FOR THE STATES  
Federal laws and regulatory activity is often opposed on the basis that that it 
violates the Tenth Amendment, or that the federal government impose requirements on 
the states that constitute an unfunded mandate. This claim often resonates, particularly 
when the federal requirements coincide with periods of increasing regulatory activity and 
when economic conditions are such that states have smaller budgets, increasing needs, 
and less federal support. This has been the case with REAL ID, and there have been 
many assertions that REAL ID imposes an unfunded mandate on the states. While this 
paper has discussed that claim and largely determined that the law is not an unfunded 
mandate, the answer to that question is probably less important than the public 
perception. As a result, the need to assist states through additional resources to achieve 
the mutually beneficial outcome associated with secure identity documents seems 
obvious. Yet, the ancillary benefits for states also warrant equal effort on behalf of states 
to achieve REAL ID’s document security objectives.  
E. PRIVACY AND SAFEGUARDING OF PRIVATE INFORMATION ARE 
IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS AND ARE BEING ADDRESSED  
The issue of government requirements and activities that may intrude on 
individual privacy and risk the exposure or theft of personal information is a significant 
concern raised by opponents of REAL ID. It is also one that is growing in public 
awareness and concern. This is particularly so due to revelations of private sector and 
government security breaches and the growing awareness of government collection of 
private information such as those exposed by Edward Snowden concerning the 
intelligence collection activities of the NSA. The requirement in the REAL ID 
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regulations that information be made available to other states and that each state utilize 
technology to store personal information on the identity documents themselves, has 
raised concerns from those that see the risks of potentially insecure systems and the 
impact on personal privacy. DHS has sought to allay those concerns, such as the use of 
RFID technology, choosing instead to keep the more low-tech, and lower capacity 
barcode technology standard for storage of REAL ID related information on driver’s 
licenses and identity cards. At the same time, DHS, recognizing that technologies change 
rapidly has also left open the possibility that it will revisit the issue of the technology 
standard to be used--including the use of encryption of the information. It had rejected 
encryption when issuing the final rules, in order to ensure the accessibility of the 
information to law enforcement and facilitate the exchange of information among the 
various states and territories.  
DHS has also declined to impose federal limitations on the access to such 
information. Instead, it has suggested that states address additional privacy protections at 
the state level. Such efforts could address concerns such as third party use of the 
information required by REAL ID, and maintained by the states in their records or on the 
cards themselves. DHS has suggested that states use model legislation such as proposed 
by AAMVA, and has provided examples of states that have enacted legislation to provide 
more stringent protections of information privacy at the local level. DHS’ approach 
addresses the concerns of individual states in a more tailored manner. 
F. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has sought to demonstrate the complex policy, legal, and practical 
issues posed by REAL ID. It has had a long, often rocky, and still incomplete journey 
toward its ultimate goal of achieving full implementation. It is this author’s view that the 
successful completion of that journey is important for fundamental security issues and 
issues of trust between governmental institutions and the people with whom they interact.  
Today, there remains inconsistency among the states regarding their adherence to 
the requirements or REAL ID. DHS has found that 21 states and territories are in full 
compliance with REAL ID, with another 35 still having taken few steps toward 
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compliance, or being in open defiance of the requirements. While states have made 
progress, not having all states in compliance means that weaknesses remain in the 
security and reliability of state identification documents. The delayed implementation has 
prevented DHS from restricting the use of those documents for the identified federal 
official purposes (currently, commercial air travel, access to nuclear facilities and access 
to federal buildings), in order to avoid significant burdens and inconvenience on the 
citizens of states that have not come into full compliance. This, in turn, means that the 
nation is tolerating the continued issuance and use of documents that are insecure and do 
not accomplish the stated purpose of increasing the security and reliability of identity 
documents. In addition to the impact that this has on the use of such documents for 
federal official purposes, the insecurity of those document has consequences that extend 
to the acquisition of federal benefits, the filing of federal tax returns, and insecure 
documents facilitate criminal activity such as identity theft that affects both businesses 
and individuals in the form of substantial monetary losses and other ancillary 
consequences. While much has been accomplished, much remains to be done to bring the 
remaining jurisdictions into full compliance. DHS has taken a necessary step by 
announcing the beginning of a phased enforcement through graduated consequences. 
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XIII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The security and reliability of state identification documents is dependent upon 
having the states adopt secure document verification procedures. As DHS continues to 
pursue full state compliance, some lessons and recommendations can guide DHS as it 
seeks to achieve full compliance. They fall into three general areas and are briefly 
discussed as follows. 
A. ENGAGE WITH THE GENERAL PUBLIC TO EDUCATE THEM ON 
THE IMPORTANCE OF DOCUMENT SECURITY EFFORTS 
DHS has generally directed its efforts at developing partnerships with states and 
allowing the states to be the principal drivers of REAL ID compliance efforts. Those 
partnerships and the primacy of the states’ role should continue. DHS should consider 
engaging the public more directly on the importance of document security efforts. Recent 
concerns with identity theft present an opportunity to not only educate the public to help 
individuals avoid the consequences of identity theft and similar crimes, but to also inform 
the public about why the reliability and security of state identification documents needs 
to be improved to protect individuals, entities, and the government itself. It can use the 
opportunity to target public service announcements and undertake other forms of 
engagement differentiated between states in compliance and those that are not.  
B. PARTNER WITH STATES THAT ARE IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH 
REAL ID AND/OR ARE STRIVING TO BE IN COMPLIANCE AND 
RECRUIT STATE LEADERS THAT SUPPORT REAL ID AS NATIONAL 
SPOKESPERSONS 
To date, 21 states have been found by DHS to be in full compliance with REAL 
ID. While DHS determines whether states are in compliance, with the exception of early 
efforts by Secretary Chertoff to partner with individual state governors to publicize 
REAL ID efforts in those states, DHS has not given much publicity as states achieve 
compliance. Instead, it has remained relatively neutral, and has acted as the arbitrator of 
compliance efforts, and occasionally, issuing a quiet press release on compliance updates. 
DHS should take a more active and publicly visible role in marking the achievements of 
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states that have reached the compliance milestone. Rather than letting those states 
announce their own compliance milestones, DHS should appear alongside state officials, 
and entities like AAMVA, and CSDL, to mark those achievements and use the 
opportunity to explain why the achievement matters.  
C. DHS SHOULD DISPEL MYTHS ASSOCIATED WITH REAL ID AND 
ACTIVELY RESPOND TO CRITICS 
DHS should take a page from the State of Delaware, and affirmatively address 
criticisms of REAL ID, and seek to dispel myths that have colored public perceptions 
relating to compliance with REAL ID. Given the current atmosphere with concerns about 
government activities affecting citizens, DHS has an opportunity to engage in ways that 
dispel myths, provides information to the public, and hopefully, increases public trust in 
government officials and programs. It should also enlist state leaders like Jennifer Cohan 
who have proven to be effective and credible spokespersons for how their states 
successfully achieved compliance and what outcomes and benefits have been seen by 
compliant states. DHS officials could, for example, appear at think tank discussions, hold 
press conferences with state officials, publish editorials, and make public appearances in 
states where implementation efforts are underway, as well as in states where 
controversies over compliance continue to exist.  
D. UNDERTAKE ANNUAL REPORTING ON STATE PROGRESS ON REAL 
ID AND OUTCOMES WITHIN INDIVIDUAL STATES 
This thesis has discussed DHS’ August 2012 Report on State Progress on REAL 
ID, which was required by Congress. The report provided an excellent overview of DHS 
efforts in furtherance of REAL ID, including high-level discussion of tools and funding 
made available to states. It also served as an update for Congress on where the various 
states stood relative to full or material compliance with REAL ID. As useful as this report 
was, it was only produced one time, in fulfillment of a congressional requirement to 
report on state progress. It is recommended that DHS voluntarily produce this report on 
an annual basis, release it publicly, through a press conference and press release, and post 
the report on it website. It should also consider preparing more detailed annexes that 
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could be published as part of the annual report addressing distinct aspects of REAL ID 
implementation, to include issues, such as each states’ compliance status, grant 
applications sought and awarded to states, ancillary effects of REAL ID implementation, 
such as state reporting on attempts to procure state identification document through fraud, 
and updated information on the effects of DHS’ phased enforcement efforts. The 
information itself would serve to inform the public, allow states to see how they compare 
to other jurisdictions relative to REAL ID compliance, and demonstrate to Congress how 
grants are being allocated. Additional items could probably be reported in the monthly 
report, but the idea is to have DHS inform the public, the states, and Congress through 
ongoing reporting on progress being made on REAL ID implementation.  
E. USE ENFORCEMENT AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO PERSUADE AND 
BUILD ALLIANCES AND AVOID DEEPENING DIVISIONS, WHILE 
PREPARING FOR LITIGATION 
In December 2013, DHS announced it was beginning its phased enforcement of 
REAL ID, and would begin rejecting driver’s licenses and state identification documents 
from non-REAL ID compliant states, beginning in April 2014. While the initial 
consequences would be mild, they would gradually increase toward the restriction of 
most concern, access to commercial airline flights, with that consequence commencing 
no sooner than 2016. Undoubtedly, any instance of enforcement will result in a period of 
publicity related to such event. DHS should not avoid publicity but should again use it as 
an opportunity to educate the public again. It should also take it as an opportunity to work 
with the affected state to offer assistance, and federal funding to ease the state’s 
compliance burden and achieve compliance. 
Along with enforcement is likely to come additional litigation. Surprisingly, little 
litigation appears to have been instituted against REAL ID, yet when citizens of non-
compliant states begin to be affected by DHS enforcement efforts, it is likely that 
individuals or states will file lawsuits to prevent the consequences to holders of non-
compliant licenses. DHS is better off addressing each situation in a way that will avoid 
litigation while focusing efforts on assisting the state to come into compliance, but it is 
likely that at least one of these actions will begin to proceed through the courts. It is 
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important that DHS, and the Department of Justice, vigorously defend against that 
litigation, or DHS risks having the system of secure identification unravel.  
F. COMMIT TO REAL ID, AND SHOW THAT COMMITMENT THROUGH 
ACTIVE ASSISTANCE AND FUNDING 
DHS can show its commitment thorough its defense against litigation as discussed 
in the preceding section. In addition, it should show its commitment to resist efforts, such 
as those that occurred in 2009, to pursue alternative legislation to REAL ID, such as that 
represented by PASS ID that loosened many of the requirements of REAL ID, which was 
described by one commenter as “dumbing down” the REAL ID requirements. While it 
seems unlikely to occur this many years into REAL ID implementation efforts, to do so 
would inject additional confusion into the understanding of states as to the requirements 
while likely introducing documents that have much less rigorous issuance standards, and 
thus, jeopardizing security.  
One powerful motivator DHS continues to possess to show its commitment to 
states and the situation of the states is to continue to award grants to states for efforts 
related to REAL ID compliance, and actively to seek additional funding from Congress 
for such efforts.  
G. IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
Achieving full implementation of REAL ID will, first and foremost, contribute to 
greater assurance in knowing the true identity of individuals acquiring and using state 
driver’s license and identification documents. In turn, it will help to strengthen national 
security efforts by helping to identify terrorists and individuals with criminal 
backgrounds who seek to embed themselves in the United States without having federal, 
or state and local governments, and individuals with whom they interact, learn their true 
identities. It will give greater assurance that those who seek to avail themselves of the 
activities currently identified as “federal official purpose” have legitimate aims in 
accessing those federal services. It will potentially help to control illegal migration and 
residency in states that adhere to REAL ID requirements, as one of those requirements is 
that the states verify the status of individuals in the United States to limit issuance of 
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REAL ID compliant documentation to those individuals authorized to remain in the 
United States. Therefore, individuals who are unlawfully residing in the United States 
would not be eligible for REAL ID compliant licenses, and at best, would be issued 
driver’s licenses or identification cards that have only limited use, and are unable to be 
used for federal official purposes. 
Various potential impacts and measures of success are possible, depending on the 
position and interests of those affected. Success should give greater assurance to 
government, business, and individuals that people with whom they interact are who they 
say they are, and in turn, should have an effect on reducing activities and crimes 
associated with hiding an individual’s identity. These beneficial effects could range from 
a reduction in terrorism, reductions in crimes against government entities, and against 
individuals. It would help law enforcement identify individuals who have been evading 
detection and capture using fraudulent documents. 
Success initially can be measured quite simply by DHS reports as to how many 
states have been determined to be in full compliance with the provisions of REAL ID. 
DHS issues the reports periodically, and should continue to issue them, but in a more 
public manner than is currently the case. The ultimate measure of success by this 
standard is having DHS determine that all 56 jurisdictions subject to REAL ID are in full 
compliance. In other less objective ways, success may be more difficult to measure. Part 
of the intended purposes of the law and its implementation is that it will serve as a 
deterrent to the use of fraudulent identities and documents, and thus to some extent, its 
effects are in the absence of certain events or occurrence of certain phenomenon. Success 
can, however, be measured in ways, such as detecting the trend over time in attempts to 
secure state driver’s licenses and identification documents through the use of fraudulent 
documents, through statistics showing hits against items like the SSA’s Death Master 
File, which would reveal attempts to present documents (birth certificates) belonging to 
already deceased individuals. It could also be measured by reductions in identity theft 
related crimes in states that achieved full compliance, as opposed to states that have not 
come into full compliance. 
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The risks associated with implementing the recommendations of the thesis are 
relatively few. One risk may perhaps be that if additional funding is needed to achieve 
full compliance, that in this partisan atmosphere, it will not be possible to achieve 
consensus for additional funding. As a result, in the course of discussing the need for 
additional funding, some members of Congress would seek to scale back the provisions 
of REAL ID, and perhaps even seeking to revive inadequate alternatives to REAL ID, 
such as the Pass ID legislation promoted by DHS early in the Obama administration. 
Such legislation would be inadequate to obtain the security and law enforcement, and 
individual identity security benefits that REAL ID seeks to bring about. 
The payoffs would be that the federal government, in facilitating access to those 
activities deemed to be federal official purposes under the act, would have greater 
assurances that the documents presented reflect the actual identity of the individual 
presenting them, and that the document was legitimately obtained. It would mean greater 
security in the transactions of individuals with the government, with business institutions, 
and with each other. It could help deter and address identity and identity theft related 
crime. A measure of success representing the results and benefits of REAL ID 
implementation would be the effect of REAL ID on identity theft. This success could 
encompass the tracking of data and publication of reports by the federal government or 
other entities showing whether REAL ID has resulted in reductions in identity theft, and 
other identity related crime and fraud, in states that have come into full compliance with 
REAL ID. 
The costs of implementing REAL ID have not been insubstantial, and are one of 
the reasons states are opposed to REAL ID. The DHS estimate in the Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking was projected to be $7.88 billion over 10 years, and the total undiscounted, 
11-year cost of the final rule was estimated by DHS to be $9.9 billion.499 However, while 
the costs are substantial, the potential savings and reduction in losses due to identity theft 
and related offenses are substantially higher. For example, it is estimated that in 2010, 
losses to individuals from identity theft reached $37 billion.500 It is unclear to what extent 
499 Department of Homeland Security, Final Rule. 
500 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Driver’s License Security. 
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implementing the recommendations proposed by this thesis will add to, or reduce those 
implementation costs. However, it seems logical that proceeding with efficient 
implementation now, across states, will avoid incurring even higher costs associated with 
delayed implementation, such as those arising from changing technology, and 
uncoordinated efforts.  
How long it takes to achieve full implementation by the states depends on various 
factors. Probably the largest driver will be the willingness of DHS to begin enforcing a 
firm deadline for the states to come into full compliance. DHS has extended that deadline 
several times, and after the last extension, which expired in January 2013, DHS provided 
a temporary deferment to states not in compliance and announced that in the fall of 2013, 
it would roll out a schedule of phased enforcement.501 That schedule was finally released 
in December 2013 with the initial enforcement measures, which limit access to DHS 
facilities, just beginning. It is hoped that DHS in signaling its intention to pursue 
enforcement, can persuade states that have been postponing complying with REAL ID, to 
do so. That tactic will work for some, but not all states that have not come into full 
compliance.  
The other factor that will affect the implementation will be the availability of 
funding at the state level, as well as the availability of Congressional appropriations and 
DHS grants to assist states with defraying the costs of implementation. A goal of 
publishing this thesis is to drive the dialogue among, and between those within state and 
federal legislatures and those responsible for allocating federal grants, to make funding 
available to facilitate full implementation.  
As noted, the ultimate measure of success is straightforward. It is when DHS 
determines that all states and territories subject to REAL ID requirements have come into 
full compliance with the federal standards for the issuance of state driver’s license and 
identity documents. To date, only 21 jurisdictions have been found to be in full 
compliance with 35 others in various stages of compliance. Until then, the regular 
501 Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Determines 13 States Meet REAL ID Standards,” 
accessed December 2, 2013, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/12/20/dhs-determines-13-states-meet-real-id-
standards. 
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addition to the list of compliant jurisdictions, through regular and consistent reporting by 
DHS, perhaps on a quarterly basis of state found to be compliance, could be 
implemented. Another measure of interim success would be the roll out of phased 
consequences for states that remain non-compliant. While states are not required to come 
into compliance, no incentive exists for states to come into compliance if their citizens 
are in no better position in terms of access to the activities deemed federal official 
purposes, if consequences are not enforced for non-compliant states.  
On a more fundamental level, it should be acknowledged that REAL ID 
represents an increasing trend and desire, particularly post-9/11, to address the “problem 
of identification” and satisfy the “persistent impulse to identify individuals with recourse 
to official records” largely because of a desire to “establish a relationship of trust between 
individuals and the institutions with which they interact in their daily lives.” A stated by 
one researcher who has studied REAL ID:  
. . . the scale of modern society is such that institutions cannot possibly 
know each individual on a personal basis and thus they require some form 
of confirmation that establishes that individuals are who they claim to be. 
Individuals themselves must establish their consistent identity over time 
and across distance for their own well-being.502 
REAL ID can be seen as promoting the security of society, and in addition, improving the 
well being of individuals through its efforts to improve the security and reliability of state 
identity documents. Looked at presently, REAL ID “outlines a desired policy outcome 
rather than actually existing administrative system.”503 Whether, and when that desired 
policy outcome becomes an existing, fully functioning system remains to be seen. 
However, after nearly nine years, the end of the REAL ID journey is within sight. 
502 Gates, “The United States REAL ID Act and the Securitization of Identity,” in Playing the Identity 
Card Surveillance, Security and Identification in Global Perspective, 220. 
503 Ibid., 226. 
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504 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 44. 
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